North Dakota Supreme Court Review by North Dakota Law Review Associate Editors
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 66 Number 4 Article 11 
1990 
North Dakota Supreme Court Review 
North Dakota Law Review Associate Editors 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
North Dakota Law Review Associate Editors (1990) "North Dakota Supreme Court Review," North Dakota 
Law Review: Vol. 66 : No. 4 , Article 11. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol66/iss4/11 
This Supreme Court Review is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly 
Commons. For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
NORTH DAKOTA SUPREME COURT REVIEW
The Supreme Court Review briefly summarizes the important
decisions rendered by the North Dakota Supreme Court. The pur-
pose of the Review is to indicate cases of first impression and cases
that significantly affect earlier interpretations of North Dakota
Law.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CHOUKALOS V. NORTH DAKOTA STATE PERSONNEL BD.
In Choukalos v. N.D. State Personnel Bd.,' the State Personnel
Board and the North Dakota Insurance Commissioner appealed a
district court judgment that reversed the board's decision uphold-
ing the termination of Richard Choukalos as an employee in the
insurance department, ordered his reinstatement, remanded to
determine back pay, and awarded Choukalos attorney fees and
costs. 2 Choukalos cross-appealed, claiming that the board's find-
ings and conclusions were unsupported.3
Following a performance evaluation, the insurance commis-
sioner notified Choukalos that his position in the commissioner's
office was to be terminated. 4 He was given a written notice of ter-
mination accompanied with the reasons for termination and
1. 429 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1988).
2. Choukalos v. N.D. State Personnel Bd., 429 N.W.2d 441, 441 (N.D. 1988).
3. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at 441.
4. Id. at 442.
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informed of an opportunity to respond in writing.' Choukalos
requested a hearing by the State Personnel Board.6 When the
board upheld the termination, Choukalos appealed to the district
court.7 After remanding for preparation of findings, conclusions,
and a decision under section 28-32-13 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code, the district court reversed the board's decision and
ordered corrective measures.' On appeal, the board argued that
the findings of fact were supported by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that Choukalos was an unsatisfactory employee, and that
attorney fees should not have been ordered when the board was
substantially justified.9
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that review of
administrative agency decisions was limited.' 0 The court must
consider whether: 1) the findings of fact are supported by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence; 2) the conclusions of law are sus-
tained by the findings of fact; and 3) the agency decision is
supported by conclusions of law."'
The board found that Choukalos' failures at work were
"cause" supporting the termination decision.' 2  The supreme
court ruled that these findings of fact were supported by the pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 3 Furthermore, the court found that
the board's decision to sustain the termination was supported by
conclusions of law. 1 4
The district court had reversed the board when it determined
that the board did not comply with portions of the North Dakota
Personnel Policies Manual. 5 However, these policies were not
raised as issues in the administrative hearing and, thus, were not




8. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-13, (1974 and Supp. 1989Xproviding that the
agency shall make and state concisely its findings of facts and separate conclusions and
deliver notice to all parties).
9. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at 443.
10. Id. See, e.g., In re Prettyman, 410 N.W.2d 533, 535-36 (N.D. 1987Xciting Triangle
Oilfield Services, Inc. v. Hagen, 373 N.W.2d 413 (N.D. 1985)).
11. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at 443 (citing Am. State Bank, Etc. v. State Banking Bd.,
289 N.W.2d 222, 225-26 (N.D. 1980)).
12. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at 444. See N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 59.5-03-03-05
(1985Xauthorizing an "appointing authority,... [to] dismiss an employee for cause") and
N.D. ADMIN. CODE § 59.5-03-03-02 (1985 and amended 1989Xdefining "cause" as "conduct
related to the employee's job duties, job performance, or working relationships which is
detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of the service..
13. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at 444.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. (quoting County of Stutsman v. State Historical Soc'y, 371 N.W.2d 321, 329
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findings and conclusions did not comply with section 28-32-13 of
the North Dakota Century Code.' 7 However, the supreme court
stated that findings are adequate when the reviewing court can
understand the basis of the agency's decision as it did in this case.18
The judgment of the district court was reversed and the board's
decision affirmed. 9
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
MONTANA-DAKOTA UTIL. V. PUB. SERVICE COMM'N
In Montana-Dakota Util. v. Pub. Service Comm%'n, 2 both par-
ties appealed a district court judgment that affirmed in part and
reversed in part the results of a hearing held by the North Dakota
Public Service Commission (PSC) in response to a rate request by
Montana-Dakota Utilities Company (MDU).21 The PSC appealed
the reversal of disallowance of part of MDU's expenditures for coal
that had been purchased from its subsidiary, the Knife River Coal
Mining Company (Knife River).' MDU cross-appealed from the
affirmation of "PSC's restatement of MDU's unamortized invest-
ment-tax-credit balance." 3
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the PSC
acted within its authority when it determined that Knife River
made an unreasonable profit in selling coal to MDU. 24 The PSC is
authorized under section 49-02-02(6) of the North Dakota Century
Code to disallow or reduce purchasing expenditures by a public
(N.D. 1985X"[o]n appeal from an administrative agency decision, the general rule is that
the reviewing court will confine its review to those issues which were raised before the
agency")).
17. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at 44. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-13. For a description
of § 28-32-13, see supra note 8.
18. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at 444 (quoting Hystad v. Indust. Comm'n, 389 N.W.2d
590, 597 (N.D. 1986X"The findings of an administrative agency are adequate when they
enable the reviewing court to understand the basis of the agency's decision")). Also, giving
Choukalos only the first page of the board's findings instead of an entire copy did not render
the findings of fact and conclusions of law legally insufficient. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at
444.
19. Choukalos, 429 N.W.2d at 444.
20. 431 N.W.2d 276 (N.D. 1988).
21. Montana-Dakota Util. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 431 N.W.2d 276, 278 (N.D. 1988).
MDU's initial application to the PSC requested $11,097,000 in additional revenue. id. The
request was reduced to $8,343,000, and the PSC authorized a rate yielding additional
annual revenue of $4,378,000. Id.
22. Montana-Dakota UHl., 431 N.W.2d at 278.
23. Id.
24. Id. Subsequently, the PSC reduced MDU's fuel expenditures by $686,000 and coal
stocks by $77,000. Id.
756 [Vol. 66:753
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utility if the subsidiary made unreasonable profits from the sale.2
The PSC used a rate-of-return analysis to determine that
excessive profits had accrued.2 6 MDU argued that a "price" test
based on fair market value should be used. However, the court
noted that there were no grounds for limiting the PSC's methodol-
ogy under section 49-02-02(6) or in case law.' Also, other jurisdic-
tions have similarly concluded that regulatory commissions may
select their methods as long as the results are not unjust or arbi-
trary.29 In this case, the PSC determined that a rate-of-return
analysis was more appropriate than a price test because of the lack
of competition. 0
MDU further asserted that deriving a reasonable rate-of-
return figure from a cash-flow model was incorrect because it com-
pared unregulated to regulated businesses.3' However, the North
Dakota Supreme Court noted that in such a technical area an
administrative agency's expert judgment is entitled to great
deference.3 2
In response to MDU's cross-appeal, the court determined that
PSC's restatement of MDU's unamortized investment-tax-credit
balance to reflect a 26-year period, rather than the 20-year period
25. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 1 49-02-02(6) (1978 and Supp. 1989). Section 4902-02(6)
provides:
49-02-02. Powers of public service commission with reference to public utilities.
The commission shall have power to:
6. Require, in its discretion, proof that no unreasonable profit is made in the
sale of material to or services supplied for any public utility by any firm or
corporation owned or controlled directly or indirectly by the public utility or any
affiliate, subsidiary, parent company, associate, or any corporation whose
controlling stockholders are also controlling stockholders of the public utility,
before permitting the value of said materials or services to be included in
valuations or cost of operations for ratemaking purposes. If unreasonable profits
have been made in any such transactions, valuations of said materials and
services may be reduced accordingly.
Id.
26. Montana-Dakota Util., 431 N.W.2d at 278. The PSC agreed with the analysis of an
expert witness that the rate of return was excessive. Id.
27. Id. MDU asserted that the court's decision in Application of Montana-Dakota Util.
Co., 102 N.w.2d 329 (N.D. 1960), mandated the use of a "price" test. Montana-Dakota
Util, 431 N.W.2d at 278.
28. Montana-Dakota Util, 431 N.W.2d at 279. (For the text of the N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 49-02-02(6) see supra note 6.)
29. Montana-Dakota Util., 431 N.W.2d at 279 (citing Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v.
Montana Dep't of Pub. Serv. Regulation 752 P.2d 155 (Mont. 1988); Application of
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co., 278 N.W.2d 189 (S.D. 1979Xallowing a rate-of-return analysis
where a subsidiary has made unreasonable profits selling materials to the regulated
business)).
30. Montana-Dakota Util., 431 N.W.2d at 279-80.
31. Id. at 280. PSC compared Knife River's rate of return with a reasonable rate-of-
return which an expert derived from a discounted cash-flow model instead of using the
actual rate of return. Id.
32. Id. (citing Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. PSC, 413 N.W.2d 308 (N.D. 1987)).
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which had been elected, was incorrect.33 If rates are unreasona-
ble, the PSC can only compensate by establishing new future
rates.34 The reinstatement of the unamortized investment-tax-
credit to reflect amortization over 26 years constituted retroactive
ratemaking.35 The PSC can only adjust the amortization schedule
on MDU's remaining unamortized balance. 36 Both the appeal and
cross-appeal were reversed and remanded.
APPEAL AND ERROR
CLUB BROADWAY, INC. v. BROADWAY PARK
In Club Broadway, Inc. v. Broadway Park,38 a North Dakota
Civil Procedure Rule 54(b) certification was held to be granted
improvidently by the trial court in an action for fraud, conversion
and interference with contractual relations.39
Mark Kiefer, sole officer, director, and shareholder of Club
Broadway, Inc. sued Broadway Park, a limited partnership which
owned the buildings in which Club Broadway was located, its
officers and directors, and also sued former employees of Club
Broadway.40 Kiefer and Club Broadway, Inc. contended that the
defendants obtained Club Broadway property through fraud,
deceit, converted membership lists and interfered with Club
Broadway's customers.41 They also contended that the Defend-
ant's Broadway Park, which now operates a health club, interfered
with Club Broadway's contracts with its employees.42
Two of the officers of Broadway Park Limited Partnership,
Calvin Fercho and Scott Fridlund, were granted a summary judg-
ment and dismissed from the action by the trial court.4 3 Kiefer
and Club Broadway, Inc. sought a Rule 54(b) certification of the
summary judgment so they could appeal the dismissal of Fercho
and Fridlund instead of waiting until after the trial of the other
33. Montana-Dakota Util., 431 N.W.2d at 280.
34. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-03 (1978); Quad County Community Action
Agency v. Elkin, 315 N.W.2d 665 (N.D. 1982)).
35. Montana-Dakota UtiL, 431 N.W.2d at 280. In making the adjustment, the PSC
increased the unamortized balance by $432,000 and reduced its current rate base by the
same amount. Id.
36. Id. at 281.
37. Id.
38. 443 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1989).
39. Club Broadway, Inc. v. Broadway Park, 443 N.W.2d 919, 920 (N.D. 1989).






defendants." The trial court agreed and granted the Rule 54(b)
certification, stating that a Rule 54(b) certification would prevent
duplicate discovery and a second trial.45 Kiefer and Club Broad-
way, Inc., appealed the summary judgment to the North Dakota
Supreme Court.46  Fercho and Fridlund cross-appealed and
argued that the trial court, in granting the Rule 54(b) certification,
abused the court's discretion.47
The supreme court noted that in Peterson v. Zerr48 it ruled
that Rule 54(b) certifications should be used in the "infrequent
harsh case."'49 The court stated that since anyone could contend
that a second trial may be required if a district court is reversed on
issues decided on summary judgment, more was needed and that
in itself is not a sufficient reason.5°
The court determined that in Club Broadway, Inc. most of the
adjudicated claims against Fercho and Fridlund were related to
the unadjudicated claims pending against the remaining defend-
ants.51 Additionally, the court noted that since the alleged con-
duct was so interrelated, the court would be required to review
the same or similar factual situations in subsequent appeals after
the lower court made a decision with regard to the remaining
defendants.52
The supreme court concluded that there were no facts pres-
ent making this an "infrequent harsh case" requiring a Rule 54(b)
certification.5 3 Therefore, the supreme court determined the trial
court abused its discretion in granting the Rule 54(b) certification
and dismissed the appeal.54
44. Id. See N.D.R. CIV. P. 54(b) (judgment involving multiple parties).
45. Club Broadway, Inc., 443 N.W.2d at 921. The trial court stated that because the
judgment was a summary judgment that needed to be certified, if the North Dakota
Supreme Court would review it and find the summary judgment not appropriate, a second
trial would be necessary, since issues involving those defendants were different than those
in the first trial. Id.
46. Id. at 920.
47. Id. at 921.
48. 443 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 1989).
49. Club Broadway, Inc., 443 N.W.2d at 921 (citing Peterson v. Zerr, 443 N.W.2d 293
(N.D. 1989)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 922.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Club Broadway, Inc., 443 N.W.2d at 922. Justice Meschke dissented, just as he had
in Peterson v. Zerr. Id. (Meschke, J., dissenting). He contended that the majority reviewed
the trial court's reasons individually, instead of reviewing them as a whole. Id. at 923. The
dissent emphasized the certainty needed in Rule 54(b) situations and stated that it was
designed for certainty and clarity. Id. The dissent concluded that the majority had
destroyed the certainty by limiting Rule 54(b). Id.
1990] 759
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ARBITRATIONS AND AWARD
BACKES V. BYRON
In Backes v. Byron, 5 the State Highway Commissioner
appealed a district court order denying the North Dakota State
Highway Department's motion for a preliminary injunction
against a construction company.56 The North Dakota Supreme
Court held that the appeal was moot.5 7
Byron's Construction was awarded a $2.3 million contract
from the North Dakota State Highway Department to rebuild a
segment of state highway.M  The Highway Department accepted
the reconstruction project after it had been finished by Byron's
Construction.5 9 The company filed a claim for an equitable adjust-
ment based on total costs incurred by Byron's Construction during
the reconstruction project.' The North Dakota Highway Depart-
ment denied the claim for equitable relief submitted by Byron's
Construction.61
Byron's Construction fied a demand on the Highway Depart-
ment for arbitration of all the claims and controversies. 2 The
arbitrators issued a decision dismissing all the claims against the
Highway Department, and this decision was confirmed by the dis-
trict court.63 Byron's Construction served a second demand for
arbitration on the Highway Department and asked the district
court to appoint arbitrators.' The Highway Department
answered with a motion seeking a preliminary injunction staying
the second arbitration. 5
The district court denied the Highway Department's motion,
concluding that there were issues of fact for the second arbitration
panel to determine.6 The North Dakota Highway Department
appealed the denial of the motion for a preliminary injunction. 7
55. 443 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1989).
56. Backes v. Byron, 443 N.W.2d 621, 622 (N.D. 1989).





62. Backes, 443 N.W.2d at 623. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-02-27 (1987Xa party
desiring arbitration shall submit a written demand on the other party).
63. Id. The district court's confirmation of the arbitrator's decision was also appealed




67. Backes, 443 N.W.2d at 621. The Highway Department raised the single issue on




The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the High-
way Department's appeal became moot as a second arbitration
hearing had already been held and a decision rendered.6 There-
fore, the appeal was dismissed.8 9
ARREST
STATE V. ZEARLEY
In State v. Zearley,7 ° it was held that the reasonableness of a
pocket search must be ascertained separately from the circum-
stances surrounding an accompanying patdown search.71
Drug Enforcement agents searched the Metzner home for
drugs pursuant to a no-knock search warrant.72 The agents
encountered Jeff Zearley at the home and conducted a patdown
search of Zearley followed by a pocket search.73 A drug pipe and
packets of methamphetamine were found as a result of the
search. 4 The agent who conducted the search later testified that
he thought that the pipe was a knife.75
The trial court ruled that the evidence was inadmissible
because there was no basis for searching the defendant and held
that the search violated the North Dakota Constitution on reason-
able searches and seizures.78
The state appealed, asserting that the patdown was a reason-
able search for weapons and the pocket search was reasonable to
determine whether the object felt by the agent in the patdown
search was a weapon.7 7
The North Dakota Supreme Court, citing past case law
rejecting the concept that an officer executing a search warrant
could also frisk all persons present for weapons, noted that a
patdown search could be conducted if there was a valid concern
for safety.78
The court found that the agent's patdown of Zearley was justi-
68. Id.
69. Id. The court noted that if the case was of great public interest and the merits of
controversy so unsettled, a determination of the issue would be rendered. Id. However,
the issues involved in this case were not of that degree of importance. Id.
70. 444 N.W.2d 353 (N.D. 1989).
71. State v. Zearley, 444 N.W.2d 353, 359 (N.D. 1989),
72. Zearley, 444 N.W.2d at 354.
73. Id. at 355.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Zearley, 444 N.W.2d at 355. See U.S. CONST. amend IV and N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8.
77. Id. at 355.
78. Id. See State v. Grant, 361 N.W.2d 243 (N.D. 1985Xperson searched when owner's
home was searched with warrant).
1990]
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fiable .7 The patdown was a valid search for safety reasons.1s The
court stated that while the patdown may be reasonable for safety
reasons, the pocket search is distinct, and must also be reason-
able." l The supreme court concluded that the patdown was rea-
sonable, but could not ascertain from the record whether the
pocket search was reasonable."2
The supreme court held that where a patdown search reveals
an object which could reasonably be a weapon, a pocket search is
reasonable to determine if in fact the object is a weapon. 3 The
North Dakota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's ruling that
the patdown of Zearley was unreasonable and remanded the case
to determine whether the agent had reasonable grounds to con-
duct a pocket search.84
ATTORNEY & CLIENT
DISCIPLINARY BD. OF SUPREME C. v. DISsELHORST
In Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Ct. v. Disselhorst,85 Thomas
M. Disselhorst, a Bismarck attorney, received a public reprimand
for failing to attend to bankruptcy and child custody matters and
failing to communicate with his cient.m
Disselhorst represented Kevin Brown in divorce proceedings,
accepted partial payment regarding a bankruptcy in 1985, and
agreed to represent him in a child custody matter in March of
1986.87 Brown had moved to Texas in 1986, and Brown's parents
acted on his behalf regarding legal matters with Disselhorst.as
On April 25, 1986, after attempts to contact Disselhorst by
phone, Brown's mother went to Disselhorst's office and gave him a
check for $200 for the child custody matter and the bankruptcy.89
As a result of Disselhorst's lack of progress on these matters,
Brown's parents tried to contact Disselhorst repeatedly, and Dis-
selhorst failed to respond to any attempt to contact him.90
79. Zearley, 444 N.W.21 at 356.
80. Id. at 357.
81. Id.
82. Zearley, 444 N.W.2d at 359.
83. Id. at 358 (citing People v. Thurman, 209 Cal. App. 3d 817, _ 257 Cal. Rptr. 417,
521 (1989)).
84. Zearley, 444 N.W.2d at 359.
85. 444 N.W.2d 334 (N.D. 1989).
86. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Ct. v. Disselhorst, 444 N.W.2d 334, 338 (N.D. 1989).
87. Dzsselhorst, 444 N.W.2d at 335.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. Disselhorst did not respond to the messages left on his answering machine and
did not answer a certified letter. Id.
762 [Vol. 66:753
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Brown retained another attorney in July of 1986 and dis-
missed Disselhorst in September of 1986.1 After repeated
requests for the documents from Brown's divorce proceeding, Dis-
selhorst finally sent the Browns the documents in January of
1987.92 Disselhorst also returned $600 that had previously been
paid.9 3
A Hearing Panel of the Disciplinary Board found that Dis-
selhorst violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by:
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrep-
resentation; neglecting legal matters; and intentionally failing to
seek the lawful objective of his client and failing to carry out a
contract of employment. 4 The hearing panel recommended that
Disselhorst be publicly reprimanded. 5
Before the North Dakota Supreme Court, Disselhorst took
exception to some of the findings and the public reprimand and
contended that his health problems mitigated his conduct to some
extent."
In reviewing the hearing panel's recommendation, the North
Dakota Supreme Court found that although Disselhorst's conduct
was attributable to health problems, they did not justify Dis-
selhorst's failure to tend to the matters entrusted to him by
Brown.9 7 The court also held that Disselhorst's conduct was negli-
gent enough to warrant a public reprimand."
However, the supreme court determined that although Dis-
selhorst's conduct was negligent it was not intentional, thus not
violative of Canon 7, DR 7-101(AX 1), (2), (3) of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility." The court additionally found no evidence
that Disselhorst intentionally misled or deceived his clients."°
91. Id.
92. Disselhorst, 444 N.W.2d at 336.
93. Id. Disselhorst paid $400 in April of 1988, and $200 in May of 1988 and promised
to pay interest on the $600 in the amount of $151.20. Id.
94. Id. See N.D. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTY DR 1-102(AX4) (deeds of
misconduct); DR 6-101(AX3) (neglect of legal matters): and DR 7-101(AX1), (2), (3)
(intentional misconduct).
95. Disselhorst, 444 N.W.2d at 336.
96. Id. at 336-37. Disselhorst was diagnosed as having hypothyroidism in 1987. Id. at
337. A letter from Disselhorst's doctor in evidence indicated that Disselhorst could have
suffered from symptoms that would have affected his intellectual functions and personality.
Id. Disselhorst contended that he suffered from hypothyroidism prior to diagnosis,
although he had no evidence of his prior condition. Id.
97. Id. at 337-38. The supreme court reviews disciplinary proceedings against an
attorney de novo on the record. Id. at 335.
98. Id. at 338.
99. Id.
100. Disselhorst, 444 N.W.2d at 338. Justice VandeWalle concurred specially, noting
that the panel indicated that "health problems... were mitigating circumstances in the
misconduct." Id. The concurrence stated that the supreme court should have been
1990] 763
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DISCIPLINARY BD. OF SUPREME CT. V. PETERSON
In Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Ct. v. Peterson, 10 an attor-
ney's actions warranted a public reprimand, suspension for one
year and before reinstatement, a successful completion of the eth-
ics portion of the bar examination. 0 A hearing panel of the Disci-
plinary Board of the Supreme Court recommended the sanctions,
and Peterson appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, con-
tending that he was denied due process.10 3
Peterson's first contention was that he was denied due process
when his request for a continuance was denied. 10 4 The continu-
ance was filed the Friday before a hearing set for Monday, April
28, 1988.105 The brief in support of the motion for a continuance
elaborated on medical problems suffered by both Peterson and his
attorney.' °6 The court noted that although it was known then
about Peterson's attorney's serious illness, the extent of the seri-
ousness of the illness was not known to the hearing panel. 10 7
The supreme court found that although a continuance will be
granted if supported by a plausible medical reason, Peterson's
request was not supported by a physician's letter or any such plau-
sible medical reason.'08 Additionally, the supreme court deter-
mined that the hearing panel did not err in not granting a
continuance because by appearing at the hearing Peterson waived
any objection to the denial. 1°9
Peterson's second argument was that the complainant's
absence at the hearing constituted a denial of due process.' 10 The
complainant's deposition was admitted instead which Peterson
argued was a denial of due process. "' Finding no error, the court
determined that the deposition was properly admitted since the
attendance of a Minnesota resident could not be compelled by the
informed whether or not the Panel would have recommended a stronger discipline if
Disselhorst had not had mitigating health problems. Id.
101. 446 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1989).
102. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Ct. v. Peterson, 446 N.W.2d 254, 257 (N.D. 1989).
103. Peterson, 446 N.W.2d at 255.
104. Id.
105. Id. The grounds on which the motion for continuance were as follows: 1) medical
reasons, 2) time constraints of the counsel; and 3) a new matter had arisen since the setting
of the hearing date. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Peterson, 446 N.W.2d at 255. See Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Ct. v. Ellis, 418
N.W.2d 788 (N.D. 1989Xsupreme court granted continuance when presented by plausible
medical reason).





hearing panel and Peterson's attorney cross-examined the com-
plainant at the deposition.' 1 2
Finally, Peterson argued that he was denied due process
because a witness subpoenaed by the hearing panel failed to
appear. 1 13 The court found that this argument was without merit
because a party contending deprivation of the right to examine a
witness may not rely on the fact that an adverse party subpoenaed
the witness." 4
The supreme court found clear and convincing evidence that
Peterson never filed an action for which he accepted a fee; that he
entered into business transactions with a client without full disclo-
sure; that he commingled a client's funds with his own; that he
kept incomplete records of the client's properties and funds; and
that Peterson failed to account for an unknown number of valua-
ble coins entrusted to him by the client." 5
The supreme court, therefore, agreed with the hearing
panel's findings of violations of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility and ordered that Peterson be publicly reprimanded, sus-
pended for one year, and before reinstatement, be required to
successfully complete the ethics portion of the bar examination.' 6
MCADAM v. DYNES
In McAdam v. Dynes,117 the North Dakota Supreme Court
determined that an oral agreement over attorney fees between a
lawyer and his client must be proved by the testimony of the par-
ties and that summary judgment was inappropriate to decide dis-
112. Id. at 256. Peterson contended that he was denied due process because his
attorney was not present at the hearing. Id. The court did not agree, finding that Peterson
had the opportunity to be represented and that Peterson in fact did present evidence by
testifying and introducing exhibits. Id.
113. Peterson, 446 N.W.2d at 256.
114. Id. (citing Great Plains Supply Co. v. Erickson, 398 NW.2d 732 (N.D. 1986)).
Peterson argued also that he was denied due process because his attorney failed to file a
brief, but the court did not consider this contention because Peterson furnished no
authority or argument in support. Peterson, 446 N.W.2d at 256.
115. Id. at 257. See N.D. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(AX4)
(lawyer shall not engage in fraudulent conduct); DR 5-104(A) (business transactions are
prohibited with client if differing interests); DR 6-101(AX3) (lawyer shall not neglect a
matter); DR-7-101(AX2) (lawyer shall not fail to carry out a contract); DR 9-102 (depositing
of client funds and maintaining complete records of client funds).
116. Peterson, 446 N.W.2d at 257. Justice VandeWalle dissented, arguing that unless a
procedure requiring a certificate of a physician in order to be granted a continuance on
medical grounds was adopted, Peterson's motion for a continuance should have been
granted. Id. at 259 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting). The dissent found that Peterson's motion
was not frivolous. Id. Additionally, the dissent noted that as a result of Peterson's attorney's
illness he had died. Id. The dissent found that Peterson was denied due process. Id.
117. 442 N.W.2d 914 (N.D. 1989).
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puted facts as to the contract terms. 118
George T. Dynes, an attorney, represented Toby McAdam in
a claim against West River Management for wrongful discharge
under the Fair Labor Standards Act.119 There was no written fee
agreement between Dynes and McAdam.' 0 Eventually, McAdam
and West River Management settled for $15,800.00.11
Dynes received the settlement in two checks and kept
$11,800.00 of it for attorney's fees and out-of-pocket expenses."
McAdam signed the release forms sent by Dynes and endorsed the
checks, receiving a total of $4,000.00.123
McAdam sued Dynes in small claims court, contending that he
believed Dynes represented him on a contingency fee basis.1'
Dynes removed the case to county court and moved for summary
judgment.1l 5 The county court granted the motion, determining
that when McAdam signed the release forms and the settlement
was divided between McAdam and Dynes, the contract was
complete. 12
6
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that an oral agree-
ment must be proved by the testimony of the parties.' 27 The
court noted that the confidential nature of the attorney-client rela-
tionship compelled the court to place attorney-client fee agree-
ments under close scrutiny. 1 28 The court found a genuine issue of
material fact to exist as to what the terms of the agreement were
and reversed the summary judgment and remanded. 2 9
SHARK V. CITY OF FARGO
In Shark v. City of Fargo,3 0 an attorney was limited to fees
only for the amount appropriated by the city for his services.'13
Myer Shark was retained by the City of Fargo to represent the city
118. McAdam v. Dynes, 442 N.w.2d 914, 916 (N.D. 1989).
119. McAdam, 442 N.W.2d at 914.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 914-15.
123. Id. at 915.
124. McAdam, 442 N.W.2d at 915. Although he agreed to the settlement, McAdan
argued that he did not agree to attorney's fees. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. The county court was not willing to undo the completed contract one year
later. Id.
127. Id. at 916.
128. Id. The court noted that the attorney has the burden of showing the fairness of
the agreement. Id.
129. McAdam, 442 N.W.2d at 916.
130. 442 N.W.2d 903 (N.D. 1989).
131. Shark v. City of Fargo, 442 N.W.2d 903, 904 (N.D. 1989).
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in litigation before the Public Service Commission regarding the
natural gas rates charged by Northern States Power. 3 2  As the
litigation progressed, the Fargo City Commission appropriated
amounts to Shark to cover his services.13 3  In his final request
before appeal, Shark asked for an additional $10,000.13' The
Fargo City Commission did not have the money and only appro-
priated $2,500.'13
Shark continued to work on the case even after he exhausted
the appropriated funds.'3 Shark brought suit to recover the
excess fees and the City of Fargo responded, contending that they
had an understanding as to the limitations on Shark's fees.' 3 7
The trial court granted the City of Fargo's motion for sum-
mary judgment, ordering the city to pay Shark all the money it
had appropriated, and Shark appealed.' 38 Shark contended in his
appeal that the city should have plead the "defense of automatic
termination of the retainer" and he argued that a genuine issue of
material fact existed to preclude a summary judgment. 13 9
The North Dakota Supreme Court began its discussion by not-
ing that in Rule 8(c) of the North Dakota Rules of Procedure, an
affirmative defense should be set forth by the defendant in the
answer.140 The court found the city to have adequately set forth
the defense of automatic termination of the retainer in its
answer.
14 1
The court observed that at the meeting where the city com-
missioners made the final appropriation to Shark, the city stated
this to be the final allocation.' 42 Additionally, Shark acknowledged
the final appropriation in a letter to the Fargo City Commission-
ers.143 Thus, the court did not find that a genuine issue of material
132. Shark, 442 N.W.2d at 904.
133. Id. Shark, on behalf of the City of Fargo, prevailed before the Public Service
Commission and before the district court. Id.
134. Id. Shark had been appropriated $15,000 previously by the city. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. In a letter to the commission, Shark stated he could not have "conscientously
[sic] said we had done all possible in this effort" if he had not continued the work. Id. at 907
n.6.
137. Shark, 442 N.W.2d at 905. $16,370 had been paid to Shark by the city. Id. at 904.
The City of Fargo made an offer of judgment of $1,300, which was the difference of the
total appropriation and the money already paid by Fargo. Id. at 905.
138. Id. The City of Fargo was ordered to pay the remaining $1,300 from the
appropriation. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 906.
141. Id.
142. Shark, 442 N.W.2d at 906.
143. Id. at 907.
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fact existed regarding the finality of the appropriation to Shark. 1 44
The supreme court held that the trial court's granting of a
summary judgment was appropriate and affirmed the
judgment.145
BANKS AND BANKING
FIRST NAT'L BANK AND ThUST CO. V. JACOBSEN
in First Nat'l Bank and Trust Co. v. Jacobsen,146 guarantors
Revold and Phyllis Jacobsen appealed a district court summary
judgment which held them "jointly and severally liable to First
National Bank & Trust Company of Williston (The Bank) for
$599,350.95 plus interest, costs and disbursements.' 147
Revold, both personally and as stockholder and director of two
corporations, borrowed money over several years from the
Bank.148 Revold and Phyllis personally guaranteed payment of
the corporation notes, and Phyllis personally guaranteed payment
of Revold's note.149
When all the notes were in default, Revold sold the mineral
interests and the proceeds were applied to his personal indebted-
ness.15 0 The trial court granted summary judgment for the Bank
and held the Jacobsens liable for the remaining notes and
guarantees.'51
An appeal from a summary judgment requires determining
"whether the information provided to the trial court, and viewed
in a light most favorable to the opposing party, precludes the exist-
ence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitles the moving
party to summary judgment as a matter of law."' 55 The Bank pro-
vided a brief, depositions of the Jacobsens, documentary evidence,
and affidavits from Bank officials.' 5 3 The Jacobsens opposed the
summary judgment motion with a brief and personal affidavits. 154
144. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 56 (summary judgment should be granted only when no
genuine issues of material fact exist).
145. Id.
146. 431 N.W.2d 284 (N.D. 1988).
147. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d 284, 285 (N.D. 1988).
148. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 285.
149. Id. One of the personal notes was also secured by a mortgage of mineral interests
owned by Revold. The notes were periodically renewed with no reduction in principal
having occurred.
150. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 285.
151. Id.
152. Id. (citing Binstock v. Tschider, 374 N.W.2d 81 (N.D. 1985)). The movant must
establish that no genuine issue of material fact exists. N.D.R. CIv. P. 56.
153. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 285.
154. Id. at 286.
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Phyllis' affidavits asserted that the guarantees were not explained,
that she did not read or understand them, that she received no
benefit from signing, and that she signed only as a "loyal wife."' 55
Revold's affidavit asserted that he did not benefit from the corpo-
ration loans, that the Bank should have secured additional guaran-
tees, that Revold's interests were not protected, and that his
mineral interests were sold below their fair market value.'5
On appeal, the Jacobsens contended that their indebtedness
was cancelled by accord and satisfaction or by estoppel. 57 More-
over, they assert that genuine issues of material fact existed
regarding whether Revold's liability on the personal note secured
by the mineral interests ceased due to North Dakota's anti-defi-
ciency statutes, whether the Bank failed to satisfy a condition pre-
cedent by not getting additional guarantees from all parties with
corporate responsibilities, whether the Bank misrepresented the
merits of Revold's investments, whether the Bank breached its
fiduciary duty, and whether there was consideration for Phyllis'
guarantees.'-
The supreme court noted that a defense raised in an affidavit
opposing summary judgment, but not pleaded in the answer,
could not be reviewed on appeal unless the answer had been
amended to include the new defense.' 59 "Accord and satisfaction,
estoppel, failure of a condition precedent, misrepresentation and
breach of a fiduciary duty" all constitute " 'an avoidance or affirm-
ative defense"' and should have been pleaded in the Jacobsens'
answer or an amended answer.'1 ° The issue of anti-deficiency stat-
utes was not raised in the district court, hence, as a new issue could
not be raised on appeal.' 61
The Jacobsens further asserted they pleaded "waiver" in their
answer, and that an issue of material fact about accord and satisfac-
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 286.
158. Id. Revold's affidavit claimed that his mineral interests was valued at $650,000
when mortgaged but sold for $56,617.82. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-19-04, 32-19-05,
32-10-06 (1976 and Supp. 1989Xanti-deficiency statutes).
159. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 286. See Northwestern Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of
Fargo v. Biby, 418 N.W.2d 786 (N.D. 1988Xa defense not pleaded in the answer could not
be reviewed on appeal).
160. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 287. See N.D.R. CIV. P. 8(c) (matters constituting an
avoidance or affirmative defense).
161. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 287 (citing Spier v. Power Concrete Inc., 304 N.W.2d 68(N.D. 1981)). See also id. (quoting Kilzer v. Binstock, 339 N.W.2d 569, 572 (N.D. 1983),
citing Rummel v. Rummel, 265 N.W.2d 230, 231 (N.D. 1978)). The fact that the Jacobsens
were represented on appeal by different counsel did not allow them to raise any new issues.
Id.
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tion regarding the sale of the mineral interests should be allowed
because the facts supporting both were the same.' 62 The court,
however, noted that the Jacobsens asserted waiver only in the
court brief and Revold's affidavit and did not connect their factual
assertions to the affirmative defense of waiver pleaded in their
answer.W
In respect to the Jacobsens' argument that there was not con-
sideration for their guarantees, the court noted that not only did
the Jacobsens' written guarantees create a presumption of consid-
eration, but that evidence established that the Jacobsens received
a benefit and the Bank a detriment.16
The district court did not err in granting the Bank's motion
for summary judgment.16 5 The Jacobsens may not raise new issues
on appeal and their remedy was to seek relief under rule 60(b) of
the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure.16
SCHIELE V. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF LINTON
In Schiele v. First National Bank of Linton,167 Edward and
Alice Schiele appealed a district court judgment in which a jury
established the "fair value" of their residential property.)6 The
Schieles had borrowed $135,000 from the First National Bank in
Linton securing the promissory note with a real estate mortgage
on their home and an assignment of their interest as mortgagees in
a farm mortgage.' 69  The Schieles defaulted.17 0  First National
foreclosed and bid $75,000 for the home at the foreclosure sale.' 7 '
162. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 287. Support for the Jacobsens' contention may be found
in Farmers Union Oil Co. v. Maxiner, 376 N.W.2d 43,47 (N.D. 1985Xa new issue was raised
during the appeal that had been based on the same facts as an issue raised in the lower
court).
163. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 288. Factual assertions in a brief do not raise a genuine
issue of material fact. Id. (citing Northwestern Equipment, Inc. v. Badinger, 403 N.W.2d 8,
10 (N.D. 1987)). Because they did not explain the significance of the evidence, they failed
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Id.
164. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 288. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-05-10 (1987Xproviding
-[a] written instrument is presumptive evidence of a consideration").
165. Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 288-89.
166. Id. at 289. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1974Xproviding relief from judgment or
order). Justice Meschke noted that N.D.R. Civ. P. 56(c) does not demand that affidavits
correspond to the pleadings. Justice Meschke noted that N.D.R. Civ. P. 15 encourages a
liberal policy of amended pleadings and suggested that issues obviously raised in affidavits
should be recognized without the formality of a motion to amend. He quoted 6 Moore's
Federal Practice, § 56.11[3] as support for his position: "'Affidavits going beyond the
pleadings may be considered if facts appear in the affidavits which would justify an
amendment."' Jacobsen, 431 N.W.2d at 289 (Meschke, J., concurring and dissenting).
167. 436 N.W.2d 248 (N.D., 1989).
168. Schiele v. First Nat'l Bank of Linton, 436 N.W.2d 248, 248 (N.D. 1989).





The Schieles then contended that their debt was satisfied and
requested that the trial court order return of the farm mort-
gage.'7 2 The trial court, however, granted summary judgment to
First National, and the Schieles appealed. 17 3
In that appeal, the supreme court held that First National was
entitled to foreclose on the farm mortgage collateral to satisfy the
remaining debt, but that the fair value of the home had to be
determined by a jury in order to compute the remaining debt. 174
On remand, the trial court defined "fair value" in its jury instruc-
tions as closely synonymous with "fair market value."'1 7 5  On
appeal, the Schieles asserted that the court erred in using this
restrictive definition. 17 6
The supreme court noted that it had previously held that "fair
market," for the purpose of determining enforceable remaining
debt under the anti-deficiency statutes, is a broader concept than
"fair market value."' 7 7 The legislative history indicates that the
state legislature intended for the jury to balance the competing
interests of the debtor and mortgagee. 78 Also, all evidence bear-
ing on the issue of value and the circumstances of the underlying
transaction can be presented. 79  The same broad definition of
"fair value" applies to all types of property. 8 0
The trial court erred in defining "fair value" as synonymous
with "fair market value."' 81  Thus, the judgment was reversed and
remanded for a new determination of the property's fair value.18 2
UNION STATE BANK V. WOELL
In Union State Bank v. Woell, ls3 William Woell and Turning
Point Manufacturing, Inc. (TPMI) appealed from a judgment
172. Id.
173. Schiele, 436 N.W.2d at 248.
174. Id. See Schiele v. First National Bank of Linton, 404 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. 1987).
175. Schiele, 436 N.W.2d at 249. The instruction was similar to instruction 1404 from
the instruction on eminent domain in N.DJ.I. - Civil and reads, in part, "fair value... is
the highest price for which the property can be sold in the open market by a willing seller
to a willing purchaser, neither party acting under compulsion and both exercising
reasonable judgment." Id. at 249 n. 1.
176. Id. at 249.
177. Id. See Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d 360 (N.D.
1988Xfair value produces a fair and equitable result between the parties).
178. Schiele, 436 N.W.2d at 249 (quoting Bergquist, 425 N.W.2d at 364).
179. Id.
180. Schiele, 436 N.W.2d at 249.
181. Id.
182. Id. Justice Levine concurred and proposed that a jury instruction on fair value
should include factors constituting "intrinsic" value such as family history, income-
producing history, and investment of labor and funds. Id. at 250 (Levine, J., concurring).
183. 434 N.W.2d 712 (N.D. 1989).
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awarding Union State Bank $78,005.19 on two overdue promissory
notes and dismissing counterclaims against the bank."s Woell and
TPMI borrowed money from the bank to finance development
and production of a new product."s In November 1982, the
promissory notes were consolidated and secured by items of
machinery and a $100,000 purchase order.186
In March, TPMI and Woell entered into a memorandum
agreement with the bank to execute a new note representing the
amount previously consolidated."l 7 The new note was to be paid
on September 15, 1983, and if not paid, Woell agreed to sell the
secured property at an auction and pay off the note by October 15,
1983.188 An auction was subsequently held during which a bank
representative informed the auctioneer's clerk of the bank's secur-
ity interest.1 8 9 The clerk then deposited the proceeds with the dis-
trict court.'10 The bank brought an action seeking judgment on
the two notes and payment of the auction proceeds.' 9' Woell
answered and counterclaimed. 192 The district court entered sum-
mary judgment in favor of the bank, declined to rule on the coun-
terclaim, and granted a rule 54(b) (of the North Dakota Rules of
Civil Procedure) certification. 193 TPMI and Woell appealed.'9 4
The supreme court dismissed the appeal, concluding that the cer-
tification had been "improvidently" granted, and the district court
judgment was vacated. 9 5 On January 8, 1988, the bank again
moved for summary judgment and to dismiss in part for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted; the trial court
granted the motions. 19 6
On appeal, Woell asserted that the trial court erred when it
dismissed his counterclaim for breach of the obligation of good
faith.197 Woell based his claim on section 41-01-13 (1-203) of the
184. Union State Bank v. Woell, 434 N.W.2d 712, 714-15 (N.D. 1989). The district
court awarded judgment against Woell and TPMI for $67,806.34 and against Woell for
$8,581.89, and awarded $1,666.96 in costs and disbursements. Id. at 715.
185. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 714.
186. Id.
187. Id. The amount of the new note was $39,753.65. Id.
188. Id.




193. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 714. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 54(b) (judgment upon multiple
claims).
194. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 714.
195. Id. (citing Union Bank v. Woell, 357 N.W.2d 234 (N.D. 1984)).
196. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 714-15. See N.D.R. Cirv. P. 12(bX5) (failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted).
197. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 715. The trial court ruled that breach of an obligation of
772
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North Dakota Century Code which defines good faith obliga-
tion. 198 However, the supreme court responded that a contract or
duty to which the good faith can attach must first exist.'" The
bank had no "duty" to finance Woell's operations.2' Further, no
oral agreement existed because the items essential to an agree-
ment were collectively absent.201 Thus, there was no contractual
or statutorily-imposed duty to which good faith could attach and
no basis existed for a breach of good faith.2 "2
Woell further alleged that the conduct of the bank's represen-
tative at the auction constituted bad faith.2 0 3 However, a lender
may monitor and protect its status as a secured creditor.20 4 More-
over, the auctioneer had the duty to determine whether the goods
were covered by any security agreement.2 0 5 In fact, if there were
an implied good faith obligation as Woell alleges, Woell had a duty
to inform the auctioneer of the security interest.2° 6 Thus, the
bank's actions were not considered evidence of bad faith.20 7
Woell asserted that summary judgment for the bank on his
conversion claim was improper.208 However, because Woell did
not show that the bank "wrongfully exercised dominion over his
personal property," the claim failed. ° 9 Woell had a duty to notify
the auctioneer which particular property was subject to the bank's
good faith was not recognized in North Dakota. Id. Even though the trial court should
have treated the motion as one for summary judgment, the dismissal may be upheld if
summary judgment would have been appropriate. Id.
198. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 716. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-01-13 (1-203X1983 and
Supp. 1989X"[e]very contract or duty within this title imposes an obligation of good faith in
its performance or enforcement").
199. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 716 (citing Brown v. Indiana Nat'l Bank, 476 N.E.2d 888,
894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985)). See also Bank of Hartland v. Arndt, 385 N.W.2d 219, 223 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1986).
200. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 717.
201. Id. See Cobse v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 389 N.W.2d 352, 355 (N.D.
1986Xrequiring definiteness in a contract to be valid and enforceable); see, e.g., Hunt v.
McIlroy Bank and Trust, 616 S.W.2d 759, 762 (Ark. App. 1981Xessential terms); Labor
Discount Center v. State Bank & Trust Co., 526 S.W.2d 407, 425 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975Xabsence of one essential term not fatal).
202. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 717.
203. Id. at 718.
204. Id. See NCNB Nat'l Bank of North Carolina v. Tiller, 814 F.2d 931, 936 (4th Cir.
1987Xsecurity interest not invalid because of failure to police the conduct of the debtor);
Bank of Beulah v. Chase, 231 N.W.2d 738, 744 (N.D. 1975Xauthorized to sell collateral).
205. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 719 (citing Annotation, Personal Liability of Auctioneer to
Ouner or Mortgagee for Conversion, 96 A.L.R.2d 208 (1964)).
206. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 719 (citing Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank and Trust Co.,
713 S.W.2d 517, 528 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986)). But cf. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-23-08 (1985 &
Supp. 1989Xdefrauding secured creditors).
207. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 719.
208. Id. at 720. "Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the personal
property of another." Great Am. Ins. v. Am. State Bank, 385 N.W.2d 460, 462 (N.D. 1986).
209. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 720.
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security agreement.21 °
Woell asserted that his claim that the bank breached a fiduci-
ary duty to him was improperly dismissed.2 1 ' The court noted
that a debtor-creditor relationship is established between a bank
and its customers. 12 A fiduciary relationship arises only under
certain circumstances.21 3 Woell did not present any evidence that
inferred dominion or control by the bank over his business, hence,
the claim was properly dismissed.214
Woell's claim of fraud was properly dismissed because it failed
to show what conduct was alleged to be fraudulent and did not
connect any factual assertions to the elements of fraud. 1
The judgment was affirmed. 6
CHILD ABUSE
IN INTEREST OF A.M.A.
In In Interest ofA.MA.2 7 the issue was whether the state had
shown by clear and convincing evidence the statutory criteria for
terminating parental rights. 1 8 In February 1986, Cindy's and
Loren's children were removed from their custody for suspected
child abuse by an emergency court order.2 1 9 The three children
were an eight-month-old (Annette), a two-and-one-half-year-old
(Tina), and a three-and-one-half-year-old (Neal).' 0 Initially the
three children, who were in foster care in Dickey County, North
Dakota, were transferred to foster care in Minnesota.2' In
December of 1986, the juvenile court placed the children in tem-
porary custody of their grandparents. =2 In November of 1987, a
petition was filed to terminate the parental rights of Cindy and
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 721. See Faith, Hope and Love, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 496 So.2d 708,
711 (Ala. 1986).
213. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 721 (citing In Re Red Cedar Const. Co., Inc., 63 B.R. 228,
242 (W.D. Mich. 1986); Nicoll v. Community State Bank, 529 N.E.2d 386,389 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988)).
214. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 721.
215. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-08 (1987 & Supp. 1989Xelements of fraud). See
also First Nat'l Bank of Hettinger v. Clark, 332 N.W.2d 264, 267 (N.D. 1983Xthe court need
not search the record for evidence opposing a summary judgment).
216. Woell, 434 N.W.2d at 721.
217. 439 N.W.2d 535 (N.D. 1989).
218. In re A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d 535, 537 (N.D. 1989).
219. Id. at 536.
220. Id. at 537. Neal and Tina showed signs of child abuse. Id.
221. Id. The maternal grandparents moved to join as parties in the legal action and
also for grandparental visitation. Id.
222. In re A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d at 537.
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Loren. '  Cindy appealed the juvenile court judgment that there
was clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental
rights.224
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the statute for
terminating parental rights is part of the Uniform Juvenile Court
Act.' This act was adopted by the state legislature with a strong
preference for parental guardianship.226 The separation of a child
from his parents should only take place when "necessary for his
welfare or in the interest of public safety."22 7 The criteria for ter-
minating parental rights are: 1) the child is deprived; 2) that dep-
rivation will continue into the future without change; and 3)
consequently, the child will probably suffer serious harm. '
The supreme court next determined whether the juvenile
court had the requisite "clear and convincing evidence" to make
its determination." 9 The court looked at the three criteria indi-
vidually to determine if there had been clear and convincing evi-
dence as to each part.23 0 The first question was to determine if the
children had been "deprived."'" The court ruled that the juve-
nile court's findings were clear and convincing within the meaning
of deprived child.2 2 The court then considered whether there
was clear and convincing evidence that the abuse and deprivation
would continue into the future 33 Based on a psychological evalu-
ation and findings of facts, the juvenile court determined that
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.; see N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 27-20 (1974 and Supp. 1987XUniform Juvenile Code
Act).
226. In re A.MA., 439 N.W.2d at 537 (citing McGurren v. S.T., 241 N.W.2d 690, 695
(N.D. 1976)).
227. In re A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d at 537. N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-01(3X1974);
McGurren v. S.T., 241 N.W.2d 690, 695 (N.D. 1976).
228. In re A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d at 537. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44(lXb)
(1974Xlists three methods by which parental rights may be terminated).
229. In reA.MA., 439 N.W.2d at 537. The North Dakota Supreme Court reviewed the
juvenile court's finding of "clear and convincing evidence based upon 'files, records, and
minutes or transcript of the evidence of the juvenile court.'" N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-
56(1X1974). The supreme court also noted that it was not bound by these findings. In re
A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d at 537 (citing In re J.A.L., 432 N.W.2d 876, 878 (N.D. 1988)).
230. In re A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d at 537-39.
231. Id. at 537. Section 27-20-02(5Xa) of the North Dakota Century Code provides in
pertinent part:
[Deprived child] [i]s without proper parental care or control, subsistence,
education as required by law, or other care or control necessary for the child's
physical, mental, or emotional health, or morals, and the deprivation is not due
primarily to lack of financial means of the child's parents....
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-02(5Xa) (1974 and Supp. 1987).
232. In re A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d at 538.
233. Id. Evidence of past deprivation alone is not enough; it must be clear that it will
continue into the future (citing Waagen v. R.J.B., 248 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1976)).
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Cindy would not be a proper parent in the future.2-1 The
supreme court decided that there was also clear and convincing
evidence that the deprivation would continue.2 5 As to the final
question, the court determined that the children would suffer
harm if they were returned to Cindy.m8 The court further con-
cluded that there was clear and convincing evidence under the
statutory criteria for terminating parental rights, and the court
affirmed the decision of the juvenile court.2 7
CHILD CUSTODY
KALOUPEK v. BURFENING
In Kaloupek v. Burfening,28 the mother of two-year-old Rob-
ert appealed from a district court judgment that granted joint
physical custody of Robert to both parents on a six-month alternat-
ing basis.239 The mother, Chris, and the father, Michael, had a
continuing relationship between 1981 to 1987; however, the rela-
tionship never resulted in marriage.2 40 In March of 1986, Robert
was born to Chris and Michael, and in June of 1987, the relation-
ship between Chris and Michael ended.2 1 On appeal, Chris
asserted that the trial court's ruling of joint physical custody was
not in Robert's best interest and was clearly erroneous. 2
234. In re A.M.A., 439 N.W.2d 538. The North Dakota Supreme Court also based its
decision on facts from the memorandum decision including inability to stay employed,
infrequent contact with children, marriage problems, attempted suicide. Id. at 538-39.
235. Id. at 539.
236. Id.
237. Id. The court noted that Annette was only eight months old and did not display
the symptoms of a deprived child as did Neal and Tina. Id. However, the court also
terminated the parental rights regarding Annette to protect her from any potential harm.
Id. (citing Sexton v. J.E.H., 355 N.W.2d 828, 832 (N.D. 1984Xif parental rights are not
terminated the younger child will be raised in the same environment as the older)).
238. 440 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 1989).
239. Kaloupek v. Burfening, 440 N.W.2d 496, 497 (N.D. 1989). The joint physical
custody arrangement between Chris Raloupek and Michael Burfening was to last until
Robert started school at which time custody could be redetermined. Id.
240. Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 497. In 1983 Chris and Michael purchased a home in
Grand Forks where they lived with Chris' daughters from her previous marriages. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id. Chris argued that she was Robert's primary caretaker and that a six month
separation from his mother and stepsisters was clearly not in his best interests. Id. She
further asserted that the court had not given her expert witness adequate consideration nd
failed to apply factors four and five under section 14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century
Code. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2. Section 14-09-06.2 provides:
For the purpose of custody, the best interests and welfare of the child shall be
determined by the court's consideration and evaluation of all factors affecting
the best interests and welfare of the child. These factors include all of the
following when applicable:
4. The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
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The North Dakota Supreme Court stated that determination
of child custody matters are questions of facts and, as such, would
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. 3 Furthermore, the
court indicated that in North Dakota there is no presumption as to
whether the mother or father will better promote the "best inter-
ests and welfare of the child. '244 After reviewing the trial court
memorandum on the case, the supreme court held that "both par-
ents have the ability and desire to care for Robert's needs" and
Robert would benefit from the shared upbringing.245 Therefore,
the supreme court held that the trial court decision had not been
clearly erroneous and as such affirmed the district court
decision.246
MERTZ V. MERTZ
In Mertz v. Mertz 2 47 the issue was whether there was a clearly
erroneous determination that there had been a significant change
in circumstance and that it was in the best interest of the child to
allow change of custody.248 In 1983, Melody Mertz and Denis
Mertz were divorced and the divorce decree awarded custody of
their child, Scott, to Melody. 49 In 1988 Melody allowed Scott to
live with his father for six months.2 0 On June 23, 1988, Denis
sought to modify the divorce decree and obtain custody of
Scott.25
After a decision by a judicial referee and confirmation by dis-
trict court, Denis was given custody of Scott.1 2 Melody appealed
5. The permanence, as a family unit, of the existing or proposed custodial
home.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2.
243. Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 497 (citing Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1980)).
The court had previously stated that alternating custody is not per se erroneous. DeForest
v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919 (N.D. 1975).
244. Kaloupek, 440 N.W.2d at 497 (citing Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D.
1986)).
245. Id. at 498. The court noted that one of the factors the trial court based its decision
on was the fact that Chris did not "manifest a desire to foster the father-son relationship
between Michael and Robert." Id.
246. Id. at 498-99. The court dismissed both arguments set forth by Chris, that the trial
court did not give due consideration to her expert, or that the court did not give deference
to section 14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. at 498-99.
247. 439 N.W.2d 94 (N.D. 1989).
248. Mertz v. Mertz, 439 N.W.2d 94, 95-96 (N.D. 1989).
249. Mertz, 439 N.W.2d at 95.
250. Id. Melody's allowing Scott to live with Denis was one of the reasons given by
Denis to support his claim of significant change in circumstances. Id. at 95-96. Other
reasons stated were that Scott could not get along with his brothers, Melody had problems
disciplining Scott, and Scott preferred living with his father. Id.
251. Id. at 95.
252. Id. The judicial referee found a significant change in circumstances. Id.
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the decision on the grounds that there was not a significant change
in circumstances nor was it in the best interests of the child that
custody be transferred.' The North Dakota Supreme Court
noted that there was a two-step analysis to follow in seeking a
modification of a custody award.5 4 First, the party seeking modifi-
cation must show a significant change in circumstances.2 5 Sec-
ond, the court must determine if it is in the best interests of the
child to allow modification.2-5
The supreme court would only set aside the lower court deci-
sion if it was found to be "clearly erroneous."12- 7 The judicial refe-
ree had decided there had been changed circumstances, and the
supreme court ruled that this finding was not clearly erroneous.25
As changed circumstances the referee cited Scott's inability to live
harmoniously with his mother and two brothers, Melody's discipli-
nary trouble with Scott, and Scott's having lived with his father for
over six months?2 9 To complete the two-step analysis the court
then looked at whether it would be in Scott's best interests to
change custody.2' Section 14-09-06.2 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code lists factors to be considered in determining the child's
best interests.2 6 ' Only the factors listed in the section that are
applicable to a situation need be considered. 2  The supreme
court was satisfied that all applicable factors had been consid-
ered.21 3 Thus, the court held that the best interests of Scott had
been met and affirmed the lower court's judgment.2
WORDEN V. WORDEN
In Worden v. Worden ,265Linda Worden appealed a divorce
judgment awarding custody of her two minor children, Elizabeth
253. Mertz, 439 N.W.2d at 95.
254. Id. at 96.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a) ("findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous .. ")
258. Mertz, 439 N.W.2d at 96. Changed circumstances are "new facts" which were
unknown to Denis at the time of the divorce decree. Id.
259. Id. at 96.
260. Id.
261. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 (197lXten factors for a court to consider in
deciding best interests of a child). The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that not all
statutory factors need be met (citing Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121 (N.D. 1980)).
262. Mertz, 439 N.W.2d at 97.
263. Id. Three of the factors discussed by the court were ability of parent to provide
food, the drop in Scott's school grades, and Scott's preference. Id. at 96-97.
264. Id. at 97.
265. 434 N.W.2d 341 (N.D. 1989).
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and Christopher, to James Worden.2 When the Wordens mar-
ried in 1985, they had a natural son, Christopher, who was seven
months old.2 7 Linda also had a four-year-old daughter, Elizabeth,
from a previous marriage.2 During the Wordens' marriage,
Linda had primary care of the children while James held various
types of employment.2 69 The parties separated in 1987.270
During the divorce, the trial court found that it would be in
both children's best interests to award custody to James with rea-
sonable visitation for Linda. 71 The court found that exceptional
circumstances - Linda's unstable lifestyle and the lack of contact
between Elizabeth and her natural father - warranted granting
James custody.272 On appeal, Linda asserted that the custody deci-
sion was clearly erroneous.2 7 3
The court must award custody based upon a factual determi-
nation of the best interests and welfare of the child. 74 The trial
court found that James had a more stable lifestyle and resources to
care for minor children and that it would be in Christopher's best
interest to live with his father.275 Thus, the North Dakota
Supreme Court found the placement of Christopher was not
clearly erroneous. 6
Elizabeth's situation required a different analysis. 7  Parents
are entitled to the custody and companionship of-their children.2 78
When the custody dispute is between a parent and a non-parent,
exceptional circumstances must exist before the court can deter-
mine that it would be in the best interest of the child to be placed
with a non-parent.27 9
266. Worden v. Worden, 434 N.W.2d 341, 341 (N.D. 1989).
267. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 341.
268. Id. Elizabeth's natural father paid $75 per month support but did not exercise his
visitation rights. Id.
269. Id. at 342.
270. Id.
271. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 342.
272. Id. Linda was unemployed and living on public assistance. She had four
residences since the separation: an apartment that was condemned, a mobile home from
which she was evicted, a residence shared with eleven other persons, and a one-bedroom
apartment. Id.
273. Id. The trial court's determination of custody is a finding of fact which will be set
aside only if clearly erroneous. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a).
274. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 342. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-22(1X1981 & Supp.
1989Xproviding for custody determination either before or after the divorce action); and
§ 14-09-06.1 (1981 & Supp. 1989Xcustody to be determined by the best interest or welfare
of the child).
275. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 342.
276. Id.
277. Id. (noting that Elizabeth is "Linda's natural daughter but is neither James's
natural nor adopted child").
278. Id. (citing Hust v. Hust, 295 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1980).
279. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 342. The test is whether or not there are exceptional
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What constitutes exceptional circumstances has not been nar-
rowly defined by the court. s  They typically involve cases in
which the child and non-parent have been physically together
long enough to develop a psychological parent-child relation-
ship."' This did not occur in Elizabeth's case, and therefore, the
finding of exceptional circumstances was clearly erroneous. 2
The court did not address the issue of whether a split-custody
arrangement would ever constitute exceptional circumstances. 2 3
The court noted that in this case there was no evidence to indicate
that serious detriment would occur to either child due to the
arrangement.2s4
If Linda's lifestyle raises the issue of child deprivation, pro-
ceedings under the Uniform Juvenile Court Act, chapter 27-20 of
the North Dakota Century Code, are available.m
Christopher's custody placement was afirmed; Elizabeth's
was reversed and remanded for entry of judgment.'
WRIGHT V. WRIGHT
In Wright v. Wright,187 Tammy Wright appealed a modifica-
tion of her divorce judgment which gave custody of her two minor
children to former husband Lorin Wright.- The Wrights had
divorced after a five year marriage.289 Tammy was awarded physi-
cal custody of their three- and four-year-old daughters with Lorin
allowed liberal visitation.29 0 Three months following the judg-
ment, Tammy moved to change the residence of the girls from
Williston, N.D., to St. Louis, Mo., so that she could attend law
school.2 9 1 Lorin then moved for modification of the divorce judg-
ment and custody of the children. 9 2
circumstances which require placing the child with a non-parent. Mansukhani v. Pailing,
318 N.W.2d 748 (N.D. 1982). Exceptional circumstances trigger the best-interest analysis.
In re Buchholz, 326 N.W.2d 203 (N.D. 1982).
280. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 342.
281. Id. See Daley v. Gunville, 348 N.W.2d 441 (N.D. 1984Xexceptional circumstances
due to development of a parent relationship).
282. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 342.
283. ld.
284. Id. See also Gravning v. Gravning 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986).
285. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 343. See N.D. CENT. CODE, § 27-20 (1974 & Supp. 1989).
Parental unfitness is not the appropriate test for custody between a parent and a third
person. Id. (citing Mansukhani, 318 N.W.2d at 748).
286. Worden, 434 N.W.2d at 343.
287. 431 N.W.2d 301 (N.D. 1988).
288. Wright v. Wright, 431 N.W.2d 301, 302 (N.D. 1988).
289. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 302.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 303.
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After an initial hearing, the court issued an interim order giv-
ing Lorin custody for two months'in Williston followed by two
months custody in St. Louis with Tammy.2 93 Home studies, psy-
chological evaluations of all family members, drug screening for
Tammy, and drug/alcohol evaluation for both parents were
ordered. 94 After receiving this data, the trial court concluded
that conditions had changed, and it would be in the best interests
of the children to remain in Williston with Lorin.295 Tammy
claimed that this decision was clearly erroneous.2'
After noting that a trial court's decision to modify custody is
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review, 97 the North
Dakota Supreme Court discussed the difference between an origi-
nal award of custody and a subsequent modification. 29 The origi-
nal decision is based on the best interests of the children.2 1 A
request to modify custody is based on the determination of two
issues in chronological order: 1) whether there has been a change
of circumstances since the original decree; and, if so, 2) whether
the best interests of the children would be fostered by a change in
custody."° Without significant changes, there can be no modifica-
tion of the custody decision.30 1
The trial court's determination in Wright was based on three
findings: 1) Tammy's move; 2) Tammy's psychological test results
indicating a need for counseling and a possible adverse effect on
the children; and.3) the existence of a stable home with Lorin in
Williston.3 °2 However, the North Dakota Supreme Court noted
that only when a custodial parent will move without the children
if the court denies permission, does that move constitute changed




297. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 303 (citing Pitsenbarger v. Pitsenbarger, 382 N.W.2d 662,
664 (N.D. 1986); and N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there
is no supporting evidence or when, reviewing all the evidence, the court has a firm
conviction that a mistake has been made. Landsberger v. Landsberger, 364 N.W.2d 918,
920 (N.D. 1985). A finding of fact is also erroneous if induced by incorrect law. Manz v.
Bohara, 367 N.W.2d 743, 746 (N.D. 1985).
298. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 303 (citing Miller v. Miller, 305 N.W.2d 666,671 (N.D.
1981)).
299. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1981Xcustody revolves around the best
interests of the child).
300. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 303 (citing Orke v. Olson, 411 N.W.2d 97, 99 (N.D. 1987);
Miller, 305 N.W.2d at 671)).
301. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 303 (citing Pitsenbarger, 382 N.W.2d at 664; Koller v.
Koller, 377 N.W.2d 130 (N.D. 1985)). "'Changed circumstances'" are new facts which
were unknown to the movant at the time of the decree. Bergstrom v. Bergstrom, 296
N.W.2d 490, 493 (N.D. 1980).
302. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 304.
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circumstances for a custody determination. °3 This was not true in
Tammy's case. 30 4  Also, Tammy's psychological status did not
change subsequent to the divorce degree, and hence, this was not
a new circumstance. 0 5 It was incorrect for the trial court to con-
sider the best interests of the children at the threshold stage of
determining changed circumstances s.30 Finally, the finding that a
stable home existed in Williston was not a changed circumstance
and again indicated that the court was considering the best inter-
ests of the children.30 1 Thus, the trial court's findings were clearly
erroneous and custody was returned to Tammy.308 The issue of
Tammy's motion to change residence was remanded .3 0
CIVIL PROCEDURE
RoLETTE EDUCATION Ass'N V. RoIETT PUBLIC SCHOOL
DiST. No. 29
In Rolette Educ. Ass'n v. Rolette Public School Dist. No. 29,310
the Rolette Education Association (REA) appealed a judgment
denying a claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against the
Rolette Public School District for breach of agreement s.3 1  The
REA had sued the school district asserting that a unilateral change
of health insurers for the 1987-88 school year violated their negoti-
ated agreement.3 12 The trial court concluded that section 15-47-
15 of the North Dakota Century Code required bids to be submit-
ted for health insurance contracts, 3 13 and therefore, the agree-
ment requiring the REA to approve any change of carrier was
303. Id.
304. Id. When custody was changed to Lorin, Tammy withdrew from law school and
moved back to Williston. Id.
305. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 304. See Bergstrom, 296 N.W.2d at 493.
306. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 304. See Okre, 411 N.W.2d at 99; Landsberger, 364
N.W.2d at 920.
307. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 304. A finding of changed circumstances due to a stable
home in Williston was based on an incorrect view of the law, it was clearly erroneous. See,
Manz, 367 N.W.2d at 746.
308. Wright, 431 N.W.2d at 304.
309. Id. at 304-05. In dicta, the court noted that when a motion for a change of
custody is dependent on a change of residence motion, the trial court should first resolve
the issue of residence so as to avoid issuing interim decisions which may disrupt the
children's lives; a speedy and complete resolution is preferable. 431 N.W.2d at 305 n.2.
Justice VandeWalle concurred but recommended leaving trial courts the flexibility and
discretion to decide the competing motions. (VandeWalle, J., concurring). Id. at 305.
310. 427 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1988).
311. Rolette Educ. Ass'n v. Rolette Public School Dist. No. 29, 427 N.W.2d 812, 812
(N.D. 1988).
312. Rolette, 427 N.W.2d at 813.
313. ld. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-47-15 (Supp. 1989Xbids required for school
contracts involving over $8,000 unless specifically excepted).
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void and unenforceable. 14
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the appeal was
moot due to a post-judgment agreement between the REA and
the school district excluding the approval decision. 15 The school
district had requested adjudication on the grounds of public inter-
est.31 6 The court, however, found that no important state govern-
ment interest was implicated by this single clause in a local school
district contract.317 The appeal was dismissed.318
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
STATE V. MELIN
In State v. Melin,31 9 the state appealed the dismissal of a com-
plaint against Jonathan and Diana Melin charging them with viola-
tion of the compulsory school-attendance law. 32 0 The Melins had
been educating their seven-year-old son at home although neither
was certified to teach in North Dakota.32 ' The trial court found
that requirement of teacher certification was an unconstitutional
infringement of the Melins' free exercise of religion.3  Thus, the
314. Rolette, 427 N.W.2d at 813.
315. Id. at 813-14.
316. Id. The court "will not dismiss an appeal as moot where the matter in controversy
is one of great public interest" involving public officials or where the matter is " 'capable of
repetition yet evading review."' (citing State v. Liberty Nat1 Bank & Trust Co., 427
N.W.2d 307, 308 (N.D. 1988)). Id. at 814.
317. Rolette, 427 N.W.2d at 814. See Forum Publishing Co., v. City of Fargo, 391
N.W.2d 169, 170 (N.D. 1986Xdefining public interest as something in which the public has a
pecuniary interest or an interest involving their legal rights or liabilities).
318. Rolette, 427 N.W.2d at 815.
319. 428 N.W.2d 227 (N.D. 1988).
320. State v. Melin, 428 N.W.2d 227,227 (N.D. 1988). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-
03(4X1981). Section 15-34.1-03(4) provides:
The parent, guardian, or other person having control of a child required to
attend school by the provisions of this chapter shall be excused by the school
board from causing the child to attend school whenever it shall be shown to the
satisfaction of the board, subject to appeal as provided by law, that one of the
following reasons exists:
1. That the child is in attendance for the same length of time at a parochial or
private school approved by the county superintendent of schools and the
superintendent of public instruction. No such school shall be approved
unless the teachers therein are legally certified in the state of North Dakota
in accordance with section 15-41-25 and chapter 15-36, the subjects offered
are in accordance with sections 15-38-07, 15-41-06, and 15-41-24, and such
school is in compliance with all municipal and state health, fire, and safety
laws (amended Supp. 1989Xproviding that a parent is qualified to supervise a
program of home-based instruction if the parent is certified or certifiable in
North Dakota, has a high school education and is supervised by a certified
teacher, or has passed the national teacher exam). (Effective through June
30, 1993.)
N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34-03(4) (1986).
321. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 227-28.
322. Id. at 228.
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complaint was dismissed and a "judgment of not guilty" issued.3 3
The issue on appeal was whether the dismissal was erroneous
because the certification requirement was constitutional.3 4
The Melins moved to dismiss the state's appeal contending
that an adverse decision would place them in double jeopardy con-
trary to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.3 m
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court ruled that the trial
court's action was not an acquittal notwithstanding its phraseol-
ogy." The trial court had not resolved all of the factual elements
of the offense.321 It only dismissed the complaint because it deter-
mined that the North Dakota statute infringed on the Melins' first
amendment rights.32s That such a factual determination is not an
acquittal is supported by the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in United States v. Scott.32 9 Therefore the court concluded
that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment did not bar
the state's appeal.33 °
The Melins further asserted that the state had no statutory
authority for appeal.33 1 However, although the trial court charac-
terized its action as a "judgment of not guilty," the supreme court
noted that the complaint was actually dismissed.332 An order dis-
missing a criminal complaint is appealable under section 29-28-07( 1).333
The court analyzed the challenge to the statute under the
"free exercise of religion clause" using a three-part test.334 First,
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing "nor shall any person be subject for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb").
326. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 229 (quoting from State v. Flohr, 259 N.W.2d 293, 295 (N.D.
1977X"The question of what constitutes an 'acquittal' is not to be controlled by the form of
a judge's ruling"Xciting United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (1970)).
327. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 229.
328. Id. at 230. See State v. Flohr, 259 N.W.2d at 293 (critical facts are those regarding
some or all of the elements of the crime). See also N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-1-01
.03(1X1985Xdefiring the elements of a criminal offense).
329. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 230. See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978Xdouble
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment did not serve as a bar to retrial if the trial court's
decision was reversed), overruling United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975Xproviding
that double jeopardy occurred whenever resolution of any factual issues relating to the
offense charged would be necessary upon reversal).
330. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 231.
331. Id.
332. Id. In a criminal action the state has only a statutory right of appeal. State v.
Borden, 316 N.W.2d 93 (N.D. 1982).
333. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 231. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-28-07(IX1974 and Supp.
1989Xproviding that the state may appeal from "an order quashing an information or
indictment or any count thereof").
334. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 232 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972Xproviding:
"(1) whether the activity interfered with by the state is motivated by and rooted
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the state conceded that the Melins were motivated by a sincerely
held religious belief. 335 Second, the state had a compelling inter-
est in the education of children and in ensuring that education is
conducted by qualified persons.338 This compelling interest justi-
fies the burden placed on the free exercise of religion.337 Third,
requiring teachers for public and nonpublic schools to be certified
satisfies the state's interest by means which are least restrictive to
the free exercise of religion.3-8 Further, other alternatives were
considered and rejected by the 1987 legislature. 339 Thus, the trial
court's dismissal of the complaint against the Melins for violating
the compulsory school attendance was reversed and remanded to
the trial court for determination of guilt or innocence.340
STATE V. TOMAN (Two CASES)
In State v. Toman,3 4 ' Chris Toman and Neil Toman appealed
their conviction for violating the compulsory school attendance
law pursuant to section 15-34.1-01 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 42
On appeal, the Tomans assert that the exemption provision
specified in section 15-34.1-01 violates the due process clause
because it allows public school officials to decide whether or not to
grant the exemption. 43 The supreme court declined to address
this issue stating; the Tomans are barred from raising objections to
in a legitimate and sincerely-held religious belief: (2) whether the parents' free
exercise of religion has been burdened by the regulation, and the extent of or
impact of the burden on their religious practices; and (3) whether the state has a
compelling interest in the regulation which justifies the burden on the free
exercise of religion and overrides the interest of the parents in exercising their
religious practices.")
See State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631 (N.D. 1986Xflnding teacher certification to be constitu-
tional when analyzed under a free-exercise-of-religion claim).
335. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 232.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 233. See Patzer, 382 N.W.2d at 636; State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316
(N.D. 1988Xupholding certification as a least-restrictive alternative even though other
alternatives have been studied).
339. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 233 (quoting State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 833, 900 (N.D.
1980X" he courtroom is simply not the best arena for the debate of issues of educational
policy and the measurement of educational quality")).
340. Melin, 428 N.W.2d at 233. Justice Meschke dissented, concluding that there is no
statutory authority for the state to appeal a criminal acquittal (citing Sanabria v. United
States, 437 U.S. 54, 64 (1978)). Id. at 234-36. (Meschke, J., dissenting). See also State v.
Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D. 1988Xdissent addressed substantive holding on freedom of
religion).
341. 436 N.W.2d 10 (N.D. 1989).
342. State v. Toman, 436 N.W.2d 10, 11 (N.D. 1989). The Tomans failed to send their
two children to school from September 1987 through December 10, 1987. Id. See N.D.
CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-01 (1981 and Supp. 198 9 Xcompulsory attendance-exceptions).
343. Toman, 436 N.W.2d at 11.
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the exemption statute as a defense to their convictions because
they did not seek an exemption for the time period in which the
violation occurred. 3 "
The Tomans further assert that the compulsory school attend-
ance law is unconstitutional because the teacher certification
requirement for religious schools is not the least restrictive alter-
native available to achieve the state's interest "in providing an
adequate education for children."345 The supreme court declined
the Tomans' invitation to overturn prior decisions which had
resolved the issue to the contrary.346
The judgment was airmed.3 7
CONTEMPT
BALER V. HAMPTON
In Baier v. Hampton,348 the defendant, James Hampton,
appealed the district court decision holding him in contempt of
court.349 The alleged contempt occurred during a number of
court proceedings to determine Hampton's ability to pay his court
ordered child support.3 5 0 When questioned about his finances
Hampton indicated that he was receiving $466 monthly in mili-
tary retirement benefits but, failed to disclose his $606 a month for
military educational benefits.3 5 1 At a later hearing, the trial court
learned of Hampton's additional benefits and held Hampton in
contempt of court for failure to pay child support and for giving
"'deceitful and evasive'" answers.352 Hampton appealed and the
North Dakota Supreme Court partially reversed the holding. 53
Upon remand, the criminal contempt charge against Hamp-
ton was assigned to the same judge who handled the child support
hearings and the previous contempt hearing.3M During the pro-
ceedings, Hampton unsuccessfully attempted to call the judge, the
344. Id.
345. Id.
346. Id. (citing State v. Anderson, 427 N.W.2d 316 (N.D.) cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 491(1988); State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631 (N.D.) cert. denied, 479 U.S. 825 (1986)).
347. Toman, 436 N.W.2d at 11.
348. 440 N.W.2d 712 (N.D. 1989).
349. Baier v. Hampton, 440 N.W.2d 712, 712 (N.D. 1989).
350. Eaier, 440 N.W.2d at 712.
351. Id.
352. Id. at 713.
353. Id. The supreme court stated that the contempt charges for the deceitful answers
was a criminal contempt matter and was governed by Rule 42(b) of the North Dakota Rules
of Criminal Procedure (citing Baier v. Hampton, 417 N.W.2d 801 (N.D. 1987)). See N.D.R.
CRIM. P. 42(bXnotice of criminal contempt must be given to defendant).
354. Baier, 440 N.W.2d at 713. Judge Wilson denied Hampton's demand for a change
of judges and the presiding judge of the district court also denied Hampton's motion. Id.
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state's attorney, and the assistant state's attorney as witnesses.3 5 5
Most of the evidence presented against and for Hampton consisted
of selected portions from the child support hearings.3 6 However,
when Hampton attempted to introduce certain evidence concern-
ing the trial judge's statements, he was denied. 5 7 Hampton
appealed and the issue before the supreme court was whether the
judge should have excused himself.35
The supreme court stated that Rule 42(b) of the North Dakota
Rules of Criminal Procedure would disqualify a judge if the con-
tempt charge "involves disrespect to or criticism of 'that
judge.' ,,359 The court indicated that the explanatory note to Rule
42 directed that if the conduct of the trial judge was contributory
to the circumstances of the contempt he should voluntarily step
aside.31° Furthermore, in Baler the court found numerous occa-
sions where the judge's impartiality was in serious question.361
The court stated that, while the judge had honestly attempted to
conduct the contempt hearings in a fair manner, he should have
dismissed himself.36 2  Therefore the district court decision was
reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial with a differ-
ent presiding judge. 63
CONTRACTS
JOHNSON V. PETERBILT OF FARGO, INC.
In Johnson v. Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc.364 the issue was whether
an employment contract provision withholding commissions of
undelivered goods after termination of employment is void as
355. Id.
356. Id. Selected portions were also entered as exhibits. Id.
357. Id. In particular, one such denial was a statement by Judge Wilson which said
"[very often not responsive to the question, and that's partly our fault, perhaps. It's partly
the fault of the attorney and partly the fault of the - the Court, and I learned something by
it .... 1, Id.
358. Baier, 440 N.W.2d at 713.
359. Id. (citing N.D.R. Crim. P. 42(b)). The United States Supreme Court has stated,
with relation to the identical federal rule, that a charge of false and evasive testimony does
not automatically trigger disqualification (citing Nilva v. United States, 352 U.S. 385, 395-96
(1957)). Baier, 440 N.W.2d at 713.
360. Baier, 440 N.W.2d at 713-14 (citing N.D.R. Cr. 42 and N.D.R. JUD. CONDUCT
3(CX1)).
361. Id. at 714. Furthermore, the trial judge's refusal to testify or allow any of his prior
statements into evidence indicated a lack of impartiality. Id. at 415.
362. Id. at 716. The supreme court held that from review of the record it was unable
to conclude that the balance of justice was not equally weighted between the state and the
accused (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). Furthermore, from his
participation in the prior hearings, the judge had "plainly formed an opinion of Hampton's
guilt." Id.
363. Id.
364. 438 N.W.2d 162 (N.D. 1989).
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against public policy. 3 5 Mike Johnson was employed as a sales-
man by Peterbilt of Fargo between April 1984 and October
1985.3  In January of 1985 the parties entered into a contract
which, in part, specified that upon termination of employment,
commission on undelivered vehicles would not be paid.367 John-
son sold two trucks which were undelivered at the time of his ter-
mination, and Peterbilt refused to pay commissions on the
vehicles.3 8 The trial court ruled that Johnson had failed to prove
that the contract clause constituted unjust enrichment or involun-
tary servitude or that it was unconscionable.369 In addition, John-
son failed to show that section 34-03-09 of the North Dakota
Century Code provided no relief. 370 Johnson appealed the deci-
sion, arguing that the contract provision was void.371
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the contract pro-
vision was not void as against public policy, nor was it inconsistent
with "fair and honorable dealing."3 72 The court's conclusion was
based on a reluctance to interfere with a person's right to enter
into a contract.373 Johnson relied upon section 34-03-09 of the
North Dakota Century Code and contended that whenever a per-
son works on commission, he or she is entitled to part of the profits
that are procured.374 The court declined to read the statute so
narrowly as to limit a party's right to contract and stated that the
clause was not inconsistent with fair dealing, or "offensive to good
morals." 3 75 Thus, the district court decision was affirmed.
37 6
365. Johnson v. Peterbilt of Fargo, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 162, 163 (N.D. 1989).
366. Johnson, 438 N.W.2d at 163. Peterbilt is in the business of repairing and selling
trucks, tractors, and trailers. Id.
367. Id.
368. Id. Total commissions claimed by Johnson were $4,128.68. Id.
369. Id.
370. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-09 (1987Xcompensation for employees upon
termination of employment).
371. Johnson, 438 N.W.2d at 163. Peterbilt countered that Johnson willingly entered
into the contract and thus there was no "overreaching." Id.
372. Id. at 165.
373. Id. at 164. "'It is not the court's function to curtail the liberty to contract by
enabling parties to escape their valid contractual obligation on the ground of public policy
unless the preservation of the general public welfare imperatively so demands."' (citing
Tshirgi v. Merchants Nat1 Bank of Cedar Rapids, 253 Iowa 682, 690, 113 N.W.2d 226, 231
(1962)).
374. Johnson, 438 N.W.2d at 164. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-09, supra note 7.
375. Johnson, 438 N.W.2d at 164, 165. "The mere fact that he can show an injury
flowing from Peterbilt's exercising its contractual rights does not compel this court to devise
some basis for relief" (citing Minneapolis Threshing Machine Co. v. Hocking, 54 N.D. 559,
209 N.W. 996 (1926)).




HOMES INS. OF DICKINSON V. SPELDRICH
In Homes Ins. of Dickinson v. Speldrich,377 David Lawrence,
and Vernon Speldrich appealed from a county court judgment
holding them liable to Home Insurance of Dickinson (Home Insur-
ance) for $3,142 in unpaid insurance premiums. 8 In January
1983, Eugene Speldrich, father of the appellants, obtained insur-
ance coverage for vehicles used in his business, Speldrich Truck-
ing, through his agent Home Insurance. 9 In January 1984, the
".named insurance" was changed to include his wife and sons
because the title to several vehicles had been placed in his sons'
names in order to obtain financing.3 °
Eugene requested renewal of the policy for the 1985 to 1986
policy year, and Home Insurance paid the premium.381 Speldrich
Trucking was billed in installments, but it did not pay.3 82 The pol-
icy was not renewed.38 3 In April, Home Insurance sued Eugene,
Ann, David, Lawrence, and Vernon Speldrich.31 4 Eugene's and
Ann's debts were discharged in bankruptcy court.3s The trial
court found that Davis, Lawrence, and Vernon owned six vehicles
and that they had used the Speldrich Trucking business as a means
to insure the vehicles. 3 m Thus, they had received the benefits of
insurance and were held jointly and severally liable for the unpaid
premiums on their vehicles.387
The supreme court noted that the trial court apparently had
based liability on the doctrine of unjust enrichment. 3 11 The doc-
trine provides a basis for restitution of the benefits received. 389 A
377. 436 N.W.2d 1 (N.D. 1989).
378. Home Ins. of Dickinson v. Speldrich, 436 N.W.2d 1, 1-2 (N.D. 1989).
379. Speldrich, 436 N.W.2d at 2. Eugene obtained general liability, automobile
liability, and physical-damage insurance from Fireman's Fund Insurance Company. Id.
Eugene Speldrich, d/b/a Speldrich Trucking was the named insured. Id.
380. Id. at 2.
381. Id. During the course of the year vehicles were added or dropped as requested.Id.
382. Id.
383. Speldrich, 436 N.W.2d at 2.
384. Id. The amount sought was $8,789.21 which represented unpaid premiums and
late payment charges. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Speldrich, 436 N.W.2d at 2.
388. Id. at 2-3 (citing Cavalier County Memorial Hosp. Ass'n v. Kartes, 343 N.W.2d 781
(N.D. 1984)). Unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine based upon quasi or constructive
contracts implied by law to prevent a person from unjust enrichment.
389. Speldrich, 435 N.W.2d at 3 (citing D.C. Trautman Co. v. Fargo Excavating Co.,
380 N.W.2d 644 (N.D. 1986)). A showing of fraud is not a prerequisite to recovery.
Sykeston Township v. Wells County, 356 N.W.2d 136 (N.D. 1984).
1990] 789
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
trial court's decision that a party has or has not been unjustly
enriched is fully reviewable.3s o
Appellants asserted that because they were not parties to the
contract, they cannot be held liable even if they gained a bene-
fit.391  This is not always the case.39 2 However, "there is appar-
ently unanimity that the named ensured is not liable for payment
of premiums where that insured has not contracted to pay premi-
ums. -393 The court agreed and concluded, in this case, that the
placing of title to the vehicles and securing insurance in appli-
cants' names was for the benefit of the father, Eugene.394 Eugene
was not his sons' agent, nor was Home Insurance under that
impression. 395 Further, the record did not support liability under
a partnership theory.396 In the absence of an agency or partner-
ship or a contract, there was not liability on the part of the
appellants.397
The judgment is reversed.398
CRIMINAL LAW
CITY OF GRAND FORKS v. CAMERON; CITY OF GRAND FORKS
v. KRILE
In City of Grand Forks v. Cameron; City of Grand Forks v.
Krile,399 Tom Krile and Michael Cameron appealed from convic-
tions of violating a city ordinance that prohibits obstructing public
officers in the discharge of their duties.4°° Krile and Cameron
390. Speldrich, 436 N.W.2d at 3 (citing Midland Diesel Service & Engine v. Sivertson,
307 N.W.2d 555 (N.D. 1981)).
391. Speldich, 436 N.W.2d at 3.
392. Id. See Midland Diesel Service, 307 N.W.2d at 559 (a third party who desires gain
from an agreement is not necessarily unjustly enriched but the court must consider
whether the third party participated in the transaction); Paschall's, Inc., v. Dozier, 407
S.W.2d 150, 154-55 (Tenn. 1966Xproviding that recovery from the person with whom there
is a contract precludes recovery from third persons incidentally benefitted).
393. Speldrich, 436 N.W.2d at 3-4. See Century Ins. Agency, Inc., v. City Commerce
Corp., 396 P.2d 80 (Alaska 1964Xholding that a landlord was not responsible for insurance
premiums on a policy procured by the tenant as required by the lease because the leaser
had made no promise); Stevens Ins., Inc., v. Howells, 473 P.2d 523 (Mont. 1970Xvendor
must make a promise or contract to pay premiums of insurance to be liable even when
coinsured); A. Copeland Enterprises v. Pickette & Meador, 422 So. 2d 752 (Miss.
1982Xlessor is not liable unless it contracted to pay the premiums); Midland Ins. Co. v.
Universal Technology, 508 A.2d 427 (1986Xa named insured does not become liable for
premium on that fact alone).
394. Speldrich, 436 N.W.2d at 4.
395. Id. at 4-5.
396. Id. at 5.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. 435 N.W.2d 700 (N.D. 1989).
400. City of Grand Forks v. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d 700, 701 (N.D. 1989). See GRAND
FoRKs, N.D., CODE § 9-0205 (1987X"Every person who willfully delays or obstructs a public
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were arrested when police dispersed guests from an early morning
house party.4 ° 1 On appeal, the defendants claimed: 1) that the
ordinance was facially invalid, unconstitutionally vague, and/or
overbroad; 2) the evidence presented at trial did not support their
convictions; 3) the trial court should have dismissed the charges; 4)
that the court erred in failing to clarify the word "remonstrate" for
the jury; and 5) a mistrial should have been declared due to
improper and inflammatory remarks made by the city attorney.4 °2
Regarding the constitutional claim, the supreme court noted
that the issue was not raised in the trial court, and issues not raised
below are not addressed on appeal.40 3
To challenge the sufficiency of the evidence, the defendant
must show that the evidence produces no reasonable inference of
guilt when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.40 4
Construing the ordinance, the supreme court determined that the
city did not indicate an intent to prohibit conduct beyond that
proscribed by the corresponding state statute that prohibits
obstruction of the administration of law or govern mental func-
tions.40 5 Thus, violation of the city ordinance requires physical
acts as does section 12.1-08-01 of the North Dakota Code.4°
Defendant Krile was arrested after asking twice why officers were
arresting people and removing them from the house.40 7 Krile's
questions did not constitute physical obstruction and his convic-
tion was reversed.4° Cameron, however, refused to leave the
house after being instructed to do so, and he stepped in front of an
officer in the discharge or attempt to discharge any duty of his office, shall upon conviction
thereof, be punished as herein provided.")
401. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 701.
402. Id. at 701-02.
403. Id. at 702. The defendants had relied on City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451
(1987) as support for declaring that the city ordinance inhibited constitutionally protected
speech and was facially invalid. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 702. The court cited State v.
Miller, 388 N.W.2d 522 (N.D. 1986) in rebuttal; even constitutional issues will not be
addressed, if not raised below, unless there is obvious error. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 702.
404. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 702 (citing State v. Lowenstein, 346 N.W.2d 292, 293
(N.D. 1984)).
405. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 702. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-08-01 (1985 & Supp.
1989Xproscribing physical obstruction of the administration of law or government). See 1
Working Papers of the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws 517, 519
(1972Xhmiting obstruction to physical acts). See City of Dickinson v. Mueller, 261 N.W.2d
787 (N.D. 1977Xan ordinance not in conflict did not supersede state law). Section 12.1-01-
05 of the North Dakota Century Code clearly expresses an intent to have statewide
uniformity in criminal law. City of Bismarck v. Hoopman, 421 N.W.2d 466, 468 (N.D.
1988).
406. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 702. Compare State v. Krawsky, 426 N.W.2d 875 (Minn.
1988Xsimilar state statute directed solely at physical acts of obstruction).
407. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 702.
408. Id.
1990]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
officer and attempted to enter the house.40 9 This conduct could
reasonably lead a jury to infer that Cameron physically obstructed
the officer in the performance of his duties.4 1°
There was evidence of physical obstruction by Cameron and
thus, there was no error in denying a motion for dismissal of the
charges.41'
Furthermore, the trial court informed both counsel and the
jury that if the jury had questions concerning the instructions, they
could inquire.4 1 2 The word in contention, "remonstrating," was
defined by defense counsel in his final argument.413 No questions
were asked by the jury, and the supreme court concluded that
there was no reversible error.4 14
The city conceded that the prosecutor engaged in improper
argument, but the trial court sustained defense counsel's objection
and admonished the jury to disregard the comments.415 The pros-
ecutor's comments did not appear to affect the jury's ability to
fairly evaluate the evidence and did not warrant a mistrial.416




In Matter of Ellis 418 the issue was whether an emotional
depression should be a mitigating factor in an action to disbar an
attorney.41 9 The Disciplinary Board of the North Dakota Supreme
Court recommended that Cheryl Ellis be disbarred from the prac-
409. Id.
410. Id. at 703. Mere verbal disagreements would not generally be considered an
unlawful obstruction. Id. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Little, 399 U.S. 1 (1950); State ex
rel. Wilmoth v. Gustke, 373 S.E.2d 484 (W. Va 1988); Annotation, What Constitutes
Obstructing or Resisting an Officer in the Absence of Actual Force, 44 A.L.R. 3d 1018
(1972).
411. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 703.
412. Id. The instructions were that "merely remonstrating with an officer... does not
amount to obstructing or delaying an officer in the performance of his duties." Id. See State
v. Rott, 380 N.W.2d 325 (N.D. 1986Xsimilar instructions).
413. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 704.
414. Id.
415. Id. A jury is presumed to follow the court's admonitions. State v. Janda, 397
N.W.2d 59, 65 (N.D. 1986).
416. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 704. A mistrial will be granted only to prevent manifest
injustice. State v. Kaiser, 417 N.W.2d 376, 379 (N.D. 1987). Inappropriate comments alone
are not enough to justify a mistrial in an otherwise fair proceeding. United States v. Young,
470 U.S. 11 (1985). See also State v. Carr, 346 N.W.2d 723, 725-26 (N.D. 1984Xsimilar
incident which did not warrant a mistrial).
417. Cameron, 435 N.W.2d at 704.
418. 439 N.W.2d 808 (N.D. 1989).
419. In re Ellis, 439 N.W.2d 808, 810-11 (N.D. 1989).
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tice of law for failure to attend to her client's matters.42 ° It was
found that in three cases she had been guilty of "misrepresenta-
tion, neglect, and failure to provide diligent and professional rep-
resentation" for her clients.42 1
This action was to review the decision of the Disciplinary
Board.42 The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that its review
must be de novo and the standard of proof must be by clear and
convincing evidence. 42 3 However, the review was more than a
formality, and the findings of the Disciplinary Board must not
automatically be approved.424 After reviewing the three cases for
which the disciplinary action was brought, the supreme court con-
cluded that there was clear and convincing evidence to determine
that Ellis had violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.42
Ellis requested that the disciplinary sanctions be mitigated
because she claimed that she was suffering from major depression
at the time of the alleged violations.42 The supreme court agreed
and determined that Ellis had shown that she had suffered severe
depression during the period in question.427 Thus, the court held
that disbarment was unduly harsh and imposed disciplinary action
that included a two-year suspension with all but the first 90 days
stayed and a one year probation provided Ellis complied with cer-
tain probationary conditions. 4 s
DIVORCE
BARANYK V. McDOWELL
In Baranyk v. McDowell,429 a former wife sought to modify a
district court judgment adjudicating the child support payments of
her former husband, James R. McDowell.43 ° In her motion to
420. Ellis, 439 N.W.2d at 809-10.
421. Id. at 810. The Disciplinary Board found that Ellis had violated the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, Cannon 1, DR T-102(AX4), (5), and (6); Cannon 6, DR 6-
101(AX3); and Cannon 7, DR 7-101(AX1), (2), (3X1980). Id. These sections pertain to
unprofessional conduct such as misrepresentation, neglect, and failure to carry out a
contract which may result in disciplinary action. Id. 809-10.
422. Ellis, 439 N.W.2d at 809.
423. Id. (citing Disciplinary Board of Supreme Court v. McKennett, 349 N.W.2d 29
(N.D. 1984)).
424. Ellis, 439 N.W.2d at 809. Each case must be decided on its own facts. Id.
425. Id. at 810.
426. Id.
427. Id. " ' [P ] ersonal or emotional problems"' and 'physical or mental disability or
impairment"' are mitigating factors to be applied if appropriate. Id., see North Dakota
Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, 9.32(cXh) (1988Xstandards designed to assist in
imposing disciplinary sanctions against attorneys).
428. Id. at 810-11.
429. 442 N.W.2d 423 (N.D. 1989).
430. Baranyk v. McDowell, 442 N.W.2d 423, 423 (N.D. 1989). McDowell, acting pro
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amend, Terry Baranyk sought to include judgment interest in the
judgment.43' The motion to amend was denied by a district court
and Baranyk appealed.43 2
In her appeal Baranyk contends that the legislative intent of
the statute allowing nonpayment of child support to become a
judgment is consistent with an award of judgment interest.4aa
Baranyk claims that the denial of her motion by the district court
was clearly erroneous.4 34
Baranyk's judgment against McDowell made no provision for
prejudgment interest. 43 5 The court cited its holding in Dick v.
Dick,43 6 which provided for prejudgment interest in alimony sup-
port, in remanding the issue of calculating interest on payments
prior to March 23, 1987.4a7
After determining that prejudgment interest should be added
to Baranyk's judgment, the court examined the question of
whether section 14-08.1-05.1(lXa) of the North Dakota Century
Code provides for interest to accrue on unpaid child support pay-
ments when they became due.438
"Interest" is not mentioned in the statute, but the language in
it provides that the unpaid support payment are to be judgments,
with "full force, effect, and attributes of a district court
judgment." 43 1
If a statute is ambiguous the court may consider extraneous
se, did not answer the motion adjudicating child support nor the motion to add the interest.
Id. at 424.
431. Baranyk, 442 N.W.2d at 424.
432. Id. After his divorce from Baranyk, McDowell consistently failed to make court
ordered child support payments. Id. at 423. On September 24, 1988, pursuant to Rule 3.2
of the North Dakota Rules of Court, Baranyk filed a motion to obtain an order adjudicating
the amount as a judgment under section 14-08.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id.
at 423-24. Section 14-08.1-05 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that an order
directing child support payments is a judgment on and after the date payment is unpaid
and due. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-08-1.-5 (1987). This judgment has the full force and effect
of a judgment of the district court. Id. McDowell did not answer the motion and a
judgment was entered against McDowell for $11,780 on October 11, 1988. Baranyk, 442
N.W.2d at 424. Baranyk's second motion to amend the judgment to contain judgment
interest was also not answered by McDowell, and was denied by the district court. Id.
433. Id. at 424.
434. Id. The supreme court determined that since section 14-08.1-05 of the North
Dakota Century Code was not enacted until 1987, the law allowing support orders to
become judgments did not apply to the payments due from 1983 to 1987. Baranyk, 442
N.W.2d at 424.
435. Id.
436. 434 N.W.2d 557 (N.D. 1989).
437. Baranyk, 442 N.W.2d at 424. In Dick, the court held that if a judgment of divorce
contains no reference to interest, section 28-20-34 of the North Dakota Century Code
applies and usual interest rates for judgments come into play. Dick v. Dick, 434 N.W.2d
557, 559 (N.D. 1989). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-20-34 (1987Xinterest rates on judgments).
438. Baranyk, 442 N.W.2d at 424.
439. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-08.1-05(lXa) (1987).
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
information such as legislative history in order to determine legis-
lative intent.44 ° Thus the court discussed what the legislative
intent was with regard to interest when section 14-08-05 of the
North Dakota Century Code was passed.44 '
The North Dakota Supreme Court drew their conclusion from
the testimony before the senate committee that the statute was
intended to bring North Dakota into compliance with federal
child support enforcement guidelines.442
The court found that the legislature intended to treat past due
child support payments as judgments and that interest was to be
ascertained in the same fashion as judgments entered by the dis-
trict court.443
The supreme court reversed the district court order denying
the motion to include interest and remanded the case to the trial
court, directing it to award interest at the statutory rate.444
BYZEWSKI V. ByzEwsKI
In Byzewski v. Byzewski, 441 Marilynn Byzewski, a member
and resident of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation,
appealed the custody and alimony provisions of a default divorce
decree from Raphael Byzewski, a non-Indian. 441
Marilynn and Raphael married in Grand Forks in 1979.4 4 ' At
the time, they had three children.448 They divorced in 1980 and
split custody of the children.449 The divorce decree was subse-
quently amended with Marilynn's retaining one child and
Raphael's parents in Manvel, North Dakota, receiving custody of
the two younger children.45 °
In 1983, the parties remarried in South Dakota and lived on
440. Baranyk, 442 N.W.2d at 425 (citing First Security Bank v. Enyart, 439 N.W.2d at
801 (N.D. 1989)).
441. Id. at 425.
442. Id. The federal guidelines make child support obligations that are unpaid
equivalent to judgments so as to prevent retroactive modification. Id.
443. Id. at 426. The exception is that past-due child support obligations could not be
entered in the judgment docket until the district court made an order for judgment and thejudgment was filed with the district court clerk according to Rule 58 of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at 426. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 58 (entry of judgment). Section 28-
20-34 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that interest on a judgment not based
upon an original instrument shall be 12%, thus the past due child support would accrue
interest at that rate. Baranyk, 442 N.W.2d at 426.
444. Baranyk, 442 N.W.2d at 426.
445. 429 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1988).
446. Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d 394, 395 (N.D. 1988).
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the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation with their three chil-
dren until 1986, when the couple separated.45 ' Marilynn obtained
several interim orders including a temporary custody order and a
temporary restraining order from the tribal court.45 2 Raphael
moved to Grand Forks with two children and filed for divorce in
district court where Marilynn's motion to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction was denied. 4 3 The district court awarded Raphael custody
of the children and ordered Marilynn to pay child support.454 The
tribal court issued Marilynn a divorce decree awarding her cus-
tody, child support, and alimony.455
Marilynn appealed the district court's judgment claiming lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because the action arose on a reser-
vation.4  Her claim was predicated on Williams v. Lee,4 ' a
United States Supreme Court decision that barred state courts
from adjudicating claims by non-Indians against Indians, arising on
a reservation. 4 m The North Dakota Supreme Court determined
that Williams was applicable to child custody and support claims
in a divorce action, because of the clear policy of the federal gov-
ernment's favoring tribal self-government. 459 The tribal court's
temporary orders were first-in-time, and the custodial domicile
was the reservation.4 ' Hence, the exercise of jurisdiction by the
state court interfered with tribal sovereignty.46 '
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that jurisdictional
prerequisites for divorce, custody, and support payments differ.462
As long as procedural due process requirements are met, district
courts may terminate marriages.463 However, a court must have
451. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d at 395.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 395-96.
454. Id. at 396.
455. Id.
456. Id.
457. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
458. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d at 396. See R.J. Williams Co. v. Belknap Housing Auth.,
719 F.2d 979, 983 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1016 (1985Xdescribing a tribe's
interest in self-governance).




462. Id. See generally Reliable, Inc. v. Stutsman County Comm'n, 409 N.W.2d 632,
634 (necessity for personal and subject matter jurisdiction in civil cases).
463. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d at 397 (citing Schillerstrom v. Schillerstrom, 75 N.D. 667,
699-702, 32 N.W.2d 106, 122-24 (1948)). See Shulze v. Shulze, 322 N.W.2d 250, 252 (N.D.




personal jurisdiction to adjudicate alimony or support.464 Whether
personal jurisdiction is required to settle child custody is
unsettled. 4
The state court itself may gauge whether it has subject matter
jurisdiction.4e Contacts with the state may not be sufficient to
grant personal jurisdiction over an Indian domiciled on a reserva-
tion.4 7  Further, domestic relations among tribal members are
important to tribal self-government.46  Thus, Raphael's residency
in Grand Forks County did not outweigh the tribe's right to "make
their own laws and be ruled by them.s
469
Raphael argued that the first amended divorce decree, giving
his North Dakota parents custody, establishes state court jurisdic-
tion, but when parties remarry prior custody provisions are gener-
ally nullified.470 Raphael also cited Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold
Eng 'g 471 as preempting chapter 27-19 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code.472 However, chapter 27-19 was not preempted insofar
as it required consent for state jurisdiction over a claim arising on a
reservation between a non-Indian and an Indian.473 Here, the
tribe did not consent to state jurisdiction and provided an avail-
able forum.474 Finally, Raphael's due process and equal protection
rights were not violated because "'such disparate treatment of the
Indian (his spouse) is justified because it is intended to benefit the
"1475class of which [s]he is a member....
The divorce was affirmed, while the child custody and support
claims were revised.476
464. Byzeweki, 429 N.W.2d at 397 (citing Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416
(1957)).
465. Id. at 398. See Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and
Enforcement, 66 MINN. L. REV. 711, 764-90 (1982).
466. Byzeuwki, 429 N.W.2d at 298. See Williams, 358 U.S. 217 (1959Xan infringement
test for subject matter jurisdiction).
467. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d at 398. See generally Fisher v. District Court 424 U.S. 382,
389 n.14 (1976Xapplication of the infringement test in an adoption proceeding).
468. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d at 399 (citing three affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering,
476 U.S. 877, 889 (1986)).
469. Id. (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. at 220).
470. Id. at 400 (citing Annotation, Effect on Remarriage of Spouses to Each Other on
Child Custody and Support Provisions of Prior Divorce Decree, 26 A.L.R. 4th 325 (1983)).
471. 467 U.S. 138 (1984).
472. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d at 400. See Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S.
138 (1984) [Three Tribes I]; Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 476 U.S. 877 (1986)
[Three Tribes II]; N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-19 (1974 and Supp. 1989XIndian Civil
Jurisdiction).
473. Byzeuski, 429 N.W.2d at 401 (citing McKenzie County Social Services Bd. v. V.G.,
392 N.W.2d 399, 402 (N.D. 1986) cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930 (1987)).
474. Id.
475. Id. (quoting Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 391 (1976)).
476. Id. at 401.
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NOVAK V. NOVAK
In Novak v. Novak,477 a child's preference was not a control-
ling factor in awarding child custody.478 After Richard and Jacque
Novak were divorced in October 1984, Joel Novak, then age nine,
was placed by stipulated divorce decree in Jacque's principal cus-
tody.479 Through the same decree Richard was awarded reason-
able visitation rights with Joel."s Joel was one of two sons born to
the Novak marriage.48 An older son, Daniel, is autistic and
resides at the Grafton State School. 41 In June 1986, Jacque remar-
ried.4 s Jacque sought, in September 1988, a court order to
change Joel's residence from Grand Forks, North Dakota, to Colo-
rado Springs, Colorado. 4s 4 Shortly after Jacque's motion for
change of residence, Richard moved for a change of custody.4 8
Throughout the proceedings, Joel expressed his preference of liv-
ing with his father.4 "o The district court granted Jacque's motion
for change of residence and denied Richard's motion for change of
custody.8 7 On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's judgment and held that the trial court's authori-
zation of the change of residence and its denial of the change of
custody was not clearly erroneous.4s
DIVORCE AND SEPARATION
BEHM V. BEHM
In Behm v. Behm,4s9 Roger Behm appealed a decree of
divorce from Frances Behm.4'9 0 The trial court ordered Roger to
pay child support of $700 per month and spousal support of $1,250
per month, in addition, the court divided all property nearly
equally.491 The issues on appeal were whether the trial court
erred in awarding spousal support, in determining property val-
477. 441 N.W.2d 656 (N.D. 1989).
478. Novak v. Novak, 441 N.W.2d 656, 657 (N.D. 1989).
479. Novak, 441 N.W.2d at 657.
480. Id.
481. Id.
482. Id. Joel has maintained contact with Daniel on a regular basis and has expressed
to the court that he enjoys these visits. Novak, 441 N.W.2d at 659 (Vande Walle, J.,
concurring specially).
483. Novak, 441 N.W.2d at 657.
484. Id.
485. Id. Richard requested the trial court to award him principal custody of Joel. Id.
486. Id. at 659 (Vande Walle, J., concurring specially).
487. Novak, 441 N.W.2d at 657.
488. Id.
489. 427 N.W.2d 332 (N.D. 1988).
490. Behm v. Behm, 427 N.W.2d 332, 333 (N.D. 1988).
491. Behm, 427 N.W.2d at 334.
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ues, and in dividing a profit-sharing fund and inherited
property.
49 2
Based on Roger's stable monthly income of $2,500 and addi-
tional fluctuating monthly income, the supreme court determined
that spousal support of $1,250 was appropriate to allow Frances to
continue living at her accustomed standard of living.493 The court
also found that the lack of a fixed term for spousal support was not
clearly erroneous when the trial court retained continuing juris-
diction and could respond to changed economic circumstances. 494
The supreme court upheld the trial court's valuation of prop-
erty as being supported by the evidence and not clearly errone-
ous.495 In terms of property division, an award of $41,000 was not
clearly erroneous because Roger had disposed of an $82,000 profit-
sharing fund in violation of an interim restraining order.49
The court mandated the division of the husband's undistrib-
uted inheritance.4 97 In support of this decision, the court noted
the longevity of the marriage, the existence of three children, and
marital misconduct. 498  There was no other savings or liquid
investments with which to recognize Frances's contributions as a
homemaker.4 1 The supreme court affirmed indefinite spousal




In Aanenson v. Bastien 50 1 the issue was whether "complicity"
492. Id. at 333.
493. Id. at 334 (citing Wheeler v. Wheeler, 419 N.W.2d 923 (N.D. 1988); Bagan v.
Bagan, 382 N.W.2d 645 (N.D. 1986)).
494. Behm, 427 N.W.2d at 334-35 (citing Wheeler v. Wheeler, 419 N.W.2d 923 (N.D.
1988)). The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that Frances's endeavor to accredit herself
as a secondary teacher did not detract from the spousal support award. Behm, 427 N.W.2d
at 335.
495. Behm, 427 N.W.2d at 335.
496. Id.
497. Id. at 336-37. "Inherited property can be divided between spouses to make an
equitable division of property." Id. (citing Winter v. Winter, 338 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1983)).
See also Anderson v. Anderson, 390 N.W.2d 584 (N.D. 1986Xproviding that a substantial
part of inherited property be set aside to a homemaker after a seventeen year marriage that
bore three children, little property, and a disparity in earning power).
498. Behm, 427 N.W.2d at 336. Marital misconduct may be considered in property
distribution under the Ruff-Fischer guidelines. Id. at 337.
499. Id. See Briese v. Briese, 325 N.W.2d 245, 247 (N.D. 1982Xrecognizing that
homemakers' contributions deserve recognition in divorce settlements).
500. Behm, 427 N.W.2d at 337.
501. 438 N.W.2d 151 (N.D. 1989).
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was a defense to a dram shop action.502 Aanenson and Wolfgraxn
were riding their motorcycles and along the way they stopped at
four bars including The Lower 48, owned by Bastien. °3 At the
four bars Aanenson and Wolfgram took turns ordering and buying
drinks.- ° 4  After the men left the Lower 48, riding their
motorcycles in single file fashion, Wolfgram's motorcycle rear-
ended Aanenson's.5 5 The accident resulted in injury to Aanenson
and he brought a dram shop action against Bastien (Lower 48).1°
The trial court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment
and entered judgment.5 07 Aanenson appealed the judgment.508
The North Dakota Supreme Court reversed and remanded
the case,5° holding that a "complicity" defense would "defeat the
purpose of the dram shop act."151 0 The court went against a major-
ity of jurisdictions in this ruling including Iowa, Michigan, and
Minnesota.5 1 The court stated that it would be "an absurd result
if alcoholic beverage dealers could avoid liability for illegal sales to
intoxicated customers . ." based upon a customary method of
patrons' taking turns buying drinks.5 12 Thus, the case was
remanded for further proceedings pursuant to the ruling.513
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED
HOLTE V. STATE HIGHWAY COMM'R
In Holte v. North Dakota State Highway Commissioner,1 4 the
North Dakota State Highway Commissioner appealed a district
court reversal of an administrative suspension of Arden Holte's
driving privileges.51 5 Holte was arrested for driving under the
influence of intoxicating liquor, taken to a law-enforcement center
for an intoxilyzer test, and denied an opportunity to consult with
502. Aanenson v. Bastien, 438 N.W.2d 151, 151-52 (N.D. 1989).
503. Aanenson, 438 N.W.2d at 152.
504. Id.
505. Id.
506. Id. Wolfgram was having trouble with his cycle. Id.
507. Aanenson, 438 N.W.2d at 151.
508. Id. The trial court determined that because Aanenson had purchased drinks for
Wolfgram, he was a "non-innocent" third party and this "complicity" was a defense to a
dram shop action in this state. Id.
509. Id.
510. Id. at 161. The purpose of the Dram Shop Act was to discourage sales to
intoxicated persons and the possible disastrous consequences. Id.
511. Aanenson, 438 N.W.2d at 157, 161.
512. Id. at 156. The court stated that "the legislature intended the responsibility and
liability for serving alcoholic beverages to an intoxicated person to fall on the merchant (the
dram shop)." Id. at 157.
513. Id. at 161.
514. 436 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989).
515. Holte v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 436 N.W.2d 250, 251 (N.D. 1989).
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an attorney before being given the intoxilyzer test.5 1 6 After the
test results were introduced as evidence in an administrative hear-
ing, Holte's driving privileges were suspended for 364 days.5 17
Holte appealed to the district court.518 The trial court concluded
that the arresting officer violated Holte's right to consult an attor-
ney; the court reversed the administrative decision and ordered
Holte's driving privileges be reinstated.519
The issue on appeal was whether the test results from a fairly
administered intoxilyzer test were properly admitted into the civil
administrative proceeding, even though Holte was not allowed to
consult an attorney prior to administering the test.52°
The supreme court distinguished another supreme court deci-
sion as involving the narrow issue of what constitutes a refusal to
take a test and not the suppression of evidence. 521 There was no
issue of refusal in Holte.522
The court refused to extend the exclusionary rule to civil pro-
ceedings for several reasons: the implied-consent law gathers reli-
able evidence of intoxication or nonintoxication; 52 the legislative
directive to receive into evidence the results of fairly administered
tests;524 previous holdings that an affirmative refusal is necessary to
withdraw consent; 52 the role of license suspension proceedings in
protecting the public;526 and constitutional protections of criminal
procedures are not applicable in administrative license-suspension
proceedings. 52 7 Thus, the district court erred in reversing Holte's
516. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 251. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (1987 and Supp.
1989Xdefinition of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor); § 39-20-01 (1987 and
Supp. 1989Xchemical test for intoxication and implied consent).
517. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 251. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-05 (1987 and Supp.
1989Xadministrative hearing on request).
518. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 251. See Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285
(1987 and Supp. 1989Xjudicial review).
519. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 251. See Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285(N.D. 1987Xdiscussing right to consult an attorney before refusing to take intoxilyzer test).
520. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 251.
521. Id. (citing Kuntz, 405 N.W.2d at 286, n.1).
522. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 251. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04 (1987 and Supp.
1989Xproviding that no test is allowed if a person refuses). See also, e.g., State v. Solbert,
381 N.W.2d 197 (N.D. 1986Xan affirmative refusal is required to withdraw implied consent).
523. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 252 (quoting Asbridge v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 291
N.W.2d 739, 750 (N.D. 1980)).
524. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 252. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-07 (1987 and Supp.
1989Xproviding that the results of a fairly administered test must be received in evidence
in any proceeding arising out of act alleged to have been committed by a person driving
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor).
525. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 252.
526. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 252 (citing Williams v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 417
N,W.2d 359, 360 (N.D. 1987Xquoting Asbridge, 291 N.W.2d at 750)).
527. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 252 (citing Holen v. Hjelle, 396 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1986)); see
also Westendorf v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 400 N.W.2d 553, 557 (Iowa, 1987Xthe benefit of
using reliable information of intoxication in license revocation hearings outweighs the
1990]
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driving suspension because Holte was not allowed to consult an
attorney before he submitted to the intoxilyzer test.52 8 The judg-
ment was reversed.529
STATE v. DRESSLER
In State v. Dressler,53° the state appealed a county court order
granting Nick Dressler's motion to suppress the results of blood
and breath tests taken after he was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol in violation of section 39-08-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code.5 31 When arrested, Dressier requested that
blood samples be drawn at the Richardton Community Hospital
located a few hundred yards away.532 Instead, the arresting officer
informed Dressier that the hospital in Richardton had refused to
draw blood samples in the past and transported him twenty-three
miles to Dickinson for testing.5 3 The state appealed the suppres-
sion of the test results contending that Dressler had not been pre-
vented from obtaining his own test, but rather that he was
required to submit to the officer's test first. 53
The supreme court noted that section 39-20-02 allows motor-
ists to obtain their own chemical test for determining blood alco-
hol content in addition to the one performed by the state. 5  The
possible benefit of applying the exclusionary rule). Contra, Whisenhunt v. Dep't of Pub.
Safety, 746 P.2d 1298 (Alaska, 1987).
528. Holte, 436 N.W.2d at 252.
529. Id. Justice Meschke dissented noting that in Kuntz, and in Bickler v. N.D. State
Highway Comm'r, 423 N.W.2d 146 (N.D. 1988), the court recognized a defendant's
qualified right to consult with counsel before taking a chemical test. Further, the Justice
argued that the appeal was moot because Holte had negotiated a plea bargain, pled guilty
to a second offense, and was sentenced. The issue was not a matter of great public interest
so that it warranted an opinion without an actual controversy. See Rolette Education Ass'n
v. Rolette Pub. School Dist., 427 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1988). (Meschke, J., dissenting. Holte,
436 N.W.2d at 252-54).
530. 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. App. 1988).
531. State v. Dressier, 433 N.W.2d 549 (N.D. App. 1988). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-
08-01(1) (1987 and Supp. 1989Xproviding in part that a person may not drive or actually
control any vehicle on a highway if -[t]hat person has a blood alcohol concentration of at
least ten one-hundredths of one percent by weight at the time of the performance of a
chemical test within two hours after the driving").
532. Dressier, 433 N.W.2d at 550-51.
533. Id.
534. Id. at 550.
535. Id. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-02 (1987 and Supp. 1989) provides in part:
The person tested may have a physician, or a qualified technician, chemist,
registered nurse, or other qualified person of his own choosing administer a
chemical test or tests in addition to any administered at the direction of a law
enforcement officer with all costs of an additional test or tests to be the sole
responsibility of the person charged. The failure or inability to obtain an
additional test by a person does not preclude the admission of the test or tests
taken at the direction of a law enforcement officer.
The state contended that section 39-20-02 required the state to test before the person
charged may obtain their own test. State v. Larson, 313 N.W.2d 750 (N.D. 1981). The
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person arrested must be given a reasonable opportunity to secure
the extra test, and what is reasonable may vary depending on the
circumstances. 36 The location, time of day, and distance to the
testing facility are factors to consider. 37 Further, although law
enforcement officers need not assist or advise the person arrested,
they must afford a reasonable opportunity for compliance.5 1
In this case Dressler's request was reasonable in view of the
closeness of Richardton Hospital, the late-night arrest, and dis-
tance required to travel to Dickinson.-39 In addition, the officer
gave misleading statements about Richardton Hospital, and the
officer would have had ample time to perform the state's test if he
had granted Dressler's request.540 Thus, Dressier was deprived of
a reasonable opportunity to exercise his statutory rights.541
Results of chemical tests may be suppressed when a motorist is
not allowed his right to independent testing, therefore the lower
court's order suppressing the results of the state's test was
affirmed.A4 2
STATE V. WRIGHT
In State v. Wright,5 43 Robert L. Wright appealed from a con-
viction of driving with a blood alcohol content of 0.10%, pursuant
to section 39-08-01 of the North Dakota Century Code.54 4 The
supreme court noted that this case did not support the state's contention. There was some
support in other jurisdictions, however. See Huff v. State, 144 Ga. App. 764,242 S.E.2d 361,
362-63 (1978Xstate must perform test first before statutory rights to alternative test attach);
Greenwood v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 13 Wash. App. 624, 536 P.2d 644, 646 (1975Xperson
must submit to or refuse test directed by law enforcement officer before having the right to
choose own test).
536. Dressler, 433 N.W.2d at 550-51 (citing People v. Underwood, 153 Mich. App. 598,
396 N.W.2d 433, 444 (1986); Commonwealth v. Alano, 388 Mass. 871, 448 N.E.2d 1122,
1128 (1988Xwhat is reasonable may differ from locality to locality).
537. Dressler, 433 N.W.2d at 551. See Alano, 448 N.E.2d at 1128 (officer may not
prevent a person's attempts to get another examination); State v. Rambousek, 358 N.W.2d
223 (N.D. 1984Xofficer need not advise a person of the right to another test).




542. Dressier, 433 N.W.2d at 551-52. See, e.g., State v. Hughes, 181 Ga. App. 464, 352
S.E.2d 643 (1987); People v. Underwood, 153 Mich. App. 598, 396 N.W.2d 443, 444 (1986).
The court reaffirmed interpretation of "failure or inability to obtain an additional test" in
section 39-20-02 of the North Dakota Century Code to mean a situation when an arrestee
does not make an effort to where an independent sample can not be obtained. It does not
constitute a "failure" nor an "inability" if a reasonable opportunity is not provided.
Dressler, 433 N.W.2d at 552.
543. 426 N.W.2d 3 (N.D. 1988).
544. State v. Wright, 426 N.W.2d 3, 4 (N.D. 1988). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01
(1987 and Supp. 1989Xproviding, in part, that a person may not drive or be in actual control
of any vehicle if "[t]hat person has a blood-alcohol concentration of at least ten one-
hundredths of one percent by weight at the time of the performance of a chemical test
within two hours after the driving").
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issue on appeal was the adequacy of the chain of custody of the
defendant's blood-alcohol test results and whether or not the trial
court erred in admitting the results into evidence. 5
It is undisputed that the arresting officer failed to seal and
label the blood sample as required by the state toxicologist.'
Furthermore, the state did not offer testimony to set forth a chain
of custody.517 The supreme court concluded that the trial court
erred in admitting the results of Wright's blood-alcohol test as evi-
dence.54s The court further found that substantial prejudice
resulted from admitting the test results.59 Thus, because the
error was not harmless, the conviction was reversed. 5"
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE
EVANS V. BACKES
In Evans v. Backes,"1 Mark Evans appealed from a district
court judgment affirming the results of an administrative hearing
suspending his driving privileges.552 Evans was arrested for driv-
ing under the influence of intoxicating liquor, taken to a law
enforcement center for an intoxilyzer test, and taken to the Man-
dan Hospital for a blood test because his intoxilyzer samples were
inadequate.5- 3 Evans requested to call his wife so that she could
call an attorney, but the deputy refused, offering to call an attor-
ney himself or to assist Evans in making a call.'m When Evans
became loud and uncooperative, the deputy determined that
Evans had refused the blood test.5
At an administrative hearing, the officer found that Evans had
refused to be tested and revoked his driving privileges for two
years.' Evans appealed and the district court affirmed, conclud-
545. Wright, 426 N.W.2d at 5.
546. Id.
547. Id. Chain of custody is established by testimony verifying that the blood tested
was the same blood that was collected. Id.
548. Id. The court noted that the instant case presented an issue identical to that in
State v. Nygaard, 426 N.W.2d 547 (N.D. 1988). Id.
549. Wright, 426 N.W.2d at 5-6 (citing State v. Micko, 393 N.W.2d 741, 746 (N.D.
1986)). See N.D.R. CnlM. P. 52(aXproviding that any error which does not affect substantial
rights may be disregarded).
550. Wright, 426 N.W.2d at 6. Justice Meschke dissented, stating that the appropriate
standard of review should be whether the trial court had abused its discretion and that such
abuse had not occurred in Wright. Id. (Meschke, J., dissenting).
551. 437 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1989).
552. Evans v. Backes, 437 N.W.2d 848, 849 (N.D. 1989).
553. Evans, 437 N.W.2d at 849.
554. id.
555. Id.




ing that there was no evidence supporting Evans' claim that he
was denied a reasonable opportunity to consult an attorney." 7
On appeal to the supreme court, Evans relied on Kuntz v.
State Highway Commissioner,5m contending that the hearing
officer failed to make a finding on whether he had been denied a
reasonable opportunity to consult an attorney.5 9
The review of administrative decisions is pursuant to section
28-32-19 of the North Dakota Century Code.,' The court deter-
mines "whether a reasoning mind could reasonably have deter-
mined that the facts or conclusions were supported by the weight
of the evidence."' 11
The hearing officer recited conflicting testimony concerning
Evans' request and did not mention the issue regarding an attor-
ney in the conclusions of law; recitation of testimony does not
equal finding of fact.5 2 Further, it is not sufficient to merely
determine whether the person refused to submit to the test
because a person who was denied a reasonable opportunity to con-
sult an attorney and refused the test did not refuse for the pur-
poses of revoking a driver's license.- 3 It cannot be argued that by
finding a refusal to be tested the hearing officer implicitly found
that a reasonable opportunity to consult an attorney was
offered.5"  An agency is required to explicitly state its findings of
fact and conclusions of law.- The failure to "draft a finding of
fact on the critical issue of whether Evans was denied a reasonable
opportunity to consult an attorney before deciding whether to
submit to the blood test[s]" warranted reversing the judgment and
remanding for proper findings.5
557. Evans, 437 N.W.2d at 849.
558. 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D. 1987). See Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d
285, 285 (1987).
559. Evans, 437 N.W.2d at 849.
560. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19 (1974 & Supp. 1989). The court in Evans
outlines a three-step process: "(1) Are the findings supported by a preponderance of the
evidence? (2) Are the conclusions of law sustained by the finding of fact? (3) Is the agency
decision supported by the conclusions of law?" Evans, 437 N.W.2d at 849.
561. Evans, 437 N.W.2d at 849 (citing Falcon v. Williams County Social Service Bd.,
430 N.W.2d 569, 571 (N.D. 1988)).
562. Evans, 437 N.W.2d at 850.
563. Id. (citing Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.w.2d 285, 288 (1987)).
564. Evans, 437 N.W.2d at 850.
565. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-13 (1974Xfndings of fact, conclusions and
decision of an agency)).
566. Id. at 851. See Hystad v. Industrial Comm'n, 389 N.W.2d 590 (N.D.
1986Xremanded because of uncertainty about basis for decision); Kuhn v. North Dakota
Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 76 N.W.2d 171, 177 (N.D. 1956Xremanded with instructions to prepare
finding). But see City of Fargo v. Windmill, Inc., 350 N.W.2d 32 (N.D. 1984Xnot remanded
because underlying basis for decision revealed despite lack of findings); Northwestern Bell
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LUBENOW V. NORTH DAKOTA STATE HIGHWAY
COMMISSIONER
In Lubenow v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r- 7 the issue was
whether evidence obtained by a policeman in an unrelated "emer-
gency" may be used to prosecute the defendant.-" 8 In December
of 1987, Terry Schander witnessed Wayne Lubenow driving errat-
ically and wandering from lane to lane." 9 Schander followed
Lubenow and called the police, using the phone in his pickup.5 7 0
Schander followed Lubenow until Lubenow pulled into the drive-
way of his home.5 7 1 Schander then witnessed a series of events
which included Lubenow lying down and walking around the
car.5 7 2  When police officer Olson arrived, he notified his dis-
patcher that there was a man down in the garage and he entered
the garage to assist Lubenow.5  Olson twice asked Lubenow if he
wanted medical assistance, but Lubenow refused on both
occasions.574
Olson then asked Lubenow to accompany him to his patrol car
at which time police officer Volrath arrived.5 75 The officers gave
Lubenow a number of field sobriety tests, all of which he failed.576
Lubenow refused to take an ALERT test.577 The officers then
placed Lubenow under arrest for drunk driving and asked him to
submit to a blood test; he refused.17  Lubenow's license was
revoked pursuant to section 39-20-04 of the North Dakota Century
Code. 79 Lubenow appealed the decision of the hearing officer
and the sustaining district court decision to revoke his license.5 °
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that Olson's initial
Telephone Co. v. Hagen, 234 N.W.2d 841 (N.D. 1975Xabsence of finding was negligible and
remand not required).
567. 438 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1989).
568. Lubenow v. N.D. State Highway Comm'r, 438 N.W.2d 528, 531,533 (N.D. 1989).
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure is made
applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment).




573. Lubenow, 438 N.W.2d at 530.
574. Id. Olson smelled a strong odor of alcohol on Lubenow's breath. Id.
575. Id. After placing Lubenow in his patrol car, Olson asked Schander if Lubenow
was the person he had witnessed driving the car. Id.
576. Id.
577. Lubenow, 438 N.W.2d at 530.
578. Id.
579. ld. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-04 (1987 & Supp. 1989Xrevocation of driver's
license upon refusal to submit to testing). A hearing was held on January 27, 1988, at which
time the revocation of the license was upheld. Lubenow, 438 N.W.2d at 530. On April 20,
1988, district court upheld the decision. Id. at 531.
580. Lubenow, 438 N.W.2d at 531.
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entry into the garage was proper and the search thereafter was
reasonable; hence, the arrest was valid.1' The court defined a
search and seizure, within the protection of the fourth amend-
ment, as an area where the person has an expectation of pri-
vacy. 2 Absent an exception, a warrant is required in these areas
of expected privacy. s3 The "emergency doctrine" is one excep-
tion to the warrant requirement.5 "'There are exceptional cir-
cumstances in which.., it may be contended that a magistrate's
warrant for search may be dispensed with.'"5a The supreme
court indicated that, based on information received from
Schander and his own observations, there was an immediate need
for action by Olson.56 Thus, there was a sufficient relationship
between the search and the emergency. Consequently, the arrest
was valid.'T The district court decision was affirmed.51
DRUGS AND NARCOTICS
STATE V. CONNERY
In State v. Connery,"9 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that a defendant's statement to an officer regarding defendant's
ownership of marijuana was admissible against him at trial.590
Kevin Connery appealed a conviction of possession of a controlled
substance.59 ' Connery was convicted after marijuana was found
on the ground around Connery's vehicle while Connery was being
stopped for a speeding violation.5 9 2  Connery made two state-
ments to the officer that "just some marijuana" was in a box in the
car when the officer had his service revolver drawn on Connery,
and that he "threw it out" when asked about baggies of marijuana
found on the ground around the patrol car when the officer
581. Id. at 533.
582. Id. at 531 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)). The supreme court
determined, in State v. Manning, 134 N.W.2d 91 (N.D. 1965), that a garage is a place where
the owner has an expectation of privacy. Lubenow, 438 N.W.2d at 531.
583. Id. at 532.
584. Id. (citations omitted).
585. Id. (quoting Johnson V. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14-15 (1947)).
586. Lubenow, 438 N.W.2d at 533. See People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, -, 383
N.Y.S.2d 246,248, 347 N.E.2d 607,609, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976Xset forth guidelines
for application of the emergency doctrine). Lubenow, 438 N.W.2d at 533.
587. Lubenow, 438 N.W.2d at 533.
588. Id.
589. 441 N.W.2d 651 (N.D. 1989).
590. State v. Connery, 441 N.W.2d 651, 654 (N.D. 1989).
591. Connery, 441 N.W.2d at 652. See N.D. CENT. CODE 1 9-03-23 (1987Xclass A
misdemeanor to possess more than one-half ounce and not less than one ounce of
marijuana).
592. Connery, 441 N.W.2d at 652. Connery seemed to be hiding the bags and also a
wooden box with marijuana. Id.
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released Connery.5 93
Connery tried to suppress both the statements.5 " The trial
court held that the first of the statements should be suppressed
because Connery was in custody, and the lack of a Miranda595
warning called for the suppression of the statement. 59 The sec-
ond statement was deemed admissible by the trial court because
Connery was told he could leave and was not in custody when the
statement was made.5 9 7
The three issues addressed by the North Dakota Supreme
Court were: 1) the trial court's refusal to dismiss the second state-
ment; 2) the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a guilty verdict;
and 3) whether Connery's right to a speedy trial was violated.5 9 8
The supreme court initially noted that Miranda warnings are
only required when a person is interrogated while in custody.599
The court found that the questioning of Connery was more than a
mere traffic stop because the officer drew his revolver, thus the
first statement was suppressible because lack of a Miranda warn-
ing., The court determined that the trial court did not err in not
suppressing the second statement because it was made while Con-
nery was returning to his car, and no reasonable person would
have thought he was in custody.w°1
Upon reaching the second issue, the court concluded that
there was sufficient evidence to sustain a guilty verdict. °2 Cir-
cumstantial evidence may be used to prove possession, and the
court found that in this case the marijuana found on the ground by
Connery's vehicle was sufficient evidence. °3
The court found the six month delay between filing of the
complaint and the start of the trial because the arresting officer
was absent from the state did not constitute a violation of Con-
593. Id. Connery was not arrested, but the material found on the ground was
submitted to the state's attorney and he was charged with possession. Id. at 653.
594. Id.
595. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
596. Connery, 441 N.W.2d at 653.
597. Id.
598. Id.
599. Connery, 441 N.W.2d at 654. The state did not present "public safety" exceptions
to Miranda on appeal. Id. at 653 (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984XMiranda
need not apply if questions prompted by concern for public safety)). Connery did not argue
the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine. ld. (citing Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298
(1985Xearlier unwarned statement taints subsequent admissions)).
600. Id. at 654.
601. Id. at 655.
602. Id.
603. Connery, 441 N.W.2d at 655 (citing State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 1989)).
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nery's right to a speedy trial.604
The judgment of conviction was affirmed. °5
STATE V. MICHLITSCH
In State v. Mihlitsch,6w DeVerne Michlitsch appealed her
conviction of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in vio-
lation of section 19-03.1-23(1) of the North Dakota Century
Code.' °7 Law enforcement officers obtained search warrants and
searched two mobile homes, numbers 12 and .13.601 When the
defendant's mobile home (13) was searched, Ronald Zuraff, the
tenant of 12, who often stayed there, was present.' Marijuana
was found, Michlitsch returned, and both Michlitsch and Zuraff
were arrested.6 10 Officers found marijuana cigarette butts in her
purse and a marijuana cigarette on her person."1
At trial, Zuraff pled guilty and testified that the marijuana
found in Michlitsch's mobile home was his alone.6 12 Michlitsch
was found guilty of possession with intent to deliver and received a
five-year suspended sentence. 13
The issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in refus-
ing to give Michlitsch's requested affirmative defense instruction
which provided that it is an afrmative defense to both crimes if
the defendant has no knowledge of the presence of the drug or its
identity.614
The State relied on State v. Rippley 15 and State v. Morris6 16
in which the supreme court held that possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver is a strict liability offense. 1 7 Fur-
604. Connery, 441 N.W.2d at 656. The court determined that there was no hint in the
record that the delay by the state was an attempt to hinder Connery's defense. Id. (citing
State v. Wunderlich, 338 N.W.2d at 658 (N.D. 1983)). To determine whether the right to a
speedy trial was violated a balancing and weighing of four factors is involved: "length of
delay, reason for delay, defendant's assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant."
Id. (citing State v. Littlewind, 417 N.W.2d at 361 (N.D. 1987) and State v. Padgett, 410
N.W.2d at 143 (N.D. 1987)).
605. Connery, 441 N.W.2d at 656.
606. 438 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1989).
607. State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d 175, 175-176 (N.D. 1989). See N.D. CENT. CODE
1 19-03.1-23(1) (1981 and Supp. 1989).




612. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 176. The jury was instructed on possession with intent
to deliver as well as simple possession. Id.
613. Id.
614. Id.
615. 319 N.W.2d 129 (N.D. 1982).
616. 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 1983).
617. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 176. See State v. Rippley, 319 N.W.2d 129 (N.D.
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ther, the court held that the crime of unlawful possession is also a
strict liability offense, and the state does not have to prove intent
or knowledge on the part of the defendant.8 8 Michlitsch relies on
Morris in which the Washington Supreme Court referred to sim-
ple possession as an "almost strict-liability" offense and establishes
an affirmative defense. 1 9
The North Dakota Supreme Court had not approved or disap-
proved of the affirmative defense instruction in Morris or Rippley,
but concluded in Michlitsch that if the evidence so warrants and
the defendant requests, an affirmative defense instruction isproper.6 2 0 The court agreed that such a provision ameliorates the
harshness of strict criminal liability for unknowing possession.621
A defendant is entitled to a jury "instruction based on a legal
defense if there is evidence to support it.' ' 62 Here, testimony of
both defendants corroborated her theory, and Michlitsch
requested the instruction.62 Because the trial court's refusal was
not harmless error, the court reversed the judgment and
remanded for a new trial.62 4
Further, Michlitsch contended that admission of the evidence
regarding the marijuana cigarette butts in her purse, the mari-
juana cigarette found on her person, and the two smoking devices
with marijuana residue found in her mobile home violated rule
404(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. 86 The general rule
is that evidence of other crimes is not admissible unless relevant
1982Xpossession with intent to deliver does not require proof of guilty knowledge); State v.
Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48 (N.D. 1983Xreaffirming Rippley).
618. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 177 (citing Morris, 331 N.W.2d at 57).
619. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 177. See State v. Cleppe, 96 Wash.2d 373, 635 P.2d
438, 440-41 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1006 (1982Xrecognition of an affirmative defense
to the crime of simple possession).
620. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 177. Id. at 178. The affirmative defense provision is an
accommodation which recognizes that the Legislature intended possession of a controlled
substance and possession with intent to deliver to be strict liability crimes but also considers
the constitutional interests of the accused. The defendant has the burden of proving this
affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence; the State is not required to prove
the nonexistence of the defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., State v. Knittel, 308
N.W.2d 379, 383 (N.D. 1981); United States v. Wulff, 758 F.2d 1121 (6th Cir. 1985); State v.
Buttrey, 651 P.2d 1075, 1083 (1982Xrecognizing the potential for a constitutional attack
against strict liability offenses when a person possesses a controlled substance unwittingly).
Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 178. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-01-03(3) (1985Xan
affirmative defense must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence);
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977Xguilty knowledge is not an essential element of
possession of a controlled substance or possession with intent to deliver).
621. Id.
622. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 179 (citing State v. Thiel, 411 N.W.2d 66, 67 (N.D.
1987)).
623. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 179.
624. Id.
625. Id. See N.D.R. EVID. 404(b) (other crimes, wrongs or acts).
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for some purpose other than showing a criminal character.6
However, evidence may be admissible when it arises out of the
same transaction and provides a more complete picture of the rel-
evant events.6 ' 7 Here, the evidence was used to enhance the
understanding of the event and not to prove propensity.68 To
prevent undue prejudice, however, only as much of the related
crimes as necessary should be admitted.612
Each item found was discovered almost contemporaneously
with the search and arrest and each is relevant to the crimes
charged.60 As such, it did not seem to constitute evidence of
other crimes.63 ' Even if this evidence were subject to rule 404(b),
it was admissible to show intent, knowledge, or absence of mis-
take. 3 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
exclude the evidence. 33
On remand, the jury was to be instructed on the atffrmative
defense if Michlitsch so requested and the evidence warranted
it.6 34
STATE v. RAYWALT
In State v. Raywalt,63 5 a defendant convicted of delivery of a
controlled substance was held not to have the standing to chal-
lenge a search of an apartment where he was a guest and that the
warrantless search of the defendant was proper under the
circumstances.636
Pursuant to a search warrant, police officers searched an
apartment where Daniel Raywalt was present at a party. 37
Raywalt, who was on probation, was searched pursuant to a clause
in his probation conditions and a recipe for methamphetamine
626. Michlitch, 438 N.W.2d at 179 (citing State v. Micho, 383 N.W.2d 741, 743-744
(N.D. 1986)).
627. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 179 (citing United States v. Simpson, 709 F.2d 903, 907(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 (1983); State v. Biby, 366 N.W.2d 460, 463 (N.D.
1985Xquoting State v. Frye, 245 N.W.2d 878, 883 (N.D. 1976)).
628. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 180.
629. Id. (citing 2 J. WEINSTMN & M. BERCER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 404 [10], at
404-77-404-80 (1988)).





635. 444 N.W.2d 688 (N.D. 1989).
636. State v. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d 688,689 (N.D. 1989). The supreme court also found
that any error in the jury instructions was harmless, and that the admission of a
methamphetamine recipe was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion. Id. at 689-91.
637. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d at 689.
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was found.' Subsequently, Raywalt was arrested for delivering
methamphetamine to Melissa Pankow at the party, which he
admitted after he had been arrested."39 Raywalt's motion to sup-
press the recipe and statements made to the police was denied and
he was convicted of delivery of a controlled substance.60 Raywalt
appealed.641
Raywalt's first argument was that there was no probable cause
to search the apartment and therefore the recipe and the state-
ments were the results of an illegal search.642 The supreme court
noted that the State raised Raywalt's lack of standing and the bur-
den was therefore on Raywalt that he had an expectation of pri-
vacy in the place searched.6 43 The court found no showing by
Raywalt that he did have standing and concluded that he failed to
establish his standing to challenge the search. 644
Raywalt contended that the search of his person was unrea-
sonable. '45 The supreme court found that since the main purpose
of the search was to ascertain whether Raywalt was violating the
conditions of his probation, the search did not violate Raywalt's
fourth amendment rights.~64
Raywalt also argued that the recipe should not have been
admitted into evidence by the trial court because his possession of
the recipe was not relevant to whether or not the substance was
delivered. 7 The supreme court found that the recipe was rele-
vant to show the nature of the substance injected into Pankow by
Raywalt.648
Raywalt contended that the jury instructions were flawed in
that they did not require the jury to find that Raywalt delivered
methamphetamine specifically, only that he delivered a controlled
638. Id.
639. Id.
640. Id. The State requested an extended sentence and after a hearing, Raywalt was
sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Id.
641. Id.
642. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d at 689.
643. Id. (citing State v. Benjamine, 417 N.W.2d 838, 839-40 (N.D. 1988)).
644. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d at 689. Raywalt did not even file a reply brief in response to
the State's argument. Id.
645. Id.
646. Id.
647. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d at 690. Raywalt contended that under Rules 403 and 404(b)
of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence, the recipe was not relevant to the issue of what
substance was delivered, and that the probative value of the recipe was substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id. See N.D.R. Evl). 403 (evidence may be
excluded if value outweighed by unfair prejudice); N.D.R. EVID. 404(b) (evidence of other
crimes not admissible to prove acting in conformity).
648. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d at 690.
812 [Vol. 66:753
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
substance. 649 The supreme court determined that there was no
difference between the information and the proof at trial.a ' Thus,
although Raywalt proposed that the State cannot allege one theory
and prove another, the supreme court found that the proposition
was not applicable in this case.651 The supreme court concluded
that any error in the instructions were harmless since the instruc-
tions as a whole were sufficient to inform the jury of the law, and
did not violate Raywalt's rights. 2
Raywalt asserted that before the trial court found that
Raywalt was a dangerous special offender and imposed an
extended sentence, it should have required a presentence investi-
gation.15 The supreme court found that a court could extend a
convicted offender's sentence under Section 12.1-32-09(4) of the
North Dakota Century Code without a presentence report in
extraordinary cases.' The supreme court noted that it is in the
discretion of the trial court as to what constitutes an extraordinary
case. 61 The supreme court found that Raywalt had several prior
drug related convictions and that Raywalt had informed the trial
court that he did not want a presentence report.6-" Therefore, no
abuse of discretion by the trial court was evident." 7
The judgment of conviction was affinmed.65
ELECTIONS
HUNTEY . TIMM
In Huntley v. Timm, 659 Thomas Huntley appealed from a dis-
missal of his challenge to the election of Mike Timm to the House
of Representatives for the Fifth Legislative District in Minot.' 0
Following the November 8, 1988 election, the Ward County Can-
vassing Board determined that Timm had won the election by a
three vote margin.66 The State Canvassing Board and the Secre-
649. Id.
650. Id. at 691.
651. Id.
652. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d at 691. If the jury instructions were erroneous and affected
the substantial rights of the accused, it would be grounds for reversal. Id: See N.D.R. CRIM.
P. 52(a) (harmless error).




657. Raywalt, 444 N.W.2d at 692.
658. Id.
659. 435 N.W.2d 683 (N.D. 1989).
660. Huntley v. Timm, 435 N.W.2d 683, 683 (N.D. 1989).
661. Huntley, 435 N.W.2d at 683.
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tary of State ordered a recount.' 2 Five ballots were excluded dur-
ing the recount because they were not initialed by an election
official.6 3 Of the five ballots, four were cast for Huntley and one
for Tinm.' Thus, the certified final count was 3,600 votes for
Timm, 3,599 for Huntley.6
On appeal, Huntley contended that section 16.1-13-22 of the
North Dakota Century Code, as amended in 1981, provides that
stamped ballots are valid if initialed.' Timm contended that the
statute was amended to codify Morgan v. Hatch,' 7 providing
"that a ballot is valid if there has been substantial compliance with
the statutory requirement that it be both stamped and initialed. '
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it is empowered
to review the interpretation of a statute." 9 Neither party nor the
court found any helpful legislative history to consider.670  How-
ever, there was precedent in case law requiring that ballots be
both stamped and initialed. 7' As explained in an 1899 case, the
rationale for the requirement was to give each voter the power to
determine whether he had received an official ballot.672 Substan-
tial compliance with the endorsement requirement has been
upheld. 73
The requirement that a valid ballot must be endorsed with
both an official stamp and initials is codified under section 16.1-15-
01 of the North Dakota Century Code.6 74 The supreme court
noted that if the legislature had intended to change the require-
662. Id.
663. Id. at 683-84.
664. Id. at 684.
665. Id. at 683.
666. Id. at 684. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-22 (1981 & Supp. 1989). Section 16.1-
13-22 provides: "Failure to stamp and initial a ballot or ballot card in the proper place does
not invalidate such ballot or ballot card, but a complete failure to stamp and initial a ballot
or ballot card does invalidate the ballot or ballot card." Section 16.1-13-22 amended section
16-12-04 which provided: "Failure to stamp and initial a ballot in the proper place on the
ballot shall not invalidate such ballot but a failure to stamp and initial a ballot at any place
on the ballot shall invalidate the ballot." Id.
667. 274 N.W.2d 563 (N.D. 1979).
668. Huntley, 435 N.W.2d at 684. See Morgan v. Hatch, 274 N.W.2d at 563 (N.D.
1979Xproviding for substantial compliance).
669. Huntley, 435 N.W.2d at 684 (citing Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Assoc. v. Conrad,
405 N.W.2d at 279 (N.D. 1987)).
670. Huntley, 435 N.W.2d at 684.
671. Id. at 684-85. See Miller v. Schallern, 8 N.D. 395, 79 N.W. 865 (1899); Weber v.
O'Connel, 55 N.D. 867, 215 N.W. 539 (1927); Torkelson v. Byrne, 68 N.D. 13, 276 N.W. 134(1937); Kuhn v. Beede, 249 N.W.2d 230 (N.D. 1976).
672. Huntley, 435 N.W.2d at 685 (quoting Miller, 79 N.W. at 867-68).
673. Id.
674. Huntley, 435 N.W.2d at 685. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-15-01 (1981Xproving




ments, it could easily have done so by amending this statute.67 5
Instead, the court concluded that the 1981 amendment was
intended merely to clarify that improper location of the endorse-
ment would not invalidate the ballot.676 Thus, a failure to stamp or
initial would constitute a "'complete failure to stamp and initial"'
and void the ballot.677
The facts in Huntley indicate that election officials may have
failed to advise each voter that their ballot would be invalidated if
not endorsed.6 78 Nevertheless, the voters were adequately
apprised by the writing on each ballot, by posted voting instruc-
tions, and by a poster displayed at the polling places.679
The judgment was affirmed.6s °
EMINENT DOMAIN
AALUND V. WILLIAMS COUNTY
In Aalund v. Williams County,8 1 a landowner's appeal of a
county's "quick-take" of his property was held to be timely
because the county had provided improper notice." 2 In 1984,
Rick Aalund was orally offered, but rejected, approximately $1,000
by a Williams County Commission to purchase land for a county
road. 8a 3 Aalund received a document titled "Notice to Property
Owners" and an "Offer to Purchase Easement" from the clerk of
district court a few days later.6 1" This document informed Aalund
that $1,045 had been deposited with the clerk and included an
offer of $1,045 to purchase the land for highway purposes.6"
In 1987, Aalund noticed the county's claim to his land went to
pay his property taxes.68 Aalund hired an attorney who wrote a
letter to the county informing it that Aalund planned to appeal the
675. Huntley, 435 N.W.2d at 685.
676. Id.
677. Id. at 685-86.
678. Id. at 686. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-13-22 (198lXproviding that each voter be
informed of the endorsement requirement).
679. Huntley, 435 N.W.2d at 686.
680. Id. Surrogate Justice Pederson dissented, noting that ambiguous language,
without the benefit of legislative history, should be construed in a manner that would avoid
disenfranchisement of voters (Pederson, V., dissenting). Id.
681. 442 N.W.2d 900 (N.D. 1989).
682. Aalund v. Williams County, 442 N.W.2d 900, 900 (N.D. 1989). See N.D. CONST.
art. I, § 16 (state may take property by depositing money with clerk of court).
683. Aalund, 442 N.W.2d at 900, The commissioner said he'd get back to Aalund after
Aalund rejected the offer for his land. Id.
684. Id.
685. Id. Aalund signed a receipt for the office on January 7, 1985. Id.
686. Id.
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taking of his property to the district court. 6 7 The county
answered with a letter asserting the appeal was too late.'
In 1988, Aalund's second attorney filed a formal notice of
appeal with the district court and the county moved to dismiss.' 9
The district court dismissed Aalund's appeal, determining that the
time to appeal had expired thirty days after Aalund had received
the offer to purchase his land from the county.' 9
Aalund appealed the district court's decision, contending the
notice sent by the county to Aalund did not comply with the con-
stitutional and statutory requirements for "quick-take."691
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that to protect the
rights of a landowner the appeal of "quick-take" procedures
should be liberally construed.6 92 The court held that section 24-
01-22.1 of the North Dakota Century Code required that the
notice provided to a landowner inform the landowner that his land
was being taken.693 The court found that the notice to Aalund was
deficient in this manner; the appeal period did not begin to run. 9 4
The county also argued that the formal notice of appeal filed
by Aalund's second attorney was beyond the 30-day appeal
period.69 5 The court found the letter sent by Aalund's first attor-
ney advising the county of Aalund's intent to the appeal was a
valid notice of appeal under section 24-01-22.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code.6
The supreme court reversed the district court decision and
remanded for further proceedings.69 7
ADAMS V. CANTERRA PETROLEUM, INC.
In Adams v. Canterra Petroleum Inc. ,698 Adams appealed
from a district court summary judgment that dismissed a trespass
687. Aalund, 442 N.W.2d at 901.
688. Id.
689. Id. The county contended that the 30-day appeal period had expired. Id.
690. Id.
691. Id. Aalund also argued that the notice sent by the county did not comply with
due process requirements of the United States and North Dakota Constitutions. Id. The
court did not deal with this issue because it found that the notice failed to comply with the
statute. Id.
692. Aalund, 442 N.W.2d at 901. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-01-22.1 (Supp.
1989Xappeal procedures after the deposit for a taking has been made).
693. Aalund, 442 N.W.2d at 902.
694. Id.
695. Id. at 902-03.
696. Id. at 903.
697. Id.
698. 439 N.W.2d 540 (N.D. 1989).
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claim against Canterra.69 Golden Valley County owns and main-
tains a road across Adams' land and over Knutson Creek.700 In
1980, Golden Valley agreed with Canterra's predecessor-in-inter-
est, Al-Aquitaine Oil Company, to abandon an existing bridge and
to install a new creek crossing and approach l.7 0  The work was
completed -without Adams' permission, and he subsequently
blocked the crossing.7 °2 In 1984, Golden Valley County con-
demned a strip of Adams' land to reconstruct the 1980 crossing.70 3
Adams accepted and cashed the warrant for damages. ° 4
In May, 1986, Adams filed a complaint asking exemplary dam-
ages for the initial trespass.705 Canterra answered that Adams
knew about the construction, that the construction was performed
for the county, and that Adams was fully compensated through the
condemnation proceedings.706 The issue on appeal was whether
summary judgment was appropriate.7°
Rule 56(e) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides that the party resisting the motion must set forth specific
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.708 The movant
must show that there is no dispute as to the material facts or the
inferences drawn from undisputed facts and that these facts neces-
sarily lead to a judgment as a matter of law. 70 9 The supreme court
found that the facts in Adams were not disputed, but these undis-
puted facts did not justify a dismissal of the complaint as a matter
of law.710
699. Adams v. Canterra Petroleum, Inc., 439 N.W.2d 540, 541 (N.D. 1989).




704. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 541. Damages were determined to be $454.70 for the
value of the land and easements plus $500 for loss of profit and general damages. Id.
705. Id. at 541-42.
706. Id. Canterra argues that Adams had constructive, if not actual notice of the work.
Id. n.3. However, the court has declared that statutory directions as to how notice is to be
given must be strictly complied with when notice is relied on to sustain forfeiture or loss of
rights. Cowl v. Wentz, 107 N.W.2d 697,700 (N.D. 1961). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-05-11
(1978Xnotice requirements); CJ.S. EMINENT DOMAIN § 215(a); 18 AM. Jun., EMINENT
DOMAIN § 312.
707. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 542.
708. Id. "Summary judgment is a procedure for promptly . . . disposing of a
controversy without a trial if there is no dispute as to any material fact or the inferences to
be drawn from undisputed facts or when only a question of law is involved." Id. (citing
Thiele v. Lindquist & Vennum, 404 N.W.2d 52, 53-54 (N.D. 1987)).
709. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 542. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 56(eXan adverse party may not rest
upon mere allegations or denials but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue).
See also, Spier v. Power Concrete, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 68 (N.D. 1981Xparty resisting the
motion must present competent evidence); First Nat'l Bank of Hettinger v. Clark, 332
N.W.2d 264, 267 (N.D. 1983Xtrial court has no obligation to search for evidence opposing
the summary judgment motion).
710. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 453. See N.D.R. CIv. P. 56; Northwestern Equipment Inc.
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There was no evidence presented to the trial court on the
issue of whether the 1984 condemnation award was intended to
cover the original 1980 entry and construction and the 1985 re-
entry and reconstruction.7 1 Condemnation proceedings must
conform to the North Dakota Constitution and North Dakota Cen-
tury Code, both of which require that private property can not be
taken or damaged for public use without first compensating the
owner.712 Further, no mention was made in the condemnation
award of an allowance for interest covering the time between the
initial entry and the condemnation.71 3 Thus, the court did not
presume that the 1984 award was curative of the 1980 taking. 1
The court had not previously considered whether an
independent action for damages resulting from prior trespasses
were included in an eminent domain compensation award.71 5
Adams relied on a Kansas case in which the appellate court con-
cluded that a condemnation award did not preclude bringing a
trespass action, and the injured land owner was entitled to receive
at least nominal damages.71 6 The supreme court agreed.717
Other issues remained to be decided on remand.71 8 Canterra
argued that its predecessor-in-interest was not trespassing because
it received authority from the county.71 9 Even if Canterra was
acting as an agent of Golden Valley, a fact not admitted or denied,
Canterra was still responsible for its acts when wrongful in nature,
v. Badinger, 403 N.W.2d 8, 9 (N.D. 1987Xsummary judgment is not appropriate if the
movant is not entitled to judgment as a mattter of law [citing Krueger v. St. Joseph's
Hospital, 305 N.W.2d 18, 22 (N.D. 1981)] even if the adverse party fails to respond by filing
proof (citing Rice v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 198 N.W.2d 247, 252 (N.D. 1972)).
711. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 543.
712. Id.
713. Id. at 543-44. See Square Butte Elec. Corp. v. Hilken, 244 N.W.2d 519 (N.D.
1976); N.D. CONST. art. I § 16; N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-15001(2) (1976).
714. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 544. When property has been taken without
compensation first, interest should be awarded from the time of the taking (citing Lineburg
v. Sandven, 74 N.D. 364, 21 N.W.2d 808, 814 (1946)).
715. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 544. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 24-05 (providing procedures
for condemnation).
716. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 544. See Lang v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op, 274 N.W.2d 253
(N.D. 1979Xcase of a landowner suing a condemnor for trespass differentiated from Adams
because of the existence of an original judgment and order of possession). See Annotation,
Condemnation-Suit or Prior Trespass, 33 A.L.R. 3d 1132, 1134 (1970Xaward does not bar an
action for prior trespass).
717. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 545 (discussion Grainland Farms v. Arkansas Louisiana
Gas, 11 Kan.App.2d 402, 722 P.2d 1125 (1986Xdamages for the taking are based on the
value of the property before and after the taking, but a landowner may suffer damages from
a trespass which would not be compensated as part of the taking)). See City of Hazelton v.
Daughtery, 275 N.W.2d 624, 627-28 (N.D. 1979Xdeflning fair market value in
condemnation cases).




such as an intentional act of trespass.72 0
The summary judgment was reversed, and the case remanded
for further proceedings.72 '
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
MUCHOW v. LINDBLAD
In Muchow v. Lindblad,7  Virginia Muchow's parents and
family appealed from a summary judgment dismissing their claim
for negligent or intentional infliction of emotional distress against
Fargo Police Department Detective James Lindblad and the City
of Fargo.723 The family alleged that Lindblad had failed to con-
duct a serious investigation of Virginia's death and had given them
false information about the incident causing them severe emo-
tional anxiety and physical symptoms of weight loss and loss of
sleep.7 4 Summary judgment for the defendants was granted
when the court concluded that: 1) the plaintiffs' physical symp-
toms did not meet the requirement of bodily harm required to
recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress; and 2) the
plaintiffs did not establish two of the threshold requirements for
intentional infliction of emotional distress - extreme and outra-
geous conduct by the defendant, coupled with severe emotional
distress by the plaintiffs.7
On appeal, the plaintiffs asserted that physical manifestation
of bodily harm was not necessary to establish negligent infliction of
emotional distress because of the "deceased person" exception;
that physical manifestation was not required under the minority
rule; that Lindblad's conduct met the required standard for inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress.726
The supreme court noted that the well-established standard of
review for summary judgments applied.727 Reviewing precedent,
the court noted that it has allowed damages for emotional distress
as a "constituent element" of other damages, but had not previ-
720. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 3-04-02(3) (1987Xproviding for an agent's personal
responsibility when his acts are wrongful); Wills v. Schroeder Aviation, Inc., 390 N.W.2d
544, 547 (N.D. 1986Xholding an individual responsible for his own torts).
721. Adams, 439 N.W.2d at 547.
722. 435 N.W.2d 918 (N.D. 1989).
723. Muchow v. Lindblad, 435 N.W.2d 918, 919 (N.D. 1989).
724. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 919.
725. Id. at 920.
726. Id.
727. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 56(c) (summary judgment will be granted only if, viewing
the evidence most favorable to the party against whom it is sought, there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the party seeking summary judgment is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law).
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ously analyzed the elements required for an independent action
for either negligent or intentional infliction of emotional
distress.7
A majority of jurisdictions follow section 436A of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts requiring physical impairment, physical
pain, or illness to recover for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress.72 9 In Muchow, the plaintiff's physical harm was "transitory
and inconsequential" and, therefore, not "bodily harm."'3  Plain-
tiffs contended that emotional distress was presumed in the "unu-
sual circumstances" exception to the requirement of bodily
harm.731 However, the recognized exceptions have arisen in tele-
graph and funeral home cases and are based respectively on a con-
tractual duty or the common law rule that any unwarranted
interference with the right to burial is actionable. 732 These cases
are inapplicable to Muchow.7
Moreover, the supreme court declined to adopt the minority
"trend" and abolish the bodily harm requirement.7" Even in
these cases most jurisdictions have required "serious" or "severe"
emotional distress, and this was not established in Muchow.735
With regard to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the degree of outrageousness may be important evidence
of severe emotional distress.7  Such conduct is narrowly limited
to that which exceeds " 'all possible bounds of decency.' ",737 Lind-
728. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 920 n.3, 921. See, e.g., Sadler v. Basin Elec. Power Co-op,
409 N.W.2d 87 (N.D. 1987); Thiele v. Lindquist & Vennum, 404 N.W.2d 52 (N.D. 1987). See
Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass. 1982Xhistorical development).
729. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 921. Section 436A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
provides:
If the actor's conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing
either bodily harm or emotional disturbance to another, and it results in such
emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or other compensable
damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1965). Bodily harm is defined as "any physical
impairment of the condition of another's body, or physical pain or illness." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 15 (1965).
730. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 922. Bodily harm may be caused by emotional distress.
Id. at 921 (citing Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171 (Mass 1982)).
731. Id. at 922. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 1 313 comment a
(1965Xproviding the conduct must result in "bodily harm or any other invasion of the
other's interests").
732. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 922-23.
733. Id. at 923.
734. Id. See, e.g., St. Elizabeth Hospital v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 n.3 (Tex.
1987Xdispensing with bodily harm requirement).
735. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 923.
736. Id. at 924. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comments j, k notes (elements
of the tort: 1) extreme and outrageous conduct that is 2) intentional or reckless and that
cause 3) severe emotional distress).
737. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 924.
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blad's conduct may have been negligent, inconsiderate, and
unkind, but it was unlikely that reasonable persons would find that
it attained the level necessary to sustain an action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.7ss
The judgment was affirmed.1 39
EMPLOYER'S LIABILITY
BENJAMIN V. BENJAMIN
In Benjamin v. Benjamin,74 ° the issue was whether summary
judgment was appropriate in a negligence case where the plaintiff
assumed risk.741 Clifford Benjamin instructed his son, James Ben-
jamin, to replace shovels on the plow with attached spikes.742
While attempting to remove the shovel, James discovered a bolt
that was an inch too long, and he used a hammer to straighten the
bolt.7 43 While striking the bolt, a piece of steel struck and injured
James's eye. 4  James sued Clifford for negligence. 4 5  Clifford
moved for summary judgment claiming there were no issues of
fact.141 James claimed issues of fact existed as to whether he was
an employee and whether Clifford was negligent in not supplying
adequate eyewear.747  The trial court granted summary
judgment.748
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that, even if more
than one inference could reasonably be drawn creating a question
of fact for a jury, the "resolution of the issue of negligence is dis-
positive ... .,,749 The court then considered whether negligence
applied in the case.75° The court stated that installing a bolt of the
738. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 924-25. See Hanke v. Global Van Lines, Inc., 533 F.2d
396 (8th Cir. 1976Xdistinguished as outrageous because of repeated false assurances).
739. Muchow, 435 N.W.2d at 925.
740. 439 N.W.2d 527 (N.D. 1989).
741. Benjamin v. Benjamin, 439 N.W.2d 527, 527, 529 (N.D. 1989).
742. Benjamin, 439 N.W.2d at 527.
743. Id.
744. Id.
745. Id. The negligence action was based on the use of a wrong-sized bolt and failure
to supply adequate eyewear. Id.
746. Benjamin, 439 N.W.2d at 527.
747. Id.
748. Id.
749. Id. at 528. The evidence must be looked at in a light most favorable to the party
against whom summary judgment is sought. Id. He or she must be given the benefit of the
doubt to all favorable inferences. Id. (citing Garcia v. Overvold Motors, Inc., 351 N.W.2d
110 (N.D. 1984).
750. Benjamin, 439 N.W.2d at 528. "[Q]uestions of negligence,.... are questions of fact
for the jury ... unless evidence is such that reasonable people can draw one conclusion
therefrom." Id. (citing Priel v. R.E.D., Inc., 392 N.W.2d 65 (N.D. 1986Xcitations omitted).
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wrong length did not constitute negligence.751 However, failing
to provide adequate eyewear may have been negligent, but that
did not dismiss the fact that James assumed the risk, which was
evident from James's deposition.752 The court affirmed the sum-
mary judgment based on the fact that James was aware of the dan-
gers in not using protective eyewear. 75 Thus, the judgment of the
district court was affirmed. 7 4
ENTRAPMENT
CITY OF MANDAN V. WILLMAN
In City of Mandan v. Willman 75 5 the issue was whether a jury
instruction on entrapment and excuse should have been allowed
for the strict liability offense of driving under revocation.7 A
police officer noticed Michael Willman pull away from a loading
ramp of a motorcycle shop, driving a pickup with a motorcycle
aboard.7 5 7 The police, suspecting the motorcycle was stolen,
turned on his interior lights and recorded Willman's license plate
number.7 s Willman interpreted the officer's actions as a signal to
move his truck, and when he drove the pickup onto the highway,
the officer stopped him.75 9 The officer discovered Willman's
license had been revoked.7 ° Willman was charged with driving
under revocation in violation of a city ordinance.761 He was found
guilty by a jury and he appealed, claiming that the trial court
should have allowed his jury instruction on entrapment and
excuse. 7 62 The city claimed that because Willman drove in the
parking lot before reacting to the officer's actions, Willman com-
mitted the offense before the alleged entrapment occurred, hence
defenses of entrapment and excuse were inapplicable.7 3
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that to rely upon the
751. Benjamin, 439 N.W.2d at 528.
752. Id. at 529. See Kittock v. Anderson, 203 N.W.2d 522 (N.D. 1973X"record shows,
without contradiction, that plaintiff was fully aware of the danger ... reasonable men
cannot disagree on the question of his assumption of risk..
753. Benjamin, 439 N.W.2d at 529.
754. Id. at 530.
755. 439 N.W.2d 92 (N.D. 1989).
756. City of Mandan v. Willman, 439 N.W.2d 92, 93 (N.D. 1989).
757. Willman, 439 N.W.2d at 92.
758. Id.
759. Id. Willman interpreted the officer's hand movements as a signal or command to
move. Id. at 93.
760. Id. at 93.
761. Willman, 439 N.W.2d at 93.
762. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court has allowed assertion of affirmative
defenses in cases of strict liability. State v. Michlitsch, 438 N.W.2d at 93.
763. Willman, 439 N.W.2d at 93.
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theory of entrapment, Willman must prove that the officer
induced the commission of the crime.7 4 In determining whether
the jury should have been instructed on entrapment, the court
must "view the evidence in a light most favorable to defend-
ant.''"76 Willman was convicted of violating a city ordinance that
was written similar to a statute in section 39-06-42 of the North
Dakota Century Code.7 ' The ordinance stated that "any person
who drives a motor vehicle on a highway or on public or private
areas to which the public has right of access for vehicular use...
while that person's license... is suspended or revoked is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor. 76 7
The supreme court stated that there was no doubt that Will-
man drove in the parking lot and that his driving occurred prior to
police involvement. 7  Therefore, the court concluded there was
no entrapment.76 9
Furthermore, the court reasoned that the only disputed issue
was whether the parking lot was a public or private lot that was
open to public use.770 This was a question of fact to be determined
by the jury and neither party claimed that the trial court erred in
its ruling.77 ' As to the jury instruction on excuse, the supreme
court dismissed Willman's allegation because, like the matter of
entrapment, Willman committed an offense before police involve-
ment.772 Thus, the decision of the trial court was affirmed.773
EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS
MATTER OF ESTATE OF STARCHER
In Matter of Estate of Starcher774 an attorney's claim for legal
fees and costs against an estate was upheld and was found not to
require a Rule 54(b) certification, not barred by res judicata, and
the oral contract between the attorney and client was held not
764. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-11(2) (1985Xentrapment occurs "when a law
enforcement agent induces the commission of an offense, using persuasion or other means
likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit an offense. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.").
765. Willman, 439 N.W.2d at 93.
766. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-42(lXl987Xit is a class B misdemeanor to drive
while license is revoked).
767. Id. N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-06-42(1X1987).
768. Id. at 94.
769. Willman, 439 N.W.2d at 94. The supreme court found that the officer's actions





774. 447 N.W.2d 293 (N.D. 1989).
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subject to the statute of frauds.7
Robert Baird had a claim for legal fees and costs incurred in
Hattie Starcher's contest of Emil Ridl's will.776 After Ridl's death,
two wills were submitted for probate. 7  Starcher was the main
beneficiary of the first will which named Baird as personal repre-
sentative.77 s The second will disinherited Starcher, and was subse-
quently found valid and admitted to probate.779 Baird alleged that
Starcher had orally agreed to pay him a fee, and pursuant to stat-
ute, petitioned Ridl's estate for his expenses incurred in the con-
test of the will, amounting to $20,506.44.78 The county court
awarded Baird $3,000 from Ridl's estate.7 s '
After Starcher died, Baird submitted a claim against Starcher's
estate for the remaining amount and the county court ruled
against Baird, finding that the claim was barred by res judicata.782
Baird appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court.7s
The supreme court noted that an order determining one, but
not all, of one creditor's claims against an estate is not appealable
in an unsupervised administration without a Rule 54(b) certifica-
tion.7 4 The court found that Baird's appeal was properly before
the court since Baird had only one claim against Starcher's estate
and did not need a Rule 54(b) certification. 7s
The supreme court concluded that the issue as to whether or
not Starcher independently retained Baird was not considered by
the county court in Baird's claim against Ridl's estate.7 8  The
supreme court determined that the trial court's award of $4,000 to
Baird was for his work on Ridl's estate and not for his efforts on
behalf of Starcher.787 The supreme court found that the first
award to Baird was not res judicata as to his claim against
Starcher's estate and remanded to the county court to determine
775. Matter of Estate of Starcher, 447 N.W.2d 293, 294-97 (N.D. 1989).




780. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 30.1-18-20 (1987Xpersonal representative entitled to
necessary expenses if defends or prosecutes a proceeding in good faith).
781. Starcher, 447 N.W.2d at 295.
782. Id.
783. Id.
784. Id. In an unsupervised administration, each proceeding involving the same estate
is treated independent of each other, and finality requires a concluding order on each
petition. Id. at 295. In a supervised administration, the court has continuing authority over
the administration and settlement of a decedents estate, until an order approving
distribution is made. Id.
785. Id. at 296.




whether or not there was an oral agreement between Starcher and
Baird.7s
The court also found that the alleged contract between
Starcher and Baird did not violate the statute of frauds because it
could have been performed within one year.78 9 Additionally, the
supreme court determined that Starcher's declarations about the
existence of the alleged contract were not hearsay since they were
offered to prove the existence of the agreement and not offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 90
The order of the county court was reversed and remanded.79 '
FAMILY LAW
LONG v. LONG
In Long v. Long,79 2 the issue was whether a North Dakota dis-
trict court has subject matter jurisdiction to modify child custody
when the family no longer resides in North Dakota.793 In August
of 1979, Jeffrey Long was given reasonable visitation rights to his
children after his divorce from Kathy A. Long. 94 Kathy and the
children moved to Minnesota.7 95 In 1985, Jeffrey, who had left
North Dakota in 1980, brought an action in North Dakota against
Kathy for not allowing him visitation of his children.716 The trial
court declared that it had subject matter jurisdiction and allowed
Jeffrey visitation.797
At that time, neither party contested the court's jurisdiction to
modify the decree.798 After Kathy again refused visitation, Jeffrey
sought modification and requested custody of the children.799
Kathy requested a stay of the proceedings and questioned the dis-
trict court's jurisdiction.' Kathy filed a motion in Minnesota
788. Id. The court additionally noted that compensation agreements between
attorney and client should be construed most strongly against the attorney. Id. at 297.
789. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-06-04 (1987Xstatute of frauds).
790. Starcher, 447 N.W.2d at 297. See N.D.R. EvID. 801(c) (hearsay is a statement
made to prove the truth of the matter asserted).
791. Starcher, 447 N.W.2d at 297.
792. 439 N.W.2d 523 (N.D. 1989).
793. Long v. Long, 439 N.W.2d 523, 523 (N.D. 1989).
794. Long, 439 N.W.2d at 523.
795. Id.
796. Id. Kathy Long claimed Jeffrey sexually abused the children, and she requested
that the court deny Jeffrey visitation. Id.
797. Id.
798. Long, 439 N.W.2d at 523.
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requesting the court to assume jurisdiction. 0 1 Kathy's motion was
denied, and Minnesota declined to override North Dakota's juris-
diction."02 In May of 1988, the Northeast Central District Court
once again granted Jeffrey visitation rights, and Kathy appealed."o
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that this was an
interstate custody dispute with jurisdiction pursuant to the Paren-
tal Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) and the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCqA).8° 4 Under these acts a court has
continuing jurisdiction to modify a decree if the child or a contest-
ant lives in the state.805 Since none of the parties, including the
Long children, had resided in North Dakota since 1980, the
supreme court found that North Dakota no longer had jurisdiction
to modify the custody decree.8s 6 Jeffrey Long contended that
even if North Dakota did not have jurisdiction under the acts, it
had jurisdiction because Minnesota deferred to North Dakota's
jurisdiction."0 7 The supreme court disagreed and cited authority
which held that subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be changed by
"agreement, consent or waiver."808 The court noted that PKPA
and UCCJA specifically set forth jurisdictional requirements and
did not allow jurisdiction by agreement or consent.8 0 9 Therefore,
the Minnesota court's consent to North Dakota's jurisdiction did
not give North Dakota jurisdiction.8 10
Finally, Jeffrey Long argued that certain provisions of PKPA
and UCCJA grant North Dakota jurisdiction.81 Regarding PKPA
801. Id. at 523-24. Kathy Long requested that the Minnesota court award her sole
legal and physical custody. Id. at 524.
802. Long, 439 N.W.2d at 524.
803. Id.
804. Id. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(d)
(1982X"CJ]urisdiction of State... continues to be met and such State remains the residence
of the child or of any contestant."); N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 14-14-03(1) (1971XUniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act; a court will have subject matter jurisdiction if- 1) the state is the
home of the child at the time of the action, and 2) the state has been the child's home state
within six months of the proceeding and the child was removed by one party and one party
continues to live in the state).
805. Long, 439 N.W.2d at 524 (citing Dahlen v. Dahlen, 393 N.W.2d 765, 767 (N.D.
1986Xinterpretation of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction Act).
806. Long, 439 N.W.2d at 524-25.
807. Id. at 525.
808. Id. (citing State v. Tinsley, 325 N.W.2d 177, 179 (N.D. 1982)).
809. Long, 439 N.W.2d at 525.
810. Id.
811. Id. at 525-26. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738A(cX2XDX1982Xgrants one state jurisdiction when another state declines jurisdiction
on the grounds that the other state is a more appropriate forum to determine custody);
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-14-03(1XdX1X1971XNorth
Dakota is a proper forum when another state declines jurisdiction on the grounds that
North Dakota is the appropriate forum).
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and UCCJA, the North Dakota Supreme Court gave two reasons
why they did not apply in the present case.81 First, the Minne-
sota court did not decide Minnesota was an inappropriate forum;
rather it sought to avoid conflicts resulting from simultaneous pro-
ceedings in two states.8 1 3 Second, North Dakota, for a variety of
reasons, was not the most appropriate of the two states to decide
custody.8 1 4 The court determined that its decision would not
leave the parties without a remedy." 5 Thus, the North Dakota
Supreme Court vacated the second amended judgment and
remanded with directions to deny modification. 16
ROEN v. ROEN
In Roen v. Roen 817 the issue was whether the trial court had
erred in its divorce decree in distribution of property, determina-
tion of spousal support, and determination of custody."' Bill and
Suzanne Roen were married in 1971, and after a series of moves,
the couple settled in Bismarck where Bill practiced medicine.819
The trial court reached a mutually agreeable property distri-
bution of sixty-nine items. However, Bill appealed the decision
regarding an additional 150 items, claiming that the distribution
used was arbitrary. 20 The trial court also ordered Bill to pay
spousal support of $2,000 per month for two years and, thereafter,
$1,000 monthly, plus ten percent of his gross income over
$100,000. s21 Bill appealed, claiming the spousal support should be
temporary and to rehabilitate Suzanne. 2 2 Bill also asserted that
the trial court had failed to end support in the case of Suzanne's
812. Long, 439 N.W.2d at 525-26.
813. Id.
814. Id. at 526. The supreme court stated that North Dakota was not the most
appropriate forum because the state has maintained no connection with the parties, the
parties resided outside of North Dakota, and Minnesota has the only connection with the
children. Id.
815. Id. The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the Minnesota court would
exercise its jurisdiction if North Dakota determined that it did not have jurisdiction. Id.
816. Id.
817. 438 N.W.2d 170 (N.D. 1989).
818. Roen v. Roen, 438 N.W.2d 170, 171, 172, 173 (N.D. 1989).
819. Roen, 438 N.W.2d at 171. At the time of their marriage, Bill was an aeronautical
engineer and Suzanne was a flight attendant. Id. The couple moved to Grand Forks in
1972 where Bill received a medical degree. Id. Pursuing Bill's medical career, the couple,
in 1977, moved to Rochester, Minnesota; in 1981 they moved to Seattle; and in 1984, they
moved to Bismarck. Id. Suzanne had a degree in sociology and worked as a stewardess, a
travel agent, and a restaurant hostess before becoming a housewife shortly after the birth of
their first child in 1980. Id.
820. Roen, 438 N.W.2d at 171. The 69 items were distributed based on an agreement
whereby Suzanne divided the items that both or neither wanted and Bill chose one of the
groups. Id.
821. Id. at 172.
822. Id.
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death, remarriage, or cohabitation." Regarding custody of Bill
and Suzanne's two children, the trial court granted custody to
Suzanne, and Bill appealed, claiming that he would provide a
more stable environment for the children and, thus, he should be
the custodial parent.824
In analyzing the issue of property distribution, the supreme
court upheld the trial court's decision, stating that the determina-
tion was reasonable in light of the circumstances. 82
Regarding spousal support, the court agreed with the trial
court that Suzanne had suffered permanent economic loss by fore-
going employment outside the home for several years and, there-
fore, she could never obtain as high a wage as if she had worked
continuously s " Thus, the trial court was correct in awarding
Suzanne spousal support after the two-year rehabilitation
period. 27 The court was mostly concerned with the trial court's
failure to specify an end to support in the event of Suzanne's death
or remarriage; however, the court indicated that it was "unwilling
to modify a lower court judgment for a deficiency first identified
during the appeal." s2
Concerning the child custody issue, the supreme court stated
that " 'the best interests and welfare of the child' "are to be the
guiding principles in determination of custody. 29 The supreme
court stated that there was no overwhelming evidence in favor of
either party. The trial court considered the best interests of the
children in weighing all factors.8 30 Therefore, the supreme court
upheld the trial court's decision on all three issues.8 3 '
823. Id.
824. Roen, 438 N.W.2d at 173-74. Because Suzanne planned to move out-of-state, Bill
claimed that it would be in the children's best interest to remain in the same community.
Id. at 173. Bill also submitted several articles to the effect that children of divorce do better
living with the parent of the same sex. Id.
825. Id. at 171-72. "Generally, if evidence . . .supports the trial court's property
division, it is not clearly erroneous and we do not disturb the division." Id. at 171 (citing
Behm v. Behm, 427 N.W.2d 332, 337 (N.D. 1988)).
826. Roen, 438 N.W.2d at 172. Suzanne had no immediate income and had received
little income-producing property in the settlement. Id. The supreme court noted that a
lack of adequate retirement savings could be considered in awarding spousal support. Id.
827. Roen, 438 N.W.2d at 172-73. Uncertainty as to spousal support "dooms the
divorced persons to meet again in the courtroom." Id. at 172. It is preferred that the court
support limits in the decree, and "[a] trial court will act to terminate unlimited spousal
support upon death or remarriage... unless there are extraordinary circumstances whichjustify its continuance." Id. at 173.
828. Id.
829. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1). "A trial court must consider and
evaluate 'all factors affecting the best interests and welfare of the child .... '" Id. (citing
N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.2 and Gravning v. Gravning, 389 N.W.2d 621 (N.D. 1986)).
830. Roen, 438 N.W.2d at 174.
831. Id. Suzanne requested attorneys' fees for the appeal and this issue was remanded




FIREMAN'S FUND MORTGAGE CORP. v. SMITH
In Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corp. v. Smith,s3 Curtis Smith
and Barbara Smith appealed from a judgment in an eviction action
brought by Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corporation pursuant to
chapter 33-06 of the North Dakota Century Code.833 The sum-
mons and complaint were served on the Smiths on January 29,
1987, and a hearing was scheduled for February 17, 1987."3 At
the hearing, the Smiths alleged that the trial court lacked jurisdic-
tion because more than fifteen days had elapsed between the sum-
mons and their appearance resulting in an illegal and improper
eviction.835 On February 19, the trial court concluded that it had
jurisdiction and that Fireman's Fund was entitled to possession of
the real property. s36
On appeal, the Smiths asserted that the trial court lacked juris-
diction in an eviction action when the defendant was given a
greater length of time to respond and appear than provided in the
statute.37 They argue that an eviction statute must be strictly
construed. s3A
In Perry v. Erling, 939 the North Dakota Supreme Court recog-
nized that a statute must be construed logically and not construed
to render an absurd or unjust result.840 The supreme court has
held that a literal reading of statutes that would lead to absurd
results should be avoided when the statutes can be reasonably con-
strued in light of their purpose. 1 Section 1-02-01 of the North
Dakota Century Code provides that statutes are to be construed
liberally with a "view to effecting its object and to promoting
justice.1842
The supreme court held that in this case, strict construction of
832. 436 N.W.2d 246 (N.D. 1989).
833. Fireman's Fund Mortgage Corp. v. Smith, 436 N.W.2d at 246, 246 (N.D. 1989).
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 33-06-02 (Supp. 1989Xproviding for not less than three nor more
than fifteen days between the summons and the defendant's appearance in an eviction
action).




838. Smith, 431 N.W.2d at 247.
839. 132 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1965).
840. Id. See Perry, 132 N.w.2d at 896 (court must construe a statute logically so as to
avoid an absurd resultXquoting 82 C.J.S. STATUTES § 325 (1953)).
841. Smith, 436 N.W.2d at 247 (quoting Haggar v. Helvering, 308 U.S. 389,394 (1940)).
842. Smith, 436 N.W.2d at 247. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (1987Xproviding a
rule of construction for the code).
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the statute would lead to injustice and absurdity.843 When an
extra four days was allowed to the defendants for responding or
appearing in the eviction action and no detriment resulted, the




In State v. Frey,84M a defendant convicted of murder was held
to have waived any right to instructions on lesser included offenses
of murder when his defense counsel specifically objected to
instructions on lesser offenses. 8 47
Jeffrey E. Frey was convicted of murder and aggravated
assault after one member of his hunting party was shot to death
and another one sustained shooting injuries 4s According to evi-
dence presented by the state, Frey shot Douglas J. Bjornson to
death and then fired shots into abandoned buildings and at trucks,
with one shot ricocheting and hitting Scott Otturn in the head.849
There were no eyewitnesses to the shooting incidents, and after
other members of the hunting party took Ottum to the hospital,
they discovered Frey in his pickup holding a shotgun.85° Frey
denied knowledge of Bjornson's death and Ottum's injuries."' At
the trial, Frey's attorney requested an instruction on self-defense
but objected to any instructions on lesser included offenses.s 2
Frey was convicted of murder and aggravated assault, and he
appealed his conviction to the North Dakota Supreme Court.s 3
Frey contended that the trial court erred in not instructing
the jury on the lesser included offenses.854 Frey contended that
although his counsel objected to instructions on the lesser included
offenses, these instructions could not be waived.855 The supreme
843. Smith, 436 N.W.2d at 247.
844. Id. at 247-48.
845. Id.
846. 441 N.W.2d 668 (N.D. 1989).
847. State v. Frey, 441 N.W.2d 668, 671 (N.D. 1989).
848. Frey, 441 N.W.2d at 669.
849. Id.
850. Id. at 670.
851. Id.
852. Id. Frey's counsel at trial did not represent him on appeal. Id. at 670 n.1.
853. Frey, 441 N.W.2d at 670.
854. Id.
855. Id. On appeal, Frey relied on State v. Leidholm, in which the supreme court held
that it is of necessity that there be an instruction on lesser included offenses when self-
defense is raised. Id. at 670 n.2 (citing State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1989)).
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court determined that the defense had a responsibility to object to
specific instructions.8 m The court noted that the waiving of
instructions on lesser included offenses is a "trial tactic" and the
defendant takes an "all-or-nothing" risk of being convicted on the
greater offense. 8 7  The supreme court concluded that by
objecting to instructions on lesser included offenses, Frey waived
his right to those instructions and therefore the trial court did not
err in not instructing the jury on the lesser included offenses.858
Frey also asserted that in order to be found guilty of murder,
the State should have proved the absence of "extreme emotional
disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse," pursuant to an
amendment of Section 12.1-16-01(1) of the North Dakota Century
Code.' 9 The court did not agree, determining that Frey was
charged with a class AA felony, and that the language of the
amendment did not change the law as asserted by Frey.86 °
Next, Frey argued that there was insufficient evidence to find
him guilty of murder and aggravated assault.861 The court noted
that the State presented substantial evidence indicating that Frey
fired the shots that killed Bjornson and injured Ottum. 862 The
supreme court found that the evidence of Bjornson's injuries were
not consistent with Frey's self-defense argument.86 3 The court
determined that viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to
the verdict, there was sufficient evidence to find Frey guilty of
murder and aggravated assault.864
Frey's last argument was that by Frey's counsel waiving the
instruction on lesser included offenses, he has given ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. 865 The court was unable to determine from
the record presented whether or not Frey's assistance of counsel
was defective, and concluded that Frey may pursue his claim at a
856. Id.
857. Id.
858. Frey, 441 N.W.2d at 671.
859. Id. at 671-72. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01(1) (1987Xdefinition of murder).
860. Id. The court held that the rationale of State v. Dilger was still applicable. Id.
(citing State v. Dilger, 338 N.W.2d at 87 (N.D. 1983)).
861. Frey, 441 N.W.2d at 672.
862. Id. at 672-73.
863. Frey, 441 N.W.2d at 673. Bjomson had pellet wounds in his right buttock and on
the back of his left leg. Id.
864. Id. The state presented overwhelming circumstantial evidence that Frey killed
Bjornson and injured Ottum. Id. at 672-73. Such evidence included three shell casings
from Frey's gun found in the area where Bjornson was shot. Id. Frey also made
inconsistent statements to police officers. Id. at 673. The pellets taken from Bjornson and
Ottumn were shown to be the same as those taken from shells in Frey's gun. Id.
865. Id.
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post conviction proceeding at which a satisfactory record can be
developed.861
The judgment was afBrmed.' 7
STATE V. TRANBY
In State v. Tranby,8 Stanley Tranby appealed his conviction
on two counts of negligent homicide, the denial of his motions for
an acquittal and a new trial.8 g Tranby and Cindy Bauer, along
with their two children and Tranby's son from a previous mar-
riage, were camping.870 At 8:30 p.m., they went for a ride in
Tranby's boat.8 7 1 Tranby had been drinking during the day and
took alcoholic beverages with him on the boat.8 7 2 At approxi-
mately 9:30 p.m., Tranby fell across the side of the boat, an act
leading to a series of events which caused the boat to capsize.
73
Cindy and one child clung to the boat until rescued the next day.
Tranby drifted with the other two children. 74 Tranby reached
shore and summoned help, but both children drowned.
8 75
Tranby was charged with two counts of negligent homicide
for failing to have each child wear a personal floatation device,
operating the boat in adverse water and weather conditions, oper-
ating the boat in poor lighting, and operating the boat while under
the influence of alcohol.876 The jury found Tranby guilty, and he
was sentenced to serve two consecutive five-year terms at the
State Penitentiary. 77
On appeal, Tranby raised five issues.878 First, he asserted that
his failure to place each child in personal floatation devices was not
evidence of criminal negligence. He asserted that such a require-
ment would violate his due process right to fair notice in that the
applicable boat safety regulations require that one floatation
device be aboard for each person.8 79 The supreme court noted,
however, that conduct need not be specifically prohibited in order
866. Id.
867. Id.
868. 437 N.W.2d 817 (N.D. 1989).
869. State v. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d 817, 818 (N.D. 1989).
870. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d at 818-19.




875. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d at 819.
876. Id. at 820.
877. Id.
878. Id.
879. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d at 820.
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to be criminally negligent.' Safety regulations do not establish a
legislatively mandated standard of care - they are only provided
for the trier of fact's consideration 81
The court concluded that section 12.1-16-03 of the North
Dakota Century Code does not violate due process. 882 A statute
does not violate due process if it provides adequate warning as to
the conduct proscribed and establishes minimal guidelines for law
enforcement. 8 When read together with the definition of "negli-
gently," the negligent homicide statute is sufficiently explicit for a
reasonable person to understand the type of conduct that is
acceptable.' The boundaries of the statute are sufficiently dis-
tinct for judges and juries to determine if an acceptable standard
of conduct has been violated.8 " Therefore, the statute is not
unconstitutionally vague, and failure to place two infants who
could not swim in personal floatation devices could be considered
as evidence of criminally negligent conduct. 8 6
Second, Tranby asserted that the trial court incorrectly
instructed the jury: The criminal information charged that a com-
bination of acts caused the children's death, whereas the jury
instructions required that he be found negligent in one or more of
the particulars alleged to be found guilty. 887 He contended that
the trial court thus changed the nature of the offense and violated
his Sixth Amendment right to be informed of the accusation
against him.8 The supreme court responded by stating the state
is not required to prove each allegation in a criminal complaint
beyond a reasonable doubt, only the elements of the offense
charged." 9 Further, the jury was instructed to consider all of the
alleged conduct as "relevant facts or risks" to be weighed when
determining guilt.8 90 The instructions, as such, were correct.8 9 '
Third, Tranby asserted that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain the verdict."9 ' The court required Tranby to show that the
evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,
880. Id.
881. Id. at 821.




886. Id. at 822.
887. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d at 822.




892. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d at 823.
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allowed no reasonable inference of guilt.89 3 The court concluded
that the evidence was sufficient to show circumstances that could
have been found to constitute a gross deviation from acceptable
standards, and that this conduct was the cause of the children's
death. 9 4
Fourth, Tranby asserted that the court erred in denying his
motions for acquittal and a new trial.s95 Rule 29 of the North
Dakota Rules of Criminal Procedure does not allow a motion for
judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict of guilty.,, A motion for
a new trial is left to the discretion of the trial court and is conclu-
sive unless abused. 97 This was not an instance of such abuse by a
trial court.898
Finally, Tranby asserted that his right to a trial by an impartial
jury was denied when his challenge for cause of a prospective
juror was denied by the trial court.8 99 Tranby had to use a pre-
emptory challenge to remove the juror.Y°° The court found that
Tranby's sixth amendment rights were not violated because
Tranby was able to remove the juror without the for cause chal-
lenge."0 Tranby did not claim the jury was impartial, therefore
his right to a fair and impartial jury was not violated. 90 2
The order denying Tranby's post-trial motions and judgment




In Swanson v. Sheppard,° an attorney misinformed his client
about the dischargeability of student loans in bankruptcy. 90 5 Alan
J. Sheppard represented Steven E. Swanson when Swanson filed
Chapter 7 bankruptcy which did not discharge his student loan
893. Id. (citing State v. Jacobson, 419 N.W.2d 899, 901 (N.D. 1988)).
894. Id. at 824.
895. Id.
896. Id. The Court limited its discussion to Tranby's motion for a new trial. Id. See
N.D.R. CRiM. P. Rule 29(c).





901. Id. at 825.
902. Tranby, 437 N.W.2d at 825.
903. Id.
904. 445 N.W.2d 654 (N.D. 1989).
905. Swanson v. Sheppard, 445 N.W.2d 654, 656 (N.D. 1989).
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obligations.' Swanson sued Sheppard for legal malpractice,
alleging that Sheppard was negligent when he did not inform
Swanson that student loans were treated differently under a Chap-
ter 7 bankruptcy filing when compared with a Chapter 13 bank-
ruptcy filing. °
The trial court ruled in Swanson's favor and determined dam-
ages to be those debts not discharged in bankruptcy minus any
payments Swanson would have made pursuant to a Chapter 13
bankruptcy filing . °0
Sheppard appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court, con-
tending that Swanson failed to establish the nature of a duty owed
by Sheppard as an attorney or that Sheppard had breached any
duty.' Sheppard's second argument was that the trial court
erred in determining the damages. 910 Swanson cross-appealed,
contending the trial court erred when it did not "impose sanctions
against Sheppard for pleading a counterclaim for improper
purposes."91'
Initially, the North Dakota Supreme Court determined that
expert testimony was not necessary when a professional's miscon-
duct is obvious to a trier of fact who understands the nature of the
specific duty owed.912 The court further concluded that expert
testimony was not needed when a basic duty existed to inform the
client that student loans were treated differently under Chapter 7
and Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings.913
The supreme court determined that the information Shep-
pard gave Swanson concerning the differences in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings was clearly wrong and the trial court's determination
that not providing the correct information constituted negligent
representation was not clearly erroneous.914
The North Dakota Supreme Court, however, found that the
trial court's determination of damages caused by Sheppard's negli-
906. Swanson, 445 N.W.2d at 656.
907. Id. A Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing does not discharge student loans unless the
loans are first due five years prior to filing chapter 7 or nondischarge would cause undue
hardship. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 523(aX8)). Chapter 13 bankruptcy filings do not have the
same restrictions. Id. In Chapter 13 bankruptcies, the debtor files a plan to pay a portion of
his debts over a period of time. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)). Thus, if Swanson had filed
under Chapter 13, he would have had to only pay a portion of his student loan debts, rather
than facing no discharge under chapter 7. Id.






914. Swanson, 445 N.W.2d at 657-58.
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gence was clearly erroneous. 15 The supreme court concluded
these damages to be merely speculative; inadequate evidence had
been presented to the trial court for it to determine damages.
9 16
The court remanded the case to provide Swanson an opportunity
to explore other remedies to discharge his student loans. 1 7
When Swanson filed the malpractice suit, Sheppard fied a
counterclaim for defamation. 1 ' The trial court found Sheppard
filed the counterclaim to discourage Swanson, but the court did
not impose sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 of the North Dakota
Rules of Civil Procedure, reasoning that Swanson did not suffer
additional expense due to the counterclaim. 19
The North Dakota Supreme Court found the trial court had
clearly erred when it did not impose sanctions against Sheppard
for violation of Rule 11.920 The trial court was required to impose
sanctions pursuant to the rule if it found that Rule 11 had been
violated.9 2 1
The judgment was reversed and the case remanded.9 '
MENTAL HEALTH
O'CALLAGHAN v. L.B.
In O'Callaghan v. L.B.,9 the court found that before invol-
untary admission, the trial court must assess the availability and
appropriateness of alternate treatment programs other than invol-
untary commitment pursuant to statute. 2 4
Renee O'Callaghan, a caregiver, filed a petition to have L.B.
involuntarily admitted for treatment.92 L.B. was a client in
O'Callaghan's center and O'Callaghan testified that L.B. appeared
to be delusional and had made threats to kill a neighbor.92
915. Id. at 658. The trial court had found that if Swanson would have filed under
chapter 13 bankruptcy, all his student loan debts would have been discharged. Id.
Swanson would have been required to pay this amount over a three-year period under a
chapter 13 plan. Id.
916. Id. at 658-59.
917. Id. The supreme court remanded, directing Swanson to mitigate his damages.
The trial court can then proceed to redetermine damages. Id. at 659.
918. Swanson, 445 N.W.2d at 659. Sheppard moved to dismiss his counterclaim at the
close of Swanson's case, without offering any evidence to support it. Id. Sheppard's
attorney admitted there was no basis for the counterclaim after questioning Swanson. Id.
919. Id. Rule 11 of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure provides for sanctions
when an attorney signs pleadings that are imposed for an improper purpose. Id.
920. Swanson, 445 N.W.2d at 659.
921. Id.
922. Id.
923. 447 N.W.2d 326 (N.D. 1989).
924. O'Callaghan v. L.B., 447 N.W.2d 326, 328-29 (N.D. 1989).




The trial court determined that L.B. was a person requiring
treatment under Chapter 25-03.1 of the North Dakota Century
Code which provides that a person requires treatment if there is a
"reasonable expectation" that there exists a "serious risk of harm
to that person, others or property" if the person is not treated.927
L.B. appealed, contending that there was not clear and con-
vincing evidence supporting the trial court's decision as required
by the statute. 92 The supreme court determined that there was
clear and convincing evidence that L.B. posed serious harm and
affirmed the finding-of the trial court.92 9
However, the supreme court found that section 25-03.1-21(1)
of the North Dakota Century Code required the State Hospital to
submit to the court a report determining the "availability and
appropriateness of alternative treatment programs other than
involuntary hospitalization.19 30
L.B. also contended that the statute had not been complied
with, and the supreme court agreed.93 ' The court noted that the
only report of the State Hospital on alternative treatments was a
"fill in the blank" form report which listed under alternatives to
involuntary treatment: "[jail."' 932 The doctor who prepared the
report had only been in the state for two weeks and was unfamiliar
with the forms of treatment available in the state.9 3
The supreme court determined that the trial court's conclu-
sion of inadequate alternative treatment was based on an incom-
plete record and was not in compliance with Section 25-03.1-21(1)
of the North Dakota Century Code.934
The supreme court reversed the trial court's order of involun-
tary commitment and remanded for consideration of a report
assessing the availability of alternative treatment programs.93 5
927. O'Callaghan, 447 N.W.2d at 328. See N.D. CENT. CODE §25-03.1-07
(1987Xstandards for involuntary admissions).
928. Id.
929. Id.
930. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 1 25-03.1-21(1) (1987Xcourt shall review report and
determine whether or not hospitalization is necessary).
931. O'Callaghan, 447 N.W.2d at 328.
932. Id.
933. Id. Dr. Pryatel, the doctor who prepared the report, testified at the hearing that
if the environment was very structured, LB. could perhaps be in a halfway house. Id.
934. Id.
935. Id. at 329.
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MORTGAGE (FARM)
FEDERAL LAND BANK OF ST. PAUL V. BOSCH
In Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bosch,9 6 Peter Bosch
appealed a foreclosure of his mortgage by the Federal Land Bank
of St. Paul.937 In 1982, Bosch had borrowed $110,000, giving the
bank a security interest in his mortgage on his farmland and build-
ings.938 Bosch failed to make his February 1986 payment and did
not pay his 1985 and 1986 real estate taxes.9 39 In May 1986, the
bank denied Bosch's request to restructure his loan after deter-
mining that Bosch would not be able to manage the debt." ° The
bank commenced foreclosure in July 1986 and judgment was
entered in September 1987.94'
On appeal, Bosch first asserted that the trial court miscon-
strued section 28-29-05 of the Nortn. Dakota Century Code when
it determined that foreclosing without delay would not be uncon-
scionable even though the amount of debt did not exceed the fair
market value of the property at trial. 42 The supreme court found
that the trial court had not abused its discretion when the trial
court considered the interest that would accrue on the mortgage
indebtedness during the one-year redemption period and that real
estate taxes for two years remained unpaid.943
Second, Bosch claimed that the bank was not authorized to
raise his interest rate after the default.94 4 He argued that a farm
credit administration regulation which allows the higher interest
rates exceeded the bank's authority.94 5 However, federal legisla-
tion gives broad authority to federal land banks to set interest
rates.946 Bosch had no convincing authority to persuade the court
936. 432 N.W.2d 855 (N.D. 1988).
937. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d 855, 856 (N.D. 1988).




942. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d 856. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-29-05 (1974 & Supp.
1989Xproviding discretionary authority to delay foreclosures). At trial, the fair market
value of the property was $156,000 which exceeded the mortgage indebtedness by $9,400.
Bosch, 432 N.W.2d at 856.
943. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d at 856. With interest accruing at $51.16 per day after June
1987, the debt at the end of 184 days from the trial date would exceed the value of Bosch's
property. Id.
944. Id. at 857. The mortgage provided that upon default the interest rate would
increase from 12.5% to 14.5% on both the principal and interest. Id.
945. Id. Both parties agree that federal law controlled. Id.
946. Id. See Farm Credit System Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2015 (1984 & Supp. 1989Xproviding
in relevant part: "Loans made by a Federal Land Bank shall bear interest at a rate or rates,
and on such terms and conditions, as may be determined by the board of directors of the
bank from time to time"). See also 12 C.F.R. § 614.4290 (1989Xproviding for higher interest
838 [Vol. 66:753
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
that the administrative regulation or mortgage terms at issue are
invalid.947
Third, Bosch asserted that the bank failed to comply with a
federal regulation which requires that lending institutions con-
sider forbearance actions prior to foreclosure.9 48 The bank did not
do so because this regulation became effective on October 28,
1986, after filing of the present foreclosure action.949  The
supreme court noted that an action to foreclose a mortgage is an
equitable proceeding. 950 The court also found that failing to com-
ply with an administrative forbearance regulation gives rise to a
valid equitable defense to foreclosure. 951 Forbearance actions
enacted under the federal regulations were incorporated into the
Agricultural Credit Act of 1987, thus indicating Congress' concern
about lenders' foreclosing on delinquent farm loans without giving
adequate consideration to forbearance. 952 In another jurisdiction,
the court concluded that the Act was applicable even though it
became effective after a foreclosure judgment.953 Thus, under the
federal regulation, Bosch was entitled to reconsideration of his
loan for forbearance action and to a reversal of foreclosure.954 He
also was entitled to disclosure of interest rate information, and this
was to be supplied on remand.955
rates after maturity of a loan); McGovern v. Federal Land Bank of St. Paul, 209 Minn. 403,
296 N.W. 473 (1941).
947. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d at 858.
948. Id. at 857-58; 12 C.F.R. § 614.4513(b) (1989Xrequiring considering forbearance
before foreclosure and enumerating the types of forbearance actions available - deferral
or. rescheduling of principal or interest payrnauth, renewal or extension of the loan or "a
reduction in the amount or rate of principal or interest due").
949. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d at 858.
950. Id. (citing Union State Bank v. Miller, 335 N.W.2d 807 (N.D. 1983Xcert. denied),
464 U.S. 1019 (1983).
951. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d at 858. See Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Overboe, 404
N.W.2d 445 (N.D. 1987).
952. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d at 858. See 12 U.S.C. § 2202(aXbXl) (lender must provide
written notice when loan is suitable for restructuring); 12 U.S.C. 2202(aXeX1) (loan must be
restructured if the cost of restructuring is less than foreclosure costs); 12 U.S.C. 2202(aXbX3)
(no foreclosure is allowed before lender has completed any pending consideration of
restructuring).
953. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d at 858. See Harper v. Federal Land Bank of Spokane, 692 F.
Supp. 1244 (Dist. Or. 1988Xrestructuring provisions applicable where judgments of
foreclosure had been entered but sheriff's sale had not occurred).
954. Bosch, 432 N.W.2d at 859.
955. Id. Justice VandeWalle concurred with the majority that the bank should have
considered forbearance actions but noted that even if it had, the same results would have
occurred. Id. Thus, under the harmless-error standard of rule 61 of the North Dakota Rules
of Civil Procedure, the judgment would have been affirmed. Id. However, because
production of the "family farm" has always had a special status in North Dakota, he agreed
that every legally required consideration must be examined and appear of record.
(Vandewalle, J., concurring. Id. at 859-60.)
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MUNICIPAL LAW
CITY OF BISMARCK V. SHOLY
In City of Bismarck v. Sholy,956 Sholy appealed a conviction of
violating a "dog at large" ordinance. 57 The issue on appeal was
whether Bismarck City Ordinance 3-03-05 required a culpable
state of mind.9 m
Municipal ordinances are generally construed in the same
manner as state statutes with words being given their ordinary
meaning unless a contrary intention is clear.9 59 Courts have inter-
preted the word "permit" either as requiring or not requiring cul-
pability.960 The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that
"'permit" required some level of culpability because penal statutes
should be construed in favor of the defendant against the
government. 61
The court noted that it would reach the same conclusion on
the basis of legislative intent. 2 In Bismarck's "dog at large" ordi-
nance, the authors simply used the word "permit," whereas in the
"animal at large" ordinance, the city used "allow or permit."' 63
Thus, the "animal at large" ordinance was intended to be broader
than the "dog at large" ordinance. '  Using "permit" alone
956. 430 N.W.2d 337 (N.D. 1988).
957. City of Bismarck v. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d 337, 337 (N.D. 1988).
958. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d at 337. See BismARcK, N.D., CODE § 3-03-05 (1987Xproviding
in part that "[i]t is unlawful for any owner or keeper of a dog to permit the animal to be at
large"Xamended 11/8/88 ("No intent or knowledge by the owner or keeper of a dog is
necessary to prove a violation of this ordinance")).
959. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d at 337 (citing City of Minot v. Central Ave. News, Inc. 308
N.W.2d 851 (N.D. 1981), appeal dismissed 454 U.S. 1117 (1981)). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-
02-02 (1987 & Supp. 1989Xproviding that "[w]ords used in any statute are to be understood
in their ordinary sense, unless a contrary intention plainly appears,...").
960. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d at 337-38. Compare LaBelle v. Powers Mercantile, 103 Minn.
515, 114 N.W. 11 31 (1908Xelevator operator did not "permit" boy to run elevator) and
Lemery v. Leonard, 99 Or. 670, 196 P.376 (1921 Xwithout knowledge one does not permit
one's livestock to be at large) with Wittenberg v. Bd. of Liquor Control, 80 N.E.2d 711
(Ohio Ct. App. 1948X"permit" requires no culpability) and Marcum v. Bellomy, 157 W.Va.
636, 203 S.E.2D 367 (1974Xan improperly secured doe is "permitted" to run at large).
961. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d at 338 (citing State v. Hogie, 424 N.W.2d 630 (N.D. 1988):
State v. Sheldon, 312 N.W.2d 367, 369 (N.D. 1981)).
962. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d at 338 (quoting State v. Olson, 356 N.W.2d 110, 112 (N.D.
1984X"[w]hether an offense is punishable without proof of intent, knowledge, willfulness, or
negligence is a question of legislative intent to be determined by the language of the statute
in connection with its manifest purpose and design")). See Dickinson Public School District
No. 1. v. Scott, 252 N.W.2d 216 (N.D. 1977Xall ordinances are to be construed together).
963. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d at 338. Section 3-01-10 of the City of Bismarck Code of
Ordinances provides in part: "It is unlawful for any person to allow or permit any animal
owned by or under his control to run at large within the city." [Emphasis added.] Sholy,
430 N.W.2d at 338.
964. Id. B. Garner, A Dictionary of Modem Legal Usage (1987), defines "allow" as "the








CULLEN V. WILLIAMS COUNTY
In Cullen v. Williams County,966 the court determined that it
could not make an intelligent review of an appeal of a personal
injury action because of an incomplete transcript provided by the
plaintiff. 06
7
Michael Cullen was injured when the school bus he was driv-
ing collided with an oil tanker truck.9" 8 He and his wife brought
an action against Williams County for negligent design and main-
tenance of the roadway and against Jim Florey for the negligent
repair of the school bus.969 The trial court dismissed the action
after a jury determined no negligence on the part of the county or
Florey.97 °
On appeal the Cullens contended that a new trial should have
been granted because Florey's trial attorney made improper
remarks to the jury, certain evidentiary rulings were erroneous
and because Florey's attorney was allowed to substitute a
witness.97 1The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that pursuant
to the "harmless error" rule, only errors that affect the substantial
rights of the parties would create conditions justifying a new
trial.972
The court noted that the transcript provided by the Cullens
was only a partial transcript.973 The court allowed the appeal but
warned the Cullens that the partial transcript might impinge upon
"meaningful and intelligent appellate review. 9 74  The court
determined that the partial transcript did not provide a sufficient
965. Sholy, 430 N.W.2d at 339.
966. 446 N.W.2d 250 (N.D. 1989).
967. Cullen v. Williams County, 446 N.W.2d 250, 253 (N.D. 1989).
968. Cullen, 446 N.W.2d at 251.
969. Id. There was testimony that the mechanic repaired the bus 30 days before the
accident and the bus had worked fine until then. Id. at 253 n.3.
970. Id. at 251-52. The Cullens moved for a new trial and for sanctions against the
mechanic's trial attorney. Id. at 252. The trial court dismissed the motion. Id. The
Cullens' claims against the county were settled after trial. Id. at 252 n.1.
971. Cullen, 446 N.W.2d at 252.
972. Id.
973. Id. Partial transcripts are permitted if both parties stipulate, however, Florey did
not agree in this case. Id. See N.D.R. APP. P. 10(b) (requires appellant to furnish the entire
transcript).
974. Cullen, 446 N.W.2d at 252.
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basis for meaningful and intelligent appellate review. 75 There-
fore, the court was unable to examine the prejudicial nature of any
of the errors alleged by the Cullens in order to grant a new trial.9 76
The court concluded that this was a case where failure to pro-
vide a transcript precluded a party's success in an appeal and
affirmed the trial court's order denying the Cullens' motion for a
new trial and sanctions. 77
KARST V. VICKERS
In Karst v. Vickers,9 78 a jury verdict attributing percentages
of negligence to "dusk" and "design of roadway" was held to have
demonstrated the jury's total misapprehension of the law and war-
ranted a new trial.979
Cameron, Constance, and Justin Karst were awarded damages
against the estate of Roger R. Vickers for injuries they incurred in
an automobile accident.9 0 The jury apportioned percentages of
negligence to "dusk" and "design of roadway" and the Karsts
moved for a new trial.98 ' The motion was denied by the trial court
and the Karsts appealed.98 2
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the instruction
on ordinary negligence instructed clearly that negligence was the
breach of a duty of care by a person.983 The court also found that
inanimate objects such as "dusk" and "design of roadway" could
not breach a duty of care.984
The trial court had concluded that the jury's errors were
harmless, but the supreme court did not agree.98 5 The supreme
court, citing Rule 59(g) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, found that by attributing a percentage of negligence to inan-
imate objects the jury showed a total misapprehension of the
instructions and the law of negligence.9 8
The supreme court held that the trial court abused its discre-
975. Id. at 253. None of the testimony heard by the jury was in the record. Id.
976. Cullen, 446 N.W.2d at 253. The court also determined that the partial transcript
contained no remarks of Florey's attorney warranting sanctions. Id.
977. Id. at 253.
978. 444 N.W.2d 698 (N.D. 1989).
979. Karst v. Vickers, 444 N.W.2d 698, 699 (N.D. 1989).
980. Karst, 444 N.W.2d at 699. Vickers was driving while under the influence and was
killed as a result of the accident. Id.
981. Id.
982. Id.
983. Id. at 700.
984. Id.
985. Karst, 444 N.W.2d at 700.
986. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 59(g) (verdict may be vacated if rendered under
misapprehension of the instructions).
842 [Vol. 66:753
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
tion in denying the Karsts' motion for a new trial and reversed the
judgments and remanded for a new trial.9 87
SATHERN V. BEHM PROPANE, INC.
In Sathern v. Behm Propane, Inc.,9ss a juror's mistaken
response during voir dire was held not to warrant a new trial in a
personal injury action.9 "
George Sathern sustained injuries in an industrial accident
and brought a personal injury action against Behm Propane.990
During voir dire, juror Kennedy answered in the negative when
asked if he had a business relationship with Behm.991 As the result
of an investigation after the jury returned a verdict for Behm,
Sathern discovered that Kennedy had done a small amount of
business with Behm three years before the trial." 2
Sathern moved for a new trial and the trial court initially
granted the motion. z After Kennedy's aflidavit surfaced, stating
he was unaware of the business until after the trial, the trial court
reversed its prior order and denied Sathern's motion for a new
trial.994
Sathern contended on appeal to the North Dakota Supreme
Court that the trial court erred in denying his motion.99 5 The
supreme court noted that it would not set aside the trial court's
decision unless there was an affirmative showing that it abused its
discretion.9
The North Dakota Supreme Court cited to the United States
Supreme Court and noted it would not adopt the United States
Supreme Court's standard, but did agree with the court's reason-
ing that only false answers that would affect a juror's impartiality
would warrant granting a motion for a new trial.997
987. Karst, 444 N.W.2d at 700. The jury's misunderstanding of the instructions
"tainted the entire verdict." Id.
988. 444 N.W.2d 696 (N.D. 1989).
989. Sathern v. Behm Propane, Inc., 444 N.W.2d 696, 698 (N.D. 1989).
990. Sathern, 444 N.W.2d at 696.
991. Id.
992. Id. This business consisted of a single service call conducted by a company
employee. Id. at 697.
993. Id.
994. Id.
995. Sathern, 444 N.W.2d at 697. Sathern asserted he would have exercised a
preemptory challenge to excuse Kennedy if Kennedy had disclosed the prior relationship.
Id.
996. Id. An abuse of discretion in failing to grant a motion for a new trial is defined as
an unreasonable arbitrary or unconscionable attitude on the part of the court. Id. (citing
Holte v. Carl Albers, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 520, 524 (N.D. 1985)).
997. Sathern, 444 N.W.2d at 698. In McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, a
juror mistakenly failed to respond to a question in voir dire. McDonough Power Equip.,
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The North Dakota Supreme Court found that in Sathern a sin-
gle business transaction, of which a juror did not recall, could not
have affected his impartiality at trial. 98 The court cited to Rule 61
of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure which provides that
no error is a ground for setting aside a verdict or granting a new
trial unless the refusal to take such action appears to be inconsis-
tent with substantial justice.'
The court found that Sathern's substantial rights were not
affected by Kennedy's honestly mistaken response.'l °° The trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sathern's motion for a
new trial. 1° °1 The judgment was affirmed.10" 2
OFFICERS & PUBLIC EMPLOYEES
BERDAHL v. N.D. STATE PERSONNEL BD.
In Berdahl v. N.D. State Personnel Bd.,1 ° 3 a state employee's
termination was supported by the evidence and no due process
violations took place during his dismissal from the North Dakota
State Highway Department.' °"
Ross Berdahl was employed by the North Dakota Highway
Department operating a four-ton Highway Department truck and
similar vehicles.' 0 5 Berdahl also operated a personal business
repairing automobiles. 10 6 The Highway Department had policies
which prohibited the personal use of Highway Department vehi-
cles.10 7 The Department had policies against the interference of
outside employment with a Highway Department job. 0 8 Ber-
dahl was well informed of these departmental policies. 1°°' 9
In September of 1986, a Highway maintenance supervisor dis-
cussed with Berdahl a number of violations of these policies and
warned him that it could result in a termination of Berdahl's
Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984). The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
decision to grant a new trial and thought it was "contrary to the practical necessities of
judicial management," -since a trial is an important investment of private and social
resources. Id. at 553-56.
998. Sathern, 444 N.W.2d at 698.
999. Id. See N.D.R. Civ. P. 61 (no error on any ruling is ground for granting a new trial




1003. 447 N.W.2d 300 (N.D. 1989).
1004. Berdahl v. N.D. State Personnel Bd., 447 N.W.2d 300, 305 (N.D. 1989).







employment. 10 10 Berdahl's supervisor observed another violation
in March of 1987, and Berdahl admitted that he had used a depart-
ment vehicle for personal use.' 0 1' Later that month, the Depart-
ment notified Berdahl that they were considering suspending him
and on April 9, 1987, suspended him for three days.10 1 2 Berdahl
unsuccessfully appealed the suspension through the internal griev-
ance procedure of the Highway Department and then the State
Personnel Board.10 1 3 After suspension was served, the Highway
Department learned of another prior incident in which Berdahl
violated departmental policy.101 4 In July, Berdahl was informed
that the Department was considering dismissing him.10 1 5  In
August, Berdahl was informed of his dismissal and appealed even-
tually to the State Personnel Board. 01 6 The board upheld Ber-
dahl's dismissal, as did the district court, and Berdahl appealed to
the North Dakota Supreme Court.
1 0 17
Berdahl first contended that the department's findings were
not supported by the preponderance of the evidence. 01 8 The
supreme court found that the record was replete with testimony
regarding Berdahl's misuse of state vehicles, use of department
time for personal business and Berdahl's abuse of sick leave. 0 1 9
The court concluded that a reasoning mind could have reasonably
determined that the allegations were supported by the
evidence. 0 20
Berdahl's second contention was that he was denied due pro-
cess. 10 2 1  The court cited to Cleveland -Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 022 and determined that Berdahl was afforded the due
process mandated by Loudermill because he received a
1010. Berdahl, 447 N.W.2d at 301-02. A member of the public had reported Berdahl's





1015. Berdahl, 447 N.W.2d at 302. The dismissal was based on charges that Berdahl
used department vehicles for his personal use, used departmental time to conduct his
personal business, created a bad image for the department and abused his sick leave. Id.
1016. Id. Berdahl responded to the notices of dismissal through letters by his attorney.Id.
1017. Id. at 302-03.
1018. Id. at 303. The supreme court's review of administrative agency decisions is
governed by section 28-32-19 of the North Dakota Century Code. Id. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 28-32-19 (Supp. 1989Xappeal procedure for review of an administrative appeal).
1019. Berdahl, 447 N.W.2d at 304. Additionally, Berdahl admitted his misuse of
department vehicles. Id. Berdahl's testimony was often uncorroborated, and he offered
little evidence in support of his argument. Id.
1020. Id.
1021. Id.
1022. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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pretermination notice, received a summary of the evidence
against him, was afforded an opportunity to respond, and a post
termination hearing was held. 0
Finally, Berdahl asserted that the three day suspension before
the department found out about the third violation acted as
administrative res judicata against further disciplinary action on
the third violation. 10 The supreme court noted that the depart-
ment had no knowledge of the third incident at the time of the
suspension and could not have raised it at the time the department
decided to suspend Berdahl. 02 The court determined that the
third incident was wholly separate from the two incidences for
which Berdahl was suspended.1 0 2 6 The court concluded that the
department was entitled to consider the third incident as well as
all of Berdahl's violations in determining whether or not to termi-
nate Berdahl's employment and therefore there was no reason to
apply the doctrine of administrative res judicata to Berdahl's
claim.
10 2 7
The judgment was affirmed. 102
OIL AND GAS
HOLMAN V. STATE
In Holman v. State'0 29 the issue was whether oil and gas
leases, which retained an overriding royalty interest, was an
assignment or sublease.10 30 The case involved mineral interests in
two quarters of land in Dunn County.10 3 ' The leasehold or min-
eral interests were owned by three parties: fifty percent of the
minerals were owned by the state; forty percent by the Bren fam-
ily; and, ten percent by Andrew Heiser. 113 2 In 1972 Natt Holman
entered into an oil and gas lease with the Brens.10 3 3 In 1976
Holman assigned his oil and gas rights to Amoco Production Com-
1023. Berdahl, 447 N.W.2d at 306. Berdahl also contended that his due process was
violated because a member of the State Personnel Board participated in deciding his
appeal. Id. The supreme court found no evidence of the member's prejudice, and no
evidence of any pecuniary interest of the member in the outcome, and thus no violation of
due process. Id.




1028. Berdahl, 447 N.W.2d at 307.
1029. 438 N.W.2d 534 (N.D. 1989).
1030. Holman v. State, 438 N.W.2d 534, 537 (N.D. 1989).





pany, reserving a five percent overriding royalty interest.10 34
After a series of transfers the original Holman mineral interest
ended up with Great Plains Petroleum, Inc. (GPP).10 35
In 1985 Holman assigned his five percent overriding interest
to GPP who subsequently filed Chapter 11 Bankruptcy. °38
Holman then commenced a quiet title action to determine respec-
tive mineral interests in the property.1 0 37 The state, as one of the
defendants, alleged that Holman had no mineral interest because
of his assignment to Amoco.10 38 The district court granted the
state's motion for summary judgment.1 0 39 Holman appealed the
trial court decision.1°40
The North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that the trial
court did not err in determining that the 1976 transfer to Amoco
from Holman was an assignment.' 0 41 Holman's argument was that
his conveyance to Amoco was a sublease, not an assignment,
because of his reservation of the five percent overriding royalty
interest. 10 42 The supreme court indicated that oil and gas convey-
ances are interpreted by the same rules that govern contractual
agreements.1 43 The rule interpreting contracts is found in sec-
tions 9-07-03 and 9-07-04 of the North Dakota Century Code. 0 44
The supreme court determined that the language of the granting
clause of the agreement transferring the lease to Amoco from
Holman, as well as the parties' subsequent action, indicated an
intent to assign all interests subject to the five percent royalty.10 45
The court followed the lead of a majority of jurisdictions by declar-
ing that the royalty interest was not sufficient to defeat an assign-
1034. Id.
1035. Holman, 438 N.W.2d at 535. Amoco assigned its oil and gas lease to Sunbehm
Gas, Inc., which assigned the lease to Great Plains Petroleum, Inc., Id.
1036. Id.
1037. Id. at 535.
1038. Id.
1039. Id. at 536. The trial court decided that "there is no genuine issue of material fact
and the State is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
1040. Id.
1041. Id. at 540.
1042. Id. at 537. If a tenant transfers an entire interest, the transfer is considered an
assignment, whereas a sublease occurs when less than an entire interest is transferred. Id.
(citing 5 E. KuN=Z, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 64.2 at 232 (1978)).
1043. Holman, 438 N.W.2d at 537 (citing Miller v. Schwartz, 354 N.W.2d 685, 688(N.D. 1984); Johnson v. Mineral Estate, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 778, 780 (N.D. 1984); MacMaster v.
Onstad, 86 N.W.2d 36, 40 (1957)).
1044. Holman, 438 N.W.2d at 538. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 9-07-03 (1987Xa contract
is to be interpreted according to intent of parties); 9-07-04 (1987Xif intent may not be
ascertained from the writing, the parties' actions may be considered).
1045. Holman, 438 N.W.2d at 538. Holman had signed a document entitled
"Correction of Assignment" that referred to the transfer to Amoco as an assignment. Id.
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ment 10 46 Thus, the district court ruling was affimed. ° 47
PARENT AND CHILD
IN INTEREST OF L.j. AND R.j.
In In Interest of L.J. and R.J.,1048 the mother (K.J.) of two men-
tally retarded male children appealed the termination of her
parental rights. 1°49 In April 1985, K.J. and her husband (B.J.) had
all five of their children removed from the home following a long
history of involvement with the county social services. °50 A peti-
tion for termination of parental rights with regard to the two men-
tally handicapped children was filed in May 1986, alleging little or
no progress on the part of the parents in being able to adequately
provide for the boys.10 5 1 K.J.'s parental rights were subsequently
terminated by the juvenile court.10 52
When reviewing termination decisions, the North Dakota
Supreme Court examines the evidence in a manner similar to trial
de novo.105 3 Although the juvenile court's findings were given
considerable weight, the court was not bound by them.X054 To ter-
minate parental rights, the state must show that: 1) the child is
"deprived"; 2) "the conditions and causes of deprivation are likely
to continue or will not be remedied"; and 3) because of the condi-
tions and causes, "the child is suffering or will probably suffer seri-
ous physical, mental, moral or emotional harm."10 55
Under section 27-20-02(5Xa) of the North Dakota Century
Code, a deprived child lacks proper parental care, control, subsis-
tence, or education, and the deprivation is not caused by a lack of
financial resources. 056 The boys' deprivation had to do with the
lack of supervision and lack of attention to their needs. 057 There
was abundant evidence to establish that in this case the depriva-
1046. Id. at 540. See 3 W. SUMMERS, THE LAw OF OIL AND GAS § 553 at 598-99
(1958Xweight of authority does not treat overriding royalty as an interest, thus, no sublease).
1047. Id. at 540.
1048. 436 N.W.2d 558 (N.D. 1989).
1049. In re L.J., 436 N.W.2d 558, 559 (N.D. 1989).
1050. In re L.J. at 560. Since 1980, twenty-one abuse and neglect reports were filed of
which fifteen were substantiated. Id.
1051. In re L.J., 436 N.W.2d at 560. The parents were to have corrected the home
conditions and participated in various social services programs. Id.
1052. Id.
1053. Id. (citing In re C.S., 417 N.W.2d 846, 847 (N.D. 1988)).
1054. In re L., 436 N.W.2d at 560 (citing In re C.S., 417 N.W.2d at 848; In re A.M.C.,
391 N.W.2d 178, 179 (N.D. 1986)).
1055. In re L.., 436 N.W.2d at 560. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-44 (1974 & Supp.
1989Xtermination of parental rights).




tion was not primarily due to finances.' ° m
K.J. asserted that the juvenile court violated her constitutional
right to parenting by requiring a standard of care for her children
that would be virtually impossible for any parent to satisfy.10 59
However, the special needs of children are relevant in determin-
ing whether there would be continuing or unremediated depriva-
tion." ° Parents do have a fundamental right to their children,
and this right may not be lost merely because a parent can not
optimize the child's potential.106 However, care must satisfy min-
imum community standards. 1 062 The care required to meet a min-
imum standard fluctuates with the kind of child; care is not an
absolute standard.'° For a special needs child, the minimum
care must provide necessities plus the support and nurture that
will allow reasonable development given the child's reasonable
potential. °64
The evidence was dramatic both in documenting the degree
of deprivation suffered by the two children as well as their substan-
tial improvement while in foster care."° K.J.'s parenting skills
may not be judged inadequate only by comparison with the foster
parents if she is able to provide minimum care.' ° The compari-
son does, however, provide evidence for assessing the children's
potential.106 7 Even without comparison, there was clear and con-
tinuing evidence of KJ.'s inadequate parenting.1°6
K.J. argued that she has improved conditions in the home and
that she can now remedy the deprivation.'O 9 However, expert
testimony established that the caregiver must be able to under-
stand the boys' special needs and provide constant reinforcement
of their skills at home. °1 0 70 Many witnesses testified that K.J. could
not understand the children's needs and that the home structure
1058. Id. (citing In re D.S., 325 N.W.2d 654, 660 (N.D. 1982)).
1059. In re LJ., 436 N.W.2d at 561.
1060. Id. (citing Jacobson v. V.S., 271 N.W.2d 562 (N.D. 1978)).
1061. In re L.J., 436 N.W.2d at 561 (citing Kleingartner v. D.P.A.B., 310 N.W.2d 575,
578 (N.D. 1981); In re L.N., 319 N.W.2d 801, 805 (N.D. 1982)).
1062. In re L.J., 436 N.W.2d at 561 (citing Asendorf v. M.S.S., 342 N.W.2d 203, 206
(N.D. 1983)).
1063. In re LJ., 436 N.W.2d at 561.
1064. Id.
1065. Id. at 561-62.
1066. Id. at 562 (citing In re J.A., 283 N.W.2d 283, 93 (N.D. 1979Xquoting In re R.D.S.,
259 N.W.2d 636, 638 (N.D. 1977)).
1067. In re L.., 436 N.W.2d at 562.
1068. Id.
1069. Id. K.J. noted that the boys are now in school; her husband, who was retarded
and required much care, died; and her two teenage sons could assist her. Id.
1070. In re L., 436 N.W.2d at 563.
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would disintegrate if the boys returned.'0 1 Lack of cooperation
with social services was also relevant in deciding whether depriva-
tion would continue, and Kj. was unable to cooperate
sufficiently. 1 072
Psychologists, social workers, and special education profes-
sionals testified that returning the children to an environment ill-
equipped to provide for their special needs would cause serious
mental harm and impair their ability to learn. 10 73
The order of termination was affirmed. 0 74
PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS
SANDE V. STATE
In Sande v. State, 075 a nurse was publicly reprimanded and
fined by the state board of nursing for violating the Nurses Prac-
tices Act in chapter 43-12.1 of the North Dakota Century Code by
practicing without a license. 0 76 The nurse appealed to a district
court which reversed the decision of the board, and the board and
state appealed to the North Dakota Supreme Court. 10 7 7
Nancy Njaa Sande had been a registered nurse since 1969 and
had renewed her license to practice nursing each year. 10 7  In
November of 1987, Sande realized she had not received her
renewal card for that year.10 79 She paid a late renewal fee and the
board of nursing filed an administrative complaint against Sande
pursuant to state statute for "willful and repeated" violations in
practicing nursing without a license. 10 °
At a hearing, the board presented evidence that 10,000 nurs-
ing license renewals were mailed each year and. that Sande's form
was not returned undelivered.' °s l Sande testified that she knew
she needed a license to practice but did not realize that she was
practicing in 1987 without a license.10 8 2 The board determined
1071. Id.
1072. Id. (citing In re R.M.B. 402 N.W.2d 912, 918 (N.D. 1987); McBeth v. JJ.H. 343
N.W.2d 355, 360 (N.D. 1984)).
1073. In re L.j., 436 N.W.2d at 563-64.
1074. Id. at 564.
1075. 440 N.W.2d 264 (N.D. 1989).
1076. Sande v. State, 440 N.W.2d 264, 265 (N.D. 1989).
1077. Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 266.
1078. Id. at 265.
1079. Id.
1080. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-12.1-03 (1987Xlicense required to practice
nursing); N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-12.1-15(4) (1987Xpracticing without a license is a class B
misdemeanor).




that Sande violated the statutes by practicing as a nurse without a
license.'0 " The board also concluded that it was not necessary to
find intent for the board to determine that Sande's conduct was
constituted willful and repeated violations.'0m The board fined
Sande five dollars per day for ninety-two working days that she
was in violation.1° s s Sande was also publicly reprimanded.' s
Sande appealed to the district court which held in her
favor.10 8 7 The district court held that it must be shown that Sande
was consciously aware of her violation before the board could dis-
cipline her.' 0 m
On appeal, the board and the state contended that the district
court could not hear the appeal because Sande did not serve a
member of the board with her notice of appeal as the statute
required. 08 9 Sande's documents were served on the assistant
attorney general who represented both the state and the
board."°° The board argued that service on at least one board
member was required by the statute.' ° °  Sande contended that it
was sufficient to serve the assistant attorney general under the
rules of civil procedure.109 2 The state supreme court agreed with
Sande, stating that unless a statute is inconsistent with the rules of
civil procedure, the rules would govern an appeal of an adminis-
trative agency decision. °0 a
The board must have found Sande guilty of willfully and
repeatedly violating the provisions governing nursing practices to
1083. Id.
1084. Id.
1085. Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 266. The days were computed from July 5, 1987, when
the daily fine was authorized in an amendment to section 43.12.1-14 of the North Dakota
Century Code, and from November 13, 1987, the date that Sande went to the renewal
office. Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 266, n.2.
1086. Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 266.
1087. Id.
1088. Id.
1089. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 1 28-32-15 (1987Xnotices of administrative agency
appeals must be served on the agency, the attorney general or assistant attorney general,
and upon all the parties).
1090. Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 266.
1091. Id.
1092. Id.
1093. Id. (citing Shroeder v. Burleigh County Board of Commissioners, 252 N.W.2d
893, 895 (N.D. 1977)). See N.D.R. Civ. P. 5(b) (service on a party's attorney constitutes
proper service if service is required or permitted on a party represented by an attorney).
Furthermore, North Dakota statutory law require that the court affirm an administrative
decision: "(1) if the findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence; (2) if
the conclusions of law are sustained by the findings of fact; (3) if the agency decision is
supported by the conclusions of law; and (4) if the decision is in accordance with the law."
Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 267. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-32-19 (1987). See also In re Stone
Creek Channel Improvements, 424 N.W.2d 894, 896 (N.D. 1988).
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discipline her.10 4 The board contended that the meaning of will-
fully should include any voluntary act whether or not it was a con-
scious violation. 10 5 Sande argued that proof of conscious violation
should be required.'0
The court noted that its decision did not solely depend on the
meaning of "willfully," and found that for the board to discipline
Sande, her conduct must be willful and repeated.10 7 The board
treated each day Sande practiced nursing without a license as a
violation.1l° 8 The court stated that for a violation to be repeated,
the violator must be conscious of prior violations.1° "
The court found that because Sande's conduct could not be
characterized as willful and repeated, the board was not author-
ized to discipline her, and the Supreme Court afirmed the district
court's judgment dismissing the board's complaint.'l 0
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
BuTx V. WERNER
In Butz v. Werner" 01 there were three issues. The first issue
was whether the determination of an unsafe product, due to a fail-
ure to warn, was a question of fact."10 2 The second issue was
whether plaintiff was required to elect one theory of recovery
over another.10 3 The third issue was whether the trial court erred
in refusing to permit defendants demonstrative evidence. l 0 4
Butz and Werner had been fishing, with two others, when they
decided to try out the "super tube" Werner had recently
purchased." 05 Butz was riding the tube and Werner was driving
the boat when the tube, with Butz riding, skimmed the shoreline
until it slammed in a partially docked boat. 1 6 As a result of these
injuries Butz brought suit against Werner, Cass Oil Co. (Cass), and
World Wide, Inc. (World), the sellers and distributors of the "super
1094. Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 268. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 43-12.1-14(7) (1987Xgrounds
for discipline and penalties). Sande's violations consisted of practicing without a license.
Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 267-68.




1099. Sande, 440 N.W.2d at 268.
1100. Id. at 268-69.
1101. 438 N.W.2d 509 (N.D. 1989).
1102. Butz v. Werner, 438 N.W.2d 509, 511 (N.D. 1989).
1103. Butz at 513.
1104. Id. at 518.




tube" on the theories of negligence, strict products liability, and
breach of warranty.'" °7 The court found for Butz on the theories
of strict liability and negligence, but found no breach of war-
ranty."' 8 Cass and World appealed the trial court judgment." 0 9
In addressing the first issue, the court stated that the "relevant
inquiry in a strict liability action based upon failure to warn is
whether the defendant marketed a product which was unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user because of inadequate warning."' 0 °
The question of whether a product is unreasonably dangerous to
the user due to lack of warning is a question of fact. 11 ' As a result
the court determined that the trial court did not err in allowing
the jury to determine whether or not the product was unsafe. 1' 2
In addressing the second issue, the court cited rules 8(a) and
18(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure which allows
parties to plead multiple claims."1 3 In refusing to declare that the
trial court erred in allowing Butz to plead multiple theories, the
court quoted from Mauch that "we believe that recovery sought
under a negligent failure-to-warn theory and recovery sought
under products-liability... are two separate and distinct theories
of recovery. Thus the trial court must instruct on each....
The Supreme Court, in confronting the third issue, concluded
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The court then
stated that the determination of whether or not to admit demon-
strative evidence is left to the discretion of the court and will not
be overturned unless abuse is shown.' 1 1 5 Thus, the district judg-
ment was affirmed in whole.' 6
RAPE
STATE V. REINART
In State v. Reinart,"117 Kenneth William Reinart appealed
1107. Id.
1108. Id. The case was tried before a jury and the verdict form required the jury to
separately assess fault on the two theories. Id. The fault assessed was as follows: on the
strict liability theory, World 37.5%, Cass 37.5%, Werner 0%, Butz 25%. Id. On the
negligence theory: World 25%, Cass 25%, Werner 15%, Butz 35%. Id. at 511.
1109. Id.
1110. Id. (citing Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales and Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 345
(N.D. 1984)).
1111. Id. (citations omitted).
1112. Id. at 512.
1113. Id. at 513. See N.D.R. CIv. P. 8(a), 18(a) (allow parties to plead multiple claims).
1114. Butz, 438 N.W.2d at 513 (quoting Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales and Service,
Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338, 345 (N.D. 1984).
1115. Id. at 518.
1116. Id.
1117. 440 N.W.2d 503 (N.D. 1989).
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from a jury verdict finding him guilty of gross sexual imposition of
his fourteen year old stepdaughter.' " 18 Reinart's stepdaughter tes-
tified that Reinart had engaged in sexual intercourse with her sev-
eral times.""'
On appeal, Reinart argued that he should have been allowed
to introduce testimony that someone else was responsible for the
complainant's physical condition." 20 The state argued that statu-
tory and case law supported the suppression of such evidence." 2'
North Dakota's "rape shield" law provides that in any prosecution
for gross sexual imposition and sexual imposition, evidence con-
cerning the reputation of the complaining witness is not admissi-
ble to prove consent of the witness. 1" In its argument, the state
tried to use the law to exclude evidence of the stepdaughter's
prior sexual activity."123 The supreme court noted that consent
was not an issue when the complainant was less than fifteen years
old and held that when the prosecutor introduced the physician's
testimony regarding possible sexual intercourse, the defendant
should have been allowed to provide an alternative explanation
for the stepdaughter's physical condition." 4
Furthermore, the court determined that it was prejudicial
error to deny the defendant the right to cross examine the com-
plainant."2 The court noted that the stepdaughter's testimony
was very important to the prosecution's case, but that the testi-
mony was contradicted by her mother and the defendant." 26
1118. State v. Reinart, 440 N.W.2d 503, 504 (N.D. 1989). See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-
20-03(lXd) (1987Xengaging in sexual acts with a person less than fifteen-years-old is gross
sexual imposition).
1119. Reinart, 440 N.W.2d at 504. A physician testified that the stepdaughter had
experienced "chronic blunt trauma" where a blunt instrument, such as a penis, had been
pushed against her vagina. Id. at 505. The doctor strongly suspected that intercourse had
taken place. Id.
1120. Id. At trial, Reinart's counsel asked the stepdaughter if she "had ever had sexual
intercourse with anyone else," and the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection that
it was not relevant. Id. at 505.
1121. Reinart, 440 N.W.2d at 505. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-14 (1987Xwhich
does not allow evidence of consent by complaining witness). See also State v. Buckley, 325
N.W.2d 169 (N.D. 1982); State v. Piper, 261 N.W.2d 650 (N.D. 1977Xboth cases dealt with
consent and credibility).
1122. Reinart, 440 N.W.2d at 506.
1123. Id.
1124. Id. at 505 (citing People v. Mikula, 269 N.W.2d at 195 (1978)). The court
emphasized that in a criminal trial the sixth amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees the defendant's right to confront witnesses, and under the fourteenth
amendment, the states must recognize this right. Id. at 506.
1125. Reinart, 440 N.W.2d at 506. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684(1986Xfactors in determining whether a denial is harmless error include the importance of a
witness's testimony, whether the testimony was cumulative, and the presence or absence of
evidence of corroborating or contradicting testimony on material points).
1126. Renart, 440 N.W.2d at 506.
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Additionally, once the medical evidence was introduced, alterna-
tive reasons for the injuries became crucial in establishing
guilt. 1127 Accordingly, the supreme court held that Reinart should
have been allowed to introduce alternative reasons for the step-
daughter's injuries, and the denial of that right was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.11 8
The supreme court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 1 29
SCHOOLS
DICKINSON PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT V. SANSTEAD
In Dickinson Public School Dist. v. Sanstead,130 Superinten-
dent of the Department of Public Instruction, Sanstead, and the
State of North Dakota appealed from a judgment awarding
$371,548.28 plus interest and costs to three public school dis-
tricts. 1 3 1 The school districts had challenged the state's method of
calculating per-pupil foundation aid payments under Chapter 15-
40.1 of the North Dakota Century Code.1 13  The district court
determined as a matter of law that an express contract was created
between the State and the school districts under the statute, and
thus, the school districts' action was not barred by sovereign
in ruity.11 33
A motion by the school districts to dismiss the state's appeal
was denied. 1 34  The supreme court noted that, while the
amended order granting summary judgment was not appealable,
an attempted appeal from that order was to be treated as anappeal from a subsequently entered consistent judgment."135
The state contended that the school districts' action was
barred by article I section 9 of the North Dakota Constitution. 1 36
1127. Id.
1128. Id. at 507. The court did not agree with Reinart's contention that the testimony
of witnesses that complainant previously told them that she and Reinart had sexual
intercourse was hearsay. Id. The court cited Rule 801(d) of the North Dakota Rules of
Evidence and concluded that the testimony rebutted a charge of recent fabrication or
improper motive and thus not hearsay. Id. See N.D.R. EvID. 801(d) (prior statements of
witnesses are not hearsay if the statement is offered to rebutt a charge of recent
fabrication).
1129. Id.
1130. 425 N.W.2d 906 (N.D. 1988).
1131. Dickinson Public School Dist. v. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d 906, 907-09 (N.D. 1988).
1132. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 908. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-40.1-07-09
(1987Xcalculation of educational foundation program per-pupil paymentsXamended 1989).
1133. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 908-09.
1134. Id. at 908.
1135. Id. (citing Vanderhoof v. Gravel Products, Inc., 404 N.W.2d 485, 488 (N.D.
1987)).
1136. Id. See N.D. CONST. art. I, § 9 (providing that "[s]uits may be brought against the
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No suit may be maintained against the state unless authorized by
the state legislature." 3 7 Also, section 32-12-02 of the North
Dakota Century Code had previously been construed as barring
any suit against the state that was not within the express provisions
of the statute."1
The North Dakota Supreme Court determined that the stat-
ute directing disbursement of appropriated funds to school dis-
tricts did not create a contractual relationship." 3 9  The court
reasoned that the legislature could have provided that all such
funds be retained by the state or that all funding for public schools
be borne by the local school districts."140  Further, the supreme
court reiterated that state aid to local school districts is a mere gra-
tuity.114  Thus, because reimbursement creates no contract
between the state and the school districts, the districts' claim was
barred by sovereign immunity. 1 42
The court also determined that the judgment could not be
sustained as a writ of mandamus or as a declaratory judgment. 143
Mandamus was not the proper remedy to compel the undoing of
acts already done.' 144  Similarly, declaratory judgments were
intended to clarify the rights of parties before rights are vio-
lated. 1 45 The school districts sought payment for past misdeeds,
hence remand was not required and the district court judgment
was reversed. 146
state in such a manner, in such courts, and in such cases, as the legislative assembly may, by
law, direct").
1137. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 908 (citing Senger v. Hulstrand Constr., Inc., 320
N.W.2d 507, 508 (N.D. 1982)).
1138. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 908 (citing Kristensen v. Strinden, 343 N.w.2d 67, 74
(N.D. 1983); Stark County v. State, 160 N.W.2d 101, 105 (N.D. 1968)). See N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-12-02 (1976 and Supp. 1989Xproviding that "[an action respecting the title to
property, or arising upon contract, may be brought in the district court against the state the
same as against a private person").
1139. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 909. See Stark County v. State, 160 N.W.2d 101, 105(N.D. 1968Xstatute providing for the distribution of motor-vehicle registration moneys did
not create a contract between the state and Stark County).
1140. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 909 (citing Dornacker v. Olson, 248 N.W.2d 844, 849(N.D. 1976); Todd v. Bd. of Education, 54 N.D. 235, 241, 209 N.W. 369, 371 (1926)).
1141. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 910 (citing Zenith School District No. 32 v. Peterson, 81
N.W.2d 764, 768 (N.D. 1957)).
1142. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 910.
1143. Id.
1144. Id. (citing State ex rel. Conrad v. Langer, 68 N.D. 167, 175, 277 N.W. 504, 509
(1937)).
1145. Id. See Allen v. City of Minot, 363 N.W.2d 553, 554 n.1 (N.D. 1985Xdiscussing
appropriate application of the Declaratory Judgment Act in chapter 32-23 of the North
Dakota Century Code).
1146. Sanstead, 425 N.W.2d at 910. Justice Meschke's concurring opinion disagreed
with the court's procedural rationale, i.e., sovereign immunity, but agreed in the result for
substantive reasons, i.e., that the Superintendent had correctly interpreted the applicable
statutes. Id. at 912 (Meschke, J., concurring).
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VAN INWAGEN V. SANSTEAD
In Van Inwagen v. Sanstead,"1 47 the North Dakota Supreme
Court upheld the State Superintendent of Public Instruction's
denial of Joseph and Renee Van Inwagen's request for an exemp-
tion for their children from compulsory school attendance.1 148
The supreme court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
Van Inwagen's appeal of the superintendent's denial which deter-
mined that there was no statute authorizing an appeal.' 149
The Van Inwagens relied on subsection four of section 15-
34.1-03 of the North Dakota Century Code in requesting to
exempt their children. I 15° The Van Inwagens initial request,
made to the Hazen School Board, stated that it would be "a viola-
tion of principle and our conscience" to comply with the compul-
sory school law." 5 A multidisciplinary team set up to review the
situation made no recommendation to the school board on the
request for exemption. 1 52 The school board denied the Van
Inwagen's after receiving no recommendation." l "
The Van Inwagen's appealed the school board's denial to the
Mercer County Superintendent of Schools in accordance with sec-
tion 15-22-17 of the North Dakota Century Code. 154 After the
superintendent of schools denied their request, the Van Inwagens
appealed to the State Superintendent Wayne Sanstead, who also
denied the request for an exemption. 1155
The Van Inwagens appealed Sanstead's denial to the district
court and Van Inwagen's appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion.11 The district court held that there was no statutory right
to appeal the decision of the State Superintendent." 57
In their appeal to the North Dakota Supreme Court, the Van
Inwagens contended that they had a right to appeal the decision of
1147. 440 N.W.2d 513 (N.D. 1989).
1148. Van Inwagen v. Sanstead, 440 N.W.2d 513, 514 (N.D. 1989). See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 15-34.1-03 (1987Xexempts from compulsory attendance those children that are in
such physical or mental condition that they are unable to attend regular special education).
1149. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 514.
1150. Id.
1151. Id.
1152. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 514. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-34.1-03(4)
(1987Xmultidisciplinary team required by statute).
1153. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 514.
1154. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 1 15-21-17 (1987Xappeal from decisions of county
superintendent).
1155. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 514.
1156. Id.
1157. Id. The supreme court noted that an appeal is a creature of statute and that
there is no right to appeal absent statutory authority. Id. (citing Investment Rarities, Inc. v.
Bottineau County Water Resource District, 396 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1986)).
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the State Superintendent of Public Instruction pursuant to sections
15-21-07, 15-22-17, and 28-32-15 of the North Dakota Century
Code."m The supreme court did not agree with the Van
Inwagen's contentions that they have a right to appeal the state
superintendent's decision. 15 9  The court noted that the state
superintendent is not generally an administrative agency."'
Thus, the statute which authorizes appeals did not apply to the
Van Inwagen's appeal.""'
Additionally, the supreme court found that although section
15-22-17 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that the
decision of the state superintendent is final "subject to appropriate
remedies in the courts," this does not mean that there is a general
right to appeal."162 It only means that a separate action may be
brought in the courts."'
The court noted that if the legislature intended for there to be
an appeal of the decision, the legislature could have provided for
an appeal mechanism in a clear manner."64
Therefore, the supreme court agreed with the decision of the
trial court to dismiss the appeal and affrmed the judgment." 5
SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS
COLES v. GLENBURN PUB. SCHOOL DIST. No. 26
In Coles v. Glenburn Pub. School Dist. No. 26,1166 Kevin Coles
and Francine Kuznia appealed from a district court order denying
1158. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 515. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-21-07
(1987Xsuperintendent of public instruction shall decide all appeals from decisions of county
superintendent of schools); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-22-17 (1987Xappeal to superintendent of
public instruction from decisions of county superintendent and his decision is final); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-32-15 (19 87Xany party can appeal an administrative decision unless it is
declared final by another statute).
1159. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 515.
1160. Id. There are exceptions to the state superintendent not being an administrative
agency when following rules dealing with section 15-21-07 and rules dealing with teacher
certification or professional codes and standards. Id.
1161. Id.
1162. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 515.
1163. Id.
1164. Id.
1165. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 516. In a special concurrence, Justice Vande Walle
noted that the lack of rules governing appeals confused the issues in this case. Id. at 517
(Vande Walle, J., concurring). The special concurrence stated that if the methods for appeal
outlined in the statutes were outdated, the statutes should be repealed. Id. Section 15-21-
07 had not been amended since 1961, and section 15-22-17 had not been amended since
1913. Id. at 516. Thus, the rules appear to need updating. Id. Justice Meschke concurred
also, emphasizing the Investment Rarities decision. Van Inwagen, 440 N.W.2d at 518
(Meschke, J., concurring). Justice Meschke noted the majority's decision in Van Inwagen
does not preclude testing the validity of an action by the North Dakota Superintendent of
Public Instruction by seeking a special proceeding or other appropriate remedy. Id.
1166. 436 N.W.2d 262 (N.D. 1989).
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their petition for writ of mandamus requiring the school district to
issue teaching contracts to them based upon the previous year's
terms. 118 7 Coles' contract for 1988-89 did not include the boys'
basketball head coaching position or the athletic director posi-
tion."11 8 The contract also reduced Coles' base teaching salary by
one-seventh. 1 69 Kuznia's contract did not include her previous
volleyball coaching position. 1 170 The teachers petitioned for a writ
of mandamus alleging breach of contract and violation of their
rights under sections 15-47-27 and 15-47-38 of the North Dakota
Century Code. 1 17 1 On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the
district court erred in concluding that the school district could
reduce their contracts without a nonrenewal hearing, that the
reductions were not severe, and that the contracts could be
reduced without mutual agreement.1 7 2
The supreme court first noted that the denial of a writ is not
overturned unless the trial court abused its discretion. 117 3 Past
decisions have construed the relevant statutes to require that the
teacher receive a good faith offer of employment but not the right
to an identical contract. 1 74 The addition or removal of new duties
is permitted without following the statutory provisions provided
for nonrenewal of a teacher's contract. 1 75 However, when the
adjustment of duties results in a severe reduction in salary for cur-
ricular activities, the nonrenewal procedures must be followed." 176
The supreme court concluded that the athletic director posi-
tion was not distinguishable from Coles' other curricular duties,
and his pay reduction was severe.1 77 Thus, the nonrenewal pro-
1167. Coles v. Glenburn Pub. School Dist. No. 26, 436 N.W.2d 262, 262 (N.D. 1989).
Coles was employed for the 1988-89 school year as a teacher, boys' basketball head coach
(paying an additional $1908.52), and athletic director (an additional $636.17). Id. Kuznia
was employed in 1987-88 as a teacher, fifth and sixth grade girls' basketball coach, and
volleyball coach ($795.22). Id. at 263.
1168. Coles, 436 N.W.2d at 263.
1169. Id.
1170. Id.
1171. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE 1 15-47-27 (1981 and Supp. 1989Xproviding that
teachers be notified in writing not later than May first if their contracts are not to be
renewed for the ensuing year, and if not notified, their contracts are renewed under the
previous year's terms and conditions) and § 15-47-38(5X1981 and Supp. 1989Xproviding
that teachers must be notified of nonrenewal by April 15, given reasons for nonrenewal and
informed of a special school board meeting to discuss and act on the nonrenewal).
1172. Coles, 436 N.W.2d at 263.
1173. Id. (citing Bradley v. Beach Pub. School Dist. No. 3, 427 N.W.2d 352 (N.D.
1988)).
1174. Coles, 436 N.W.2d at 264 (discussing Engstad v. N. Cent. of Barnes Pub. School
Dist. No. 65, 268 N.W.2d 126, 134 (N.D. 1978)).
1175. Coles, 436 N.W.2d at 264 (discussing Quarles v. McKenzie Pub. School Dist. No.
34, 325 N.W.2d 662, 667 (N.D. 1982)).
1176. Coles, 436 N.W.2d at 264.
1177. Id.
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cedures were required.' 178 The coaching positions of both Coles
and Kuznia were extracurricular and the district reassignment of
those positions without following nonrenewal procedures was
reasonable. 1179
The teachers contended that any changes to a contract must
be made by mutual agreement between the teacher and the
administration according to their negotiated master contract. 8 0
However, the supreme court agreed with the district court that
this language refers to changes in a current contract, not to offers
for new contracts." 8'
The order appealed from was affirmed with regard to the
coaching positions." 8 2 The order was reversed regarding Coles'
athletic director position. 1 s3 Because it was too late for effectual




In State v. Dahl,"s8 Dahl appealed from a conviction of pos-
session of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture or
deliver."' Marijuana was discovered during the search of Dahl's
premises resulting from a search warrant to recover stolen
goods." 87 The search warrant had been obtained due to the
admission of an informant who was allegedly involved in a bur-
glary." s However, during the hearing to issue the search war-
rant, the magistrate was not told that the informant was currently
incarcerated or that he had been told he would not be prosecuted
with regard to the information he gave." 9 Dahl's pre-trial
1178. Id.
1179. Id. It has been held that coaching is not teaching, and thus not subject to
nonrenewal provisions. Id. at 264, n.2. The court declined to address the issue. Id.
1180. Id. at 265.
1181. Coles, 436 N.W.2d at 265.
1182. Id.
1183. Id.
1184. Id. (citing Selland v. Fargo Pub. School Dist. No. 1, 285 N.W.2d 567, 575 (N.D.
1979)).
1185. 440 N.W.2d 716 (N.D. 1989).
1186. State v. Dahl, 440 N.W.2d 716, 717 (N.D. 1989).
1187. Dahl, 440 N.W.2d at 717. The theft for which the search warrant applied
involved the burglary of a custom-made couch, as well as other items from a farmstead used
as a hunting lodge. Id.
1188. Id. The informant was given immunity from prosecution regarding the
information he gave about the robbery, including the whereabouts of several stolen articles.
Id.
1189. Dahl, 440 N.W.2d at 717. The sheriff did testify on direct examination and when
answering questions to the court as to the informant's reliability. Id.
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motion for suppression of the evidence obtained in the search was
denied. 1 90 Dahi was convicted by the district court and appealed
to the North Dakota Supreme Court.1 91 The primary issue on
appeal was whether the search warrant was sufficiently reliable so
as to show probable cause.' 192 The supreme court stated that the
totality-of-the-circumstances test was the proper review for prob-
able cause. 1193 The court also stated that the reliability of an
informant is pertinent to the determination of probable cause,
especially when the informant is a member of the "criminal
milieu."1194 In furtherance of those statements, the court indi-
cated it would have been preferable that the sheriff had informed
the magistrate of the circumstances; however, testimony given by
the sheriff at the hearing with regard to the informant's reliability
was sufficient to show probable cause.1115 Therefore, the supreme
court affirmed the conviction of the district court."6
STATE V. HANDTMANN
In State v. Handtmann,11 7 Mark Handtmann and Sheila
Fuhrman appealed their convictions for drug-related offenses after
the district court denied their motions to suppress evidence seized
1190. Id. Dahl asserted that the information provided by the informant was
insufficient to show probable cause and, as such, the warrant should not have been granted
and the evidence obtained should be suppressed. Id. at 717-18.
1191. Id. at 717.
1192. Id. at 718. Dahl claims that the sheriff's failure to advise the magistrate of the
informant's incarceration and promised immunity was an intentional omission equivalent to
a false statement. Id. Dahl also contended that because the informant was a criminal, the
veracity requirements of Aguilar-Spinelli should be strictly applied. Id. However, the
supreme court dismissed the Aguilar-Spinelli argument by indicating that the "totality-of-
the-circumstances test" had been adopted and the veracity test of Aguilar-Spinelli no
longer governed. Id.
1193. Id. The totality-of-the-circumstances test was adopted in State v. Ringquist, 433
N.W.2d 207, 211 (N.D. 1988). North Dakota's standard is now the same standard required
by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution as set forth in Illinois v. Gates:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense
decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before
him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of knowledge' of persons supplying
hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place. And the duty of a reviewing court is
simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for... conclud[ing]
that probable cause existed.
462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983).
1194. Dahl, 440 N.W.2d at 718 (quoting W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3 at
611 (2nd ed. 1987)). The reliability of a criminal informant must be established as opposed
to the presumption given to "upstanding citizens." Dahl, 440 N.W.2d at 718.
1195. Dahl, 440 N.W.2d 719-20. At the hearing the sheriff testified as to several
reasons why he felt the informant was reliable, including several facts that "'only someone
who was present at the time of the burglary could determine."' Id. at 719.
1196. Id. at 720. The court ruled that in light of the testimony of the sheriff regarding
the detailed accuracy of the informant, the informant was sufficiently reliable and the
warrant was issued with probable cause. Id.
1197. 437 N.W.2d 830 (N.D. 1989).
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from their home during a search conducted pursuant to a search
warrant. 11
9 8
The application for the search warrant was based upon testi-
mony by the deputy chief of police, Detective Bullinger.", Bul-
linger testified that Handtmann was " 'suspected of trafficking in
narcotics.' "12 Bullinger inaccurately reported that Handtmann
had an automatic rifle when Handtmann had actually reported the
gun had been stolen.120' The detective also inaccurately reported
that Handtmann had been seen at a known narcotic-dealing resi-
dence and was storing chemicals at his mother's home. 2 0 2 Search
warrants were issued and the police found drug paraphernalia,
marijuana, and over $14,000 in cash at Handtmann's home.12 0 3
Handtmann and another defendant, Sheila Fuhrman, moved
to suppress the evidence contending that there was no probable
cause for the search and that officials had given false evidence in
support of the warrant.1 204 The district court denied the motion
to suppress the evidence concluding that there was sufficient evi-
dence to establish probable cause, even excluding the detective's
false statements 20 Further, even if probable cause did not exist,
the police did not act in bad faith and inevitably the evidence
would have been discovered.' 2° 6
On appeal, the defendants contended that insufficient evi-
dence was presented to establish probable cause.' 20 7 In assessing
the sufficiency of the evidence for establishing probable cause, the
North Dakota Supreme Court has adopted the totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances test. 208 In Handtmann, there was not a substantial
1198. State v. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d 830, 831 (N.D. 1989).
1199. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 831. An anonymous female informant said she had
seen marijuana at the Begleys' house on two occasions, she knew the location of the house
and provided a description of their cars, someone with a blue car was currently leaving
marijuana at the home, and the person would be making other deliveries. Bullinger located
the house and cars. The blue car was registered to Jeff Stockert. Bullinger eventually
followed Stockert to Handtmann's home. Id.
1200. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 832.
1201. Id.
1202. Id.
1203. Id. at 833.
1204. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 833.
1205. Id.
1206. Id.
1207. Id. at 833-34. The claim was based on an alleged violation of the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, § 8 of the North
Dakota Constitution. Id. The defendants alleged that the anonymous informant's veracity
or basis of knowledge was not established, that none of the informant's information directly
implicated them, and that Bullinger's false statements were made intentionally or with
reckless disregard for the truth. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 834.
1208. Id. at 834 (citing State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 211XN.D. 1988)). Probable
cause exists if certain objects probably connected with criminal activity are in a certain
place. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 212. The Ringquist decision followed the federal standard
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basis for believing that criminal evidence would probably be
found at the defendant's house because the informant did not
implicate the defendants. 1 ' North Dakota cases have consist-
ently required more than unsupported conclusions or statements
about reputation to establish probable cause. 12 10 Evidence of rep-
utation in conjunction with other evidence may support finding
probable cause. 121' In this case, the false information and conclu-
sions about Handtmann may have created suspicion, but suspicion
does not amount to probable cause.'12 2 There was no substantial
basis for issuing the search warrant, and thus, the evidence was
illegally obtained. 21 3
The court declined to apply the inevitable discovery rule
because a search warrant cannot be validated by information not
revealed to the magistrate or by information subsequently dis-
covered.12 14  Application of the doctrine in this case would
encourage law enforcement shortcuts and incomplete police
investigation. 12 15
The convictions were reversed and the case remanded. 2 16
STATE V. HANSEN
In State v. Hansen,217 the North Dakota Supreme Court held
that in accidents involving death or serious bodily injury, a motor-
ist must be placed under arrest before obtaining a sample of
blood. 21 8
adopted in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). Under the totality-of-the-
circumstances test, "bare-bones" conclusions continue to be insufficient for establishing
probable cause. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 213.
1209. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 834-35. The specific information about Handtmann
represented only unsupported conclusions. Id. at 835. See 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 3.2 (2d ed. 1987).
1210. Handtnmann, 437 N.W.2d at 835. See State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D.
1985); State v. Schmeets, 278 N.W.2d 401 (N.D. 1979Xconclusory statements without
additional supporting circumstances are insufficient).
1211. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 835 (citing Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 211; State v.
Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224 (N.D. 1985)).
1212. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 835.
1213. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 836. The State argued that the search could be
validated under the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule, relying on
testimony given at the suppression hearing, and the subsequent seizure of marijuana. Id.
The exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence obtained in a search violating the
Fourth Amendment. Id. The exclusionary rule is extended in the "fruit-of-the-poisonous-
tree" doctrine which prohibits even indirect use of information obtained through illegal
searches or seizures. Id. However, such evidence is not inadmissible if it is shown that it
would have been inevitably discovered without the unlawful search or seizure. Id.
1214. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 838 (citing Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971);
United States v. Griffin, 502 F.2d 959 (6th Cir.) cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1050 (1974)).
1215. Handtmann, 437 N.W.2d at 838.
1216. Id.
1217. 444 N.W.2d 330 (N.D. 1989).
1218. State v. Hansen, 444 N.W.2d 330, 334 (N.D. 1989).
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James E. Hansen was the driver of a motorcycle which col-
lided with an automobile in Morton County.12 1 9 A passenger on
the motorcycle died and Hansen had his right hand severed above
the elbow.1 0 Hansen was taken to the hospital and hospital per-
sonnel took a blood sample from Hansen before he went into the
operating room prior to any arrest.122 After the sample was
taken, the patrolman was permitted to see Hansen. The patrol-
man placed him under arrest for driving while under the influence
of alcohol." -
The trial court suppressed the blood test results, concluding
that section 39-20-01.1 of the North Dakota Century Code
required that before a blood sample may be taken, an individual
must be placed under arrest.'2 The state appealed, contending
that there was no constitutional requirement of arrest."
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that the North
Dakota implied consent statute required, absent consent, an indi-
vidual be arrested prior to obtaining a blood sample."
The court determined that section 39-20-01.1 of the North
Dakota Century Code was ambiguous and looked at legislative his-
tory in determining its intent.'2 The court examined testimony
given at a legislative hearing on the statute and concluded that it
did not dispense with the requirement for arresting an individual
before obtaining a blood sample.12 7 The court noted that there is
a constitutional requirement for arrest prior to obtaining a blood
sample and that an arrest is not too great of a burden when
weighed against constitutional liberties."
The supreme court conclud,.cd chat the legislature could have
specifically stated its intention to require the test without an
arrest. 1229
1219. Hansen, 444 N.W.2d at 330.
1220. Id.
1221. Id.
1222. Id. at 331. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-08-01 (1987Xdriving under the influence
of alcohol).
1223. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01.1 (1987Xif there is probable cause that a
driver is under the influence in an accident resulting in death or serious bodily injury, a
blood, breath, saliva, or urine sample may be obtained).
1224. Hansen, 444 N.W.2d at 331.
1225. Id. See State v. Anderson, 336 N.W.2d 634 (N.D. 1983Xcourt held that absent
consent, arrest is required prior to obtaining a blood sample); N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01
(1987Xindividual must be arrested before a blood sample can be taken).
1226. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 39-20-01.1 (1987Xif there is probable cause to
believe a driver is under the influence he may be compelled to submit to a blood test).
1227. Hansen, 444 N.W.2d at 332. The court also stated that serious constitutional
questions arise if there were not an arrest requirement. Id.
1228. Id. at 333.
1229. Id. The court found, if faced with two possible interpretations of the statute, the
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Therefore, since section 39-20-01.1 of the North Dakota Cen-
tury Code requires an arrest prior to obtaining a blood sample, the
trial court's decision to suppress the results of Hansen's blood test
was affirmed. 12 0
STATE V. RINGQUIST
In State v. Ringquist,1231 the State of North Dakota appealed a
district court order suppressing evidence obtained during a search
of Ringquist's apartment pursuant to a search warrant.1 2  The
county court determined that the following evidence gave prob-
able cause to issue the warrant: police identification of Ringquist's
residence, car and physical characteristics; two confidential infor-
mants who connected Ringquist with selling drugs; and another
anonymous caller furnishing information relating to drug traffic at
Ringquist's apartment. 12 3 Officers seized cocaine and marijuana
from Ringquist's apartment and Ringquist was charged.1" 4 Ring-
quist subsequently moved to suppress the evidence, claiming that
there was not probable cause to issue the search warrant under the
United States and North Dakota Constitutions.12 5 The district
court granted Ringquist's motion, concluding that the evidence
did not provide good cause. 1 36 On appeal, the State argued that
constitutional one which effectuates the legislative purpose will be adopted, even though it
is not as natural as the unconstitutional one. Id.
1230. Id.
1231. 433 N.W.2d 207 (N.D. 1988).
1232. State v. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 207, 208 (N.D. 1988).
1233. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 208-09.
1234. Id. at 209.
1235. Id. at 209-210. The fourteenth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no
warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend IV. Article I, § 8 of the North Dakota Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particu-
larly describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8.
1236. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 210. The North Dakota Supreme Court traced the
history of the U.S. Supreme Court decisions dealing with the establishment of probable
cause for issuing a search warrant. Id. The Supreme Court had held that a search warrant
could not be issued upon purely conclusory statements that probable cause existed.
Nathanson v. United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933). Hearsay could serve as a basis for a search
warrant if there was a substantial reason for crediting the hearsay. Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960). The court refined how to evaluate hearsay with a two-pronged test in
Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). The test required that the magistrate must
know enough of the circumstances to determine that the informant's observations were
accurate ("basis of knowledge" prong) and that the informant was credible or his
information reliable ("veracity" prong). Id. The Supreme Court later suggested that
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the warrant was supported by probable cause." 7
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that their analysis
under the fourth amendment was controlled by the Gates totality-
of-the-circumstances test.12 8  The court also adopted the Gates
test for assessing probable cause under article I, section 8 of the
North Dakota Constitution.'3 9 In making this decision, the court
approved "the interrelationship of the standard of proof necessary
to establish probable cause with the flexibility of the totality-of-the-
circumstance test."' 0 The court agreed with the Gates rationale
that probable cause is a "fluid concept" that depends on assessing
probabilities within each fact situation rather than applying a
rigid, technical set of rules.'2' The court also noted that the
guidelines provided by Aguilar-Spinelli should continue to pro-
vide helpful input for an informed decision even though a more
flexible test is desirable. 1 2
The court applied the information available in Ringquist's
case to the probable cause determination using Gates.'2 3 First,
information must be timely so that probable cause to search exists
at the time the warrant is issued.' 2 4  Staleness of information
depends upon the nature of the crime and whether the activity is
deficiencies in either prong could be satisfied by police corroboration. Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The veracity prong could be met by establishing the
informant's inherent credibility; the basis of knowledge prong could be satisfied by
provision of enough detail by the informant. Id.
The Court abandoned the Aguilar-Spinelli test and reaffirmed the totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39 (1983). The Court noted that
veracity and basis of knowledge were each relevant but that courts should view the prongs
as intertwined so that a deficiency in either may be compensated by a stronger showing in
the other. Id.
1237. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 210.
1238. Id. at 212.
1239. Id. The court noted that the state may go beyond the safeguards enumerated in
the Federal Constitution. State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985); State v.
Stockert, 245 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1976). Other jurisdictions and scholars have criticized
Gates. E.g., State v. Jones, 706 P.2d 317 (Alaska 1985); State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498 (1985);
1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.3 (Supp. 1984).
However, the North Dakota Supreme Court decided to join the majority of
jurisdictions adopting Gates as state constitutional law. E.g., People v. Pannebaker, 714
P.2d 904 (Col. 1986); State v. Lang, 672 P.2d 561 (1983); Potts v. State of Maryland, 479
A.2d 1335 (1984).
1240. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 212. See State v. Mondo, 325 N.W.2d 201 (N.D.
1982Xdescribing the lesser standard of proof required for probable cause compared to
conviction at trial).
1241. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 212-13.
1242. Id. at 213 (citing United States v. Sorrels, 714 F.2d 1522, 1528-29 (11th Cir.
1983Xusefulness of the Aguilar test in providing guidelines for determining the existence of
probable cause)).
1243. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 213.
1244. Id. (citing State v. Mondo, 325 N.W.2d at 201). A warrant based on "stale
information" is insufficient because the conduct may not be continuing. E.g., United States
v. Weinrich, 586 F.2d 481 (5th Cir. 1978) cert. denied, 441 U.S. 927 (1979). Staleness must
be decided on the facts of each case. United States v. Hyde, 574 F.2d 856 (5th Cir. 1978).
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isolated or continuing.1 45 Continuous activity is inherent in drug
activity. 12 6 In Ringquist's case, although the information per-
tained to activities occurring from one to four months before the
warrant was issued, the magistrate could properly rely on it to the
extent that it established a connection with drug trafficking. 12 47 In
this case, the anonymous informant provided information with suf-
ficient detail. Further, the police independently investigated and
confirmed that Ringquist's cable television had recently been dis-
connected, indicating that he might leave town. 2 48 Although
each piece of information by itself may not establish probable
cause, probable cause is the "'sum" of the information synthesized
by trained police oicers.1249
Viewing the evidence under the totality-of-the-circumstances,
the magistrate had a substantial basis to determine that probable
cause existed.1250 Thus, the district court erred in suppressing the
evidence and the case was remanded./2!
1245. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d 213-214 (quoting Bastida v. Henderson, 487 F.2d 860,
864 (5th Cir. 1973Xproviding a rule for determining staleness depending on whether the
activity is continuous or not)).
1246. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 214 (citing United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335
(11th Cir. 1984) cert. denied 472 U.S. 1017 (1985)).
1247. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 214.
1248. Id. Cf State v. Thompson, 369 N.W.2d 363 (N.D. 1985Xpolice officer's affidavit
did not provide a substantial basis for supporting probable cause because the anonymous tip
did not disclose any specific facts).
1249. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 215 (quoting United States v. Edwards, 577 F.2d 883,
895 (5th Cir. 1978Xen banc) cert. denied, 439 U.S. 968 (1978)).
1250. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 216.
1251. Id. Justice Vande Walle concurred. He agreed that the warrant was issued with
probable cause under Aguilar-Spinelli. However, even if not necessary, it was time to
determine whether to adopt Gates. He concluded that the application of Gates will not
significantly dilute the rights of North Dakota citizens. He interpreted Gates as confirming
a "'common sense interpretation"' of the evidence. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 216-217
(Vande Walle, J., concurring). Whether probable cause exists depends on the facts of each
case. State v. Berger, 285 N.W.2d 533, 536 (N.D. 1979).
Justice Levine argued that the state should provide greater protection for its citizens
under the state constitution than under the federal constitution. She noted that the history
of the state constitution's adoption revealed an intent to broaden the basic rights of North
Dakota citizens. See Boughey, An Introduction to North Dakota Constitutional Law:
Contents and Methods of Interpretation, 63 N.D.L. REv. 157, 255-59 (1987). Further, as a
matter of public policy, Justice Levine believed that the state should offer more protection
because of the dilution of the Aguilar-Spinelli standards. The Aguilar-Spinelli probable
cause test is worth preserving because it provides clearly expressed and reviewable
guidelines as opposed to the "standardless standards" and "guideless guidelines" of the
Gates test. The Gates decision was in response to a misapplication of the Aguilar-Spinelli
test, a situation which was not occurring in North Dakota. Law enforcement officers in
North Dakota had educated themselves to comply with Aguilar-Spinelli. Now they are
given only an "amorphous standard." In Ringquist, the Aguilar-Spinelli test was met; the
basis-of-knowledge prong was met because it was based on firsthand observation and the
veracity prong was met because the information was corroborated by police investigation.
Hence, Justice Levine concurred in the reversal but dissented from the adoption of Gates as
a matter of state constitutional law. Ringquist, 433 N.W.2d at 217-220 (Levine, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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SEXUAL ASSAULT
OSLAND V. OSLAND
In Osland v. Osland 1 2 both parties appealed the judgment
of the trial court in a sexual abuse case.12 3 The issues appealed by
the defendant (John Osland) were whether the assault and battery
action brought by his daughter should be barred by the statute of
limitations and whether his daughter failed to establish that she
was sexually abused. 1 ' 4 The issue brought on cross-appeal by the
plaintiff (Rebecca Osland) was whether the determination of dam-
ages was inadequate.1 5 From 1973 to 1978, Rebecca Osland was
allegedly sexually abused by her father. 1 " In February of 1985,
Rebecca commenced this action against her father for assault and
battery.12 7 Her father claimed that this action should be barred
by the two-year statute of limitations. 1 5 The trial court did not
allow the defense and awarded the plaintiff $12,000.119
The North Dakota Supreme Court first looked at the issue of
whether the action was barred by the statute of limitation.126°
The assault and battery took place when Rebecca was a minor
between the ages of ten and fifteen.1 1 Generally, the statute
begins to run at the time of the wrongful act that gave rise to the
action.12 6 2 However, when a person entitled to bring an action is
under eighteen, the cause of action does not accrue during the
period of minority.1 m Under section 28-01-25 of the North
Dakota Century Code, Rebecca's claim did not accrue until she
was nineteen. 1 4 However, Rebecca did not bring this action
until she was twenty-two, three years after her nineteenth
birthday.1265
Rebecca claimed that because of severe emotional trauma she
1252. 442 N.W.2d 907 (N.D. 1989).
1253. Osland v. Osland, 442 N.W.2d 907, 908 (N.D. 1989).




1258. Id. at 908, 909. In North Dakota the statute of limitations for assault and battery
is two years. N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-18(1) (1974 & Supp. 1989).
1259. Osland, 442 N.W.2d at 908, 909.
1260. Id. at 908-09.
1261. Id. at 908.
1262. Id. (citing Fox v. Higgins, 149 N.W.2d 369 (N.D. 1967)).
1263. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1974 & Supp. 1989Xlists certain disabilities
that extend the statute of limitations).
1264. Osland, 442 N.W.2d at 908. North Dakota Century Code section 28-01-25 states
that the statute of limitations cannot "be extended in any case longer than one year after
the disability ceases." N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-25 (1974 & Supp. 1989).
1265. Osland, 442 N.W.2d at 908.
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did not fully discover she had a claim, thus the discovery rule
should be applied.' 2 m The discovery rule "tolls the statute of limi-
tations until the plaintiff knows, or with reasonable diligence
should know, that a potential claim exists."'' 1 7 Because this was a
question of fact, the court refused to find that the trial court's
determination was "clearly erroneous."'l 2 Because Rebecca was
not able to understand or discover her cause of action, the discov-
ery rule should apply. Regarding the issue of proving sexual abuse,
the supreme court held the trial court's finding of sexual abuse was
not clearly erroneous.2 9
On the issue of punitive damages, the supreme court summa-
rily decided that the trial court had not "abused its discretion and
thereby effected an injustice" by not awarding punitive dam-
ages.1 270 As to the issue of damages for emotional distress, the
court stated that this was also a question of fact.' 2 7 1 This would not
be set aside unless it was "clearly erroneous" or so "inadequate as
to be without support in the evidence."' 2 72 Therefore, the court
concluded that the trial court had not made a mistake, and the
amount of damages would not be set aside.' 273
TAXATION
PETERSON V. HEITKAMP
In Peterson v. Heitkamp,12 7 4 the issue was whether oil pro-
duced during the twelve month period required to qualify for an
oil tax exemption was subject to an oil extraction tax. 1275 To qual-
ify for an exemption, land must be stripper well property, and
meet certain requirements twelve months preceding the
exemption. 276
1266. Id.
1267. Id. at 909 (citing Wall v. Lewis, 393 N.W.2d 758 (N.D. 1986)).
1268. Osland, 442 N.W.2d at 909. N.D.R. Civ. P. 52(a) (1989Xa finding of fact will not
be set aside by an appellate court unless clearly erroneous).
1269. Osland, 442 N.W.2d at 909.
1270. Id.
1271. Id. (citing Amerada Hess Corp. v. Furlong Oil & Minerals Co., 348 N.W.2d 913
(N.D. 1984)).
1272. Id. at 909-10.
1273. Id. at 910 (citing F-M Potatoes, Inc. v. Suda, 259 N.W.2d 481 (N.D. 1977);
Radspinner v. Charles Worth, 369 N.W.2d 109 (N.D. 1985)).
1274. 442 N.W.2d 219 (N.D. 1989).
1275. Peterson v. Heitkamp, 442 N.W.2d 219, 219 (N.D. 1989).
1276. Peterson, 442 N.W.2d at 220. Section 57-51.1-02 of the North Dakota Century
Code provides for an oil extraction tax and section 57-51.1-03(2) of the North Dakota
Century Code provides for an exemption from the tax for "stripper well property." See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-51.1-08 (1987Xdeflnition of stripper well property); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 57.1-51.1-02 (1987Xoil extraction tax); N.D. CENT. CODE 1 57-51.1-03 (exemption
for stripper well property).
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The North Dakota State Tax Commissioner assessed an oil
extraction tax against James Peterson and Ashland Oil, including
in it tax on oil produced during the twelve month qualifying
period. 1277 After a series of administrative appeals, the distrit
court affirmed the tax commissioner's decision and Peterson and
Ashland Oil appealed. 2 78
The tax commissioner asserted on appeal that only oil pro-
duced after the twelve month qualification period was exempt
from the tax, whereas Peterson and Ashland Oil contended that oil
produced during the period was also exempt. 2 79
The North Dakota Supreme Court found the legislative intent
to be apparent from the face of the statute, and followed the rule
of liberal interpretation to explain the meaning of the statute." 8
The court noted that both parties found the statue unambigu-
ous, and agreed with the tax commissioner's assertion that the
meaning of "preceding" in the statute was "occur prior to" the
property becoming a stripper well.1281
Peterson and Ashland Oil argued that the twelve month quali-
fication period was not a prerequisite, but simply an identification
of a stripper well property.) 28 The supreme court stated that to
interpret the statute in the method Peterson and Ashland Oil sug-.
gested would, in effect, create a refund during the qualifying
period.' 83 The court found that the legislature did not intend the
exemption to include the twelve month qualifying period and
affirmed the judgment.' s 84
TRADE REGULATION
FARGO WOMEN'S HEALTH V. FM WOMEN'S HELP
In Fargo Women's Health v. FM Women's Help,l" an anti-
abortion clinic was found liable for damages to an abortion clinic
for violating a false advertising statute.'28 Fargo Women's
1277. Peterson, 442 N.W.2d at 220.
1278. Id.
1279. Id. The supreme court noted that one claiming the tax exemption has the
burden of proving it, and the statute will be strictly construed against the claimant. Id. at
221 (citing Minot Farmers Elevator v. Conrad, 386 N.W.2d 463, 466 (N.D. 1989)).
1280. Peterson, 442 N.W.2d at 221.
1281. Id.
1282. Id.
1283. Id. at 221-22.
1284. Id. at 222.
1285. 444 N.W.2d 683 (N.D. 1989).
1286. Fargo Women's Health v. FM Women's Help, 444 N.W.2d 683,683 (N.D. 1989).
See N.D. CENT. CODE Chapter 51-12 (1987Xfalse advertising is a class B misdemeanor).
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Health Organization operated an abortion clinic. 1 2 8' The FM
Women's Help and Caring Connection provided pregnancy tests
and anti-abortion counseling.m In Fargo Women's Health Org.
v. Larson,"'s9 the North Dakota Supreme Court found that the
owners and directors of FM Women's Help and Caring Connec-
tion were in contempt of court for violating an injunction prohibit-
ing false advertising.'129 The advertising consisted of using a
similar name as the abortion clinic, thereby misleading people
through their advertising into believing that the group provided
abortions, and then counseling persons seeking abortions to not
have them. 2 "' The issue before the North Dakota Supreme Court
was whether the abortion clinic could recover damages from the
anti-abortion counseling clinic for the violation of the false adver-
tising statute. 129 2
The trial court had determined that there had been a decline
in the abortion clinic's business and that they had to counteract
the Help Clinic's advertising. 12 93 The jury assessed proximately
caused damages in the amount of $23,500 and punitive damages of
$5,500. 1294
The Help Clinic appealed, asserting that Chapter 51-12 of the
North Dakota Century Code only allows criminal penalties and
injunctions, and did not allow damage claims. 295
The supreme court noted that there may be both a criminal
prosecution and a civil tort action for the same act. 29 6 The court
found that Chapter 51-12 of the North Dakota Century Code was
a consumer protection statute and should be construed liberally to
protect the consumers. 129 7
The court found strong public policy reasons for the statute
and concluded that one injured by a violation of the statute may
1287. Fargo Women's Health, 444 N.W.2d at 683. The underlying facts and assertions
are the same to those in Fargo Women's Health Organization v. Larson. Id. See Fargo
Women's Health Org. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d 176 (N.D. 1986), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108
(1986XNorth Dakota Supreme Court affirmed a district court order finding the anti-abortion
clinic in contempt).
1288. Fargo Women's Health, 444 N.W.2d at 683.
1289. 381 N.W.2d at 176 (N.D. 1986).
1290. Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Larson, 381 N.W.2d at 176, 183 (N.D. 1986), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1108 (1986).
1291. Fargo Women's Health, 444 N.W.2d at 684.
1292. Id. at 683.
1293. Id. at 684.
1294. Id.
1295. Fargo Women's Health, 444 N.W.2d at 684.
1296. Id.
1297. Id. at 685 (citing State ex rel. Spaeth v. Eddy Furniture Co., 386 N.W.2d 901,903
(N.D. 1986)).
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bring an action for damages incurred by false advertising.1298 The
court noted that the two elements needed for a cause of action,
wrongful conduct and damages, were present. 299 Additionally,
the court found that there was no necessity for a tort to have a
name and that there was not error in allowing the punitive
damages. '300
The judgment was affirmed.' 30 '
TRUSTS
BLACK V. PETERSON
In Black v. Peterson,3 °2 H.N. Peterson, the legal guardian of
Franklin C. Black, was held to have violated a confidential rela-
tionship he had with Black when he acquired ownership in farm-
land that Black's grandmother had originally given Black.130 3
Black lived with his grandmother, Ellen Magnuson, until he
was nine years old, after which time Black lived with H.N. Peter-
son, who became his legal guardian until he was seventeen years
old.13 0 4 Without Black's knowledge, Magnuson conveyed farm-
land to Black in 1971, reserving a life estate.130 5 To obtain a loan
from Magnuson, Blac]c assigned the interest back to her at Peter-
son's insistence. 30 6 In October of 1980, Magnuson executed a will
leaving the land to Peterson. Magnuson died in 1981.1307
The trial court found that the land conveyed for $25,000 was
actually worth $298,605.1308 The trial court determined that
Peterson and Magnuson had failed to act in good faith and had
violated Black's trust in them which had been created by a confi-
dential relationship. 30 9 Consequently, the trial court concluded
1298. Fargo Women's Health, 444 N.W.2d at 685.
1299. Id. The jury found wrongful conduct by the anti-abortion clinic and awarded
damages to the abortion clinic. Id.
1300. Fargo Women's Health, 444 N.W.2d at 686.
1301. Id. Justice VandeWalle concurred, explicitly stating that he did not believe that
every act of the legislature resulted in a private cause of action. Id. at 687. The
concurrence stated that if the plaintiff was entitled to damages, it would be under wrongful
interference with business or occupation. Id. The concurrence believed that the jury
should have been instructed that the action was for wrongful interference of business as a
result of the false advertising. Id. at 688. However, the concurrence found that the
distinction would not alter the result and therefore concurred. Id.
1302. 442 N.W.2d 426 (N.D. 1989).
1303. Black v. Peterson, 442 N.W.2d 426, 427 (N.D. 1989).
1304. Black, 442 N.W.2d at 427.
1305. Id.
1306. Id. Black testified that generally he did not read any documents Peterson asked
him to sign. Id.
1307. Black, 442 N.W.2d at 427.
1308. Id. at 428.
1309. Black, 442 N.W.2d at 429.
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that the land was held in an implied trust by both Magnuson and
Peterson for the benefit of Black.13 10 The trial court held that
Black was the owner of the farmland and directed Peterson to
deliver an accounting of his trusteeship of the land. 31 1 Peterson
appealed. 1312
On appeal, Peterson argued that the trial court's determina-
tion that he held a confidential relation with Black was clearly
erroneous.313 1 The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that it
would not overturn the trial court's findings unless the supreme
court felt a definite mistake was made. 13 14 The court determined
there was a confidential relationship because Magnuson was
Black's grandmother and Peterson was Black's legal guardian, not-
ing that family relationships are likely to create confidential
relationships. 3 1 5
The court found that when there was a violation of a confiden-
tial relationship or of a fiduciary duty, as in this case, a constructive
trust may be imposed. 3 16
Peterson also contended that the trial court's conclusion that
Peterson and Magnuson collaborated to obtain Black's interest in
the farmland was clearly erroneous.13 17 The evidence disclosed
the following: 1) Peterson told Magnuson not to convey the land
to Black, and Peterson did not tell Black he owned the land; 2)
Peterson insisted that Black sign the papers that conveyed the
land back to Magnuson; 3) Peterson told Black to sign the papers
to convey and not to ask questions; and 4) Magnuson changed her
will, leaving the land to Peterson soon after Black conveyed the
land back to Magnuson. x' 1 Based on these findings, the supreme
court held that the trial court's finding of collusion was not clearly




1313. Black, 442 N.W.2d at 429.
1314. Id. (citing In re Estate of Elmer, 210 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 1973)).
1315. Black, 442 N.W.2d at 429. Black trusted both of them, and relied on their
advice. Id. at 428.
1316. Black, 442 N.W.2d at 429. A trustee is required to have the highest of good faith
and is not to profit from dealing with the property in trust. Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 59-01-09 and 59-01-10 (1987)).
1317. Black, 442 N.W.2d at 429.
1318. Id.
1319. Id. at 430.
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THOMPSON V. BUFORD 7)'.
In Thompson v. Buford Township,13 20 a county judge, who
was trustee of patent property, failed to consider the proper stat-
utes in distributing the property and should have disqualified him-
self as judge since he had a conflict of interest.'13 2  In 1906, a
patent was issued to a Williams County judge to hold in trust for
the benefit of occupants of the townsite of Buford, which was in
Williams County.13 2 By virtue of his office of judge of the county
court of Williams County, Gordon C. Thompson is the successor
trustee. 13 3
Thompson filed a complaint against Buford Township to dis-
tribute the remaining property held in trust and oil and gas lease
proceeds from the property.13 24 At a hearing on the complaint
both Buford Township and Williams County appeared.13 2
Thompson presided over the hearing and awarded all the
mineral rights, bonuses, and one-half the royalty interest to Wil-
liams County.13 2 6  The other half of the royalty interest was
awarded to Buford Township by Thompson, who gave great
importance to the benefits received by Buford Township from
Williams County.
3 27
Buford Township appealed to the North Dakota Supreme
Court, arguing that the evidence did not support the trial court's
decision and that the evidence indicated that the "spirit of the
trust" would best be served by granting the trust property to
Buford Township.13 28
The court examined the statutory enactments by Congress
and corresponding state legislature enactments concerning the
terms and execution of trusts.13 2 9 The court looked at section 3042
of Article 21 of Chapter 32, Cities and Villages of the 1905 Revised
1320. 445 N.W.2d 303 (N.D. 1989).
1321. Thompson v. Buford Tp., 445 N.W.2d 303, 306 (N.D. 1989).
1322. Thompson, 445 N.W.2d at 303. This patent was granted pursuant to statutes
later codified as 43 U.S.C. § 711 et. seq. Id.
1323. Id.
1324. Id. This amounted to approximately $14,471. Id. at n.1.
1325. Id. at 304. Buford Township contended that it was entitled to the trust money
because it would fulfill the spirit of the trust. Id.
1326. Id.
1327. Thompson, 445 N.W.2d at 304. The court cited the greater overhead of the
county government. Id.
1328. Id. The township also argued that the judge should have disqualified himself
since he was trustee. Id.
1329. Id. at 305. Chapter 135, enacted by the territory of Dakota in 1881, became a
source of Article 21 of Chapter 32, City and Villages, of the 1905 revised code of North
Dakota. Thompson, 445 N.W.2d at 305. See 43 U.S.C. § 718 (left defining the terms and
execution of trusts to state legislature).
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Code of North Dakota. 133 0  This provided that the proceeds
derived were to be placed in a general fund of the city, town, or
village.' 33' The court deemed the statute a trust instrument, and
noted that in construing a trust instrument, the objective is to
determine the intent of the trustor.1332
The court determined that the intent of the legislature in
enacting the statute was to benefit the local community. 333 The
court concluded that since there was no townsite to which the pro-
ceeds could be disbursed, the next most local unit of government
should be the beneficiary in order to effectuate the intent of the
trust.133rhe court found that the trial court did not give due con-
sideration to the intent of the legislature as provided in Article 21
of Chapter 31 of the 1905 code. 3 35 The supreme court stated that
on remand the trial court must determine which local unit of gov-
ernment could best carry out the intent of the trust for the local
area. 336 Since Thompson was a party in the proceedings, to avoid
even an appearance of impropriety, the supreme court also con-
cluded that the case be assigned to a different county judge.13 37
The supreme court reversed the judgment and remanded for fur-
ther consideration.1 338
UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS
LEE V. JOB SERVICE OF NORTH DAKOTA
In Lee v. Job Service of N.D. 1339 a full-time college student
challenged a statute that disqualified full-time college students
from receiving unemployment benefits. 1340 Pursuant to section
52-06-02(6) of the North Dakota Century Code, the North Dakota
Job Service denied Kent Lee unemployment benefits, and a dis-
trict court affirmed this decision.1341 Lee appealed, alleging that
1330. Id.
1331. Id.
1332. Thompson, 445 N.W.2d at 305.
1333. Id.
1334. Id. at 306.
1335. Id.
1336. Id.
1337. Thompson, 445 N.W.2d at 306-07. See N.D.R. JUD. CONDuCr 3(cX1) (judge
disqualification).
1338. Thompson, 445 N.W.2d at 304.
1339. 440 N.W.2d 518 (N.D. 1989).
1340. Lee v. Job S"vice of N.D., 440 N.W.2d 518, 518 (N.D. 1989). See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 52-06-02(6) (1987Xdisqualifies individuals from unemployment benefits if they are
full-time students). The 1989 legislature amended section 52-06-02(6) of the North Dakota
Century Code to provide that unemployment benefits will be available to full-time
employees who are also full-time college students. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 518, n.1.
1341. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 518.
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the statute violated his constitutional guarantees of equal protec-
tion and due process.'. 4
The supreme court noted that it looks to three standards of
review when considering an "equal protection" challenge to a
statute: 1) strict scrutiny in cases involving "inherently suspect"
classes and fundamental rights; 2) intermediate standard of review
in cases involving an "important substantive right"; and 3) rational
basis scrutiny in cases of economic and social matters.1343 The
North Dakota Supreme Court determined that unemployment
benefits were not a substantive right, but "a matter of legislative
grace." 13 44 The court followed a United States Supreme Court
case which held that unemployment benefits were within the
social and economic areas and concluded it was appropriate to util-
ize the rational basis standard in reviewing the validity of the
North Dakota unemployment benefits statute.13 45
The North Dakota Supreme Court noted that with the
rational basis standard of review, a statute would be upheld unless
it had no rational relationship to a legitimate government inter-
est."' 6 A few inequities do not deny equal protection. 3 47
The North Dakota Supreme Court found that the legislature
could reasonably conclude that college students are not as avail-
able to work as those people who are not full-time students and,
thus, not eligible for unemployment benefits.13 48 The court added
that perhaps a full-time employee who is also a full-time college
student deserves unemployment benefits, but that was for legisla-
tive determination.13 49
Due process analysis is also satisfied by a classification that sat-
isfies an equal protection analysis.13 5 0 The court also determined
that the North Dakota Constitution was not violated.13 5 '
Therefore, using the rational basis standard, the North Dakota
1342. Id. at 519. See N.D. CONST. art. I, 1 21 (privilege and immunity cannot be
granted to certain citizens); N.D, CONST. art. I, § 12 (no person shall be deprived property
without due process); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (privileges and immunities, and equal
protection clauses); U.S. CONST. amend V (due process clause).
1343. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 519 (citing Hanson v. Williams County, 389 N.W.2d 319
(N.D. 1986)).
1344. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 519.
1345. Id. (citing Idaho Dept. of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 101 (1977)).
1346. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 519 (citing Hanson, 389 N.W.2d at 319).
1347. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 520 (citing Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory,
431 U.S. 471, 491 (1977)).
1348. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 520 (citing Shreve v. Dep't of Economic Security, 283
N.W.2d 506, 609 (Minn. 1979)).
1349. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 520.
1350. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 520 (citing Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975)).
1351. Lee, 440 N.W.2d at 520.
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Supreme Court held that a state statute that disqualifies full-time
college students from receiving unemployment benefits does not
violate state and federal constitutional guarantees of equal protec-
tion and due process.1352 The judgment was affirmed. 35 3
VALUATION
KBM, INC. v. MAcKiCHAN
In KBM, Inc. v. MacKichan l13 4 one issue was whether the
trial court used the proper accounting method to determine the
value of stock.13 5 The second issue was whether the plaintiff
shareholder was entitled to interest on the value of stock beyond
the time the plaintiff rejected the defendant's offer. 13 5
Alan MacKichan was an employee and stockholder of KBM,
Inc., a closely held engineering and architectural firm in Grand
Forks.135 7  MacKichan tendered his resignation, and it was
accepted by the board of directors on February 28, 1983. a58 A
stockholders' agreement required the stockholder, upon resigna-
tion, to first offer all of his or her stock to the corporation for "book
value as of the end of the corporate fiscal year preceding the date
of resignation."' l3 5 9 The corporation had sixty days to respond. 136 0
The agreement also required the stockholder to offer remaining
shares to other KBM stockholders for the same price and allow
sixty days for response.1361
Unsold shares were then subject to an additional sixty-day
period during which the corporation and the stockholder could
negotiate an agreement "mutually satisfactory to all parties.' ' 3 2
If an agreement was still not reached, the corporation was to be
liquidated with distribution of assets to stockholders. 136 3 KBM and
MacKichan agreed that the date for value determination was Feb-
ruary 28, 1982, giving the stock a value of $100.28 per share.13 64
MacKichan abided by the stockholders' agreement by offering
his shares to the corporation and to individual shareholders before
1352. Id.
1353. Id.
1354. 438 N.W.2d 181 (N.D. 1989).
1355. KBM, Inc. v. MacKichan, 438 N.W.2d 181, 183 (N.D. 1989).
1356. KBM, Inc., 438 N.W.2d at 184.
1357. Id. at 182.
1358. Id.
1359. Id.




1364. KBM, Inc., 438 N.W.2d at 182.
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entering the 60-day negotiation period with the corporation.' 1
During this 60-day negotiation period, on August 17, 1983, KBM
accepted MacKichan's offer made on February 28, 1983; however,
MacKichan refused to sell for that price.13 6  KBM then brought
suit against MacKichan, requesting the court to order the sale of
the stock at the February 28, 1983, price of $100.28.'M7 MacK-
ichan counterclaimed seeking liquidation of the corporation
assets. 1368
The trial court denied MacKichan's liquidation request and
ordered MacKichan to sell his stock to KBM for $100.28 per
share.' 369 On appeal, the Ncrib Dakota Supreme Court held that
the trial court erred in requiring MacKichan to accept the "agreed
upon book value" because it may result in unfair compensa-
tion.1370 The case was remanded to formulate the proper damage
remedy in "an amount the greater of: (1) the agreed-upon
purchase price under the stockholders' agreement, which in this
case is the book value of $100.28; or (2) the fair value of MacK-
ichan's shares of KBM as of the effective date of MacKichan's resig-
nation. . . ,,1371 The trial court determined that the proper
approach to determine value was a net asset method, and because
the net asset method resulted in an amount less than the agreed
upon book value, the book value of $100.28 was set.1372 The court
ordered KBM to pay thirteen percent interest only from February
25, 1983, to August 17, 1983, opining that MacKichan could have
taken his money on August 17, 1983, and avoided the cost of litiga-
tion.13 7 3 MacKichan appealed, claiming the court erred in deter-
mination of fair value and by not awarding interest beyond August17, 1983. 1374
The North Dakota Supreme Court held that the trial court did
not err in the determination of value; however, the supreme court
concluded that the lower court did err in not allowing interest
1365. Id. The corporation declined to purchase MacKichan's stock during the 60-day
period. Id. The shareholders also refused to purchase. Id.
1366. Id.
1367. Id.
1368. KBM, Inc., 438 N.W.2d at 182.
1369. Id.
1370. Id. at 182.
1371. Id. at 183. On remand, both parties presented testimony about the fair value of
the stock, as prepared by certified public accountants, using the chase flow method, the
retained earnings method, and the net asset method of accounting. Id.
1372. KBM, Inc., 438 N.W.2d at 183. The trial court ordered KBM to pay $120.28 per





beyond August 17, 1983.137 5 In determining that the trial court
had used the proper method for determining fair value, the
supreme court indicated that "[d]eterminations of the value of
property are questions of fact subject to the 'clearly erroneous'
standard of Rule 52(a), N.D.R. Civ. p."'1376 The trial court heard
various methods for fair value determination and did not strictly
adhere to any of the expert opinions and thus, there was no clearly
erroneous finding.1377
On the issue of interest the supreme court deferred to section
32-03-04 of the North Dakota Century Code which indicates that a
person is entitled to interest on damages except when prevented
by law or act of the creditor. 1378 MacKichan could rightfully reject
KBM's belated offer to purchase, and the rejection cannot be con-
strued as an "act which prevented KBM from paying the debt
within the meaning of the statute."'1 37 Therefore, MacKichan was
entitled to interest beyond August 17, 1983, and thus, the trial
court decision was affirmed in part and reversed in part.1380
VENDOR-PURCHASER
ANDERSON V. ANDERSON
In Anderson v. Anderson,381 plaintiffs appealed a judgment
quieting defendants' title to one-fourth of 280 acres of farm-
land.1382 Plaintiffs have record title to three-fourths of the 280
acres and claim the remaining one-quarter through adverse pos-
session and through a deed from the original owner, Julia, to their
grandfather dated February 7, 1934 and recorded December 14,
1983.111 The defendants, Julia's heirs, claimed the quarter
through a quit claim deed from Julia dated October 1, 1951, and
recorded October 11, 1951.13 84 The trial court rejected the
adverse possession claim because Julia and her heirs had never
1375. Id. at 184-85.
1376. Id. at 183 (citing Hesch v. Hesch, 308 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 1981); Amoco Oil Co. v.
State Highway Dep't, 262 N.W.2d 726 (N.D. 1978)). See N.D.R. CIV. P. 52(aXfinding of fact
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous).
1377. KBM, Inc., 438 N.W.2d at 184.
1378. Id. at 184-85. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-04 (1987Xany person is entitled to
interest on damages unless prevented by law or act of creditor).
1379. KBM, Inc., 438 N.W.2d at 185.
1380. Id.
1381. 435 N.W.2d 687 (N.D. 1989).
1382. Anderson v. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d 687, 687-88 (N.D. 1989).
1383. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d at 688. Plaintiffs and their predecessors in interest have
farmed the land since 1936. Id. They paid property taxes and satisfied the original
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been ousted of their rights as cotenants.' 385 Further, it concluded
that the recorded 1951 deed had priority over the unrecorded
1934 deed because the defendants' were purchasers in good faith
for valuable consideration."m
On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that the defendants were
not good faith purchasers for valuable consideration.'" 7 Defend-
ants rely on their 1951 deed as presumptive evidence of considera-
tion and note that the burden of proving lack of consideration falls
on the party seeking to invalidate the deed.'-'
To qualify for protection under a recording act the purchase
must generally be for valuable and not nominal consideration. 3 9
The rationale for this requirement is to protect purchasers "who
honestly believe they are acquiring good title" and who invest a
substantial amount in that belief.13 90
A written deed is not always presumptive evidence of valid
consideration especially when, as in this case, the grantor has
already executed a valid deed to the same estate.139 1 Recital of
nominal consideration is insufficient to establish a presumption of
value.139 2  Further, the good faith purchaser has the burden of
proving that valuable consideration was given using evidence
other than the deed. 393 There was no evidence of any actual con-
sideration in this case. 394
The court concluded that the recited consideration was normi-
1385. Id.
1386. Id. Section 47-19-41 of the North Dakota Century Code provides in relevant
part:
Every conveyance of real estate not recorded shall be void as against any
subsequent purchaser in good faith, and for a valuable consideration, of the same
real estate, or any part or portion thereof, whose conveyance, . . . first is
deposited with the proper officer for record and subsequently recorded, whether
entitled to record or not .... prior to the recording of such conveyance.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-1941 (1978 and Supp. 1989).
1387. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d at 688.
1388. Id. Defendants rely on section 9-05-10 of the North Dakota Century Code,
providing that "a written instrument is presumptive evidence of a consideration" and
section 9-05-11 which states that "[t]he burden of showing a want of consideration sufficient
to support an instrument lies with the party seeking to invalidate or avoid it." N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 9-05-10, 9-05-11 (1987 & Supp. 1989).
1389. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d at 689 (citing 6A Powell on Real Property § 905[2]
(1988)). See cases cited in United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 85 F. Supp. 986, 1006
n.17 (S.D. Cal. 1949).
1390. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d at 689 (quoting from Harton v. Kyburz, 53 Cal. 2d 59, -'
346 P.2d 399, 403 (1959)).
1391. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d at 689 (citing Certain Parcels of Land, 85 F. Supp. at
1001, quoting President and Presiding Elder of Southern Cal. Conference on Seventh Day
Adventist v. Goodwin, 119 Cal.App. 37, 39, 5 P.2d 973, 974 (1931)).
1392. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d at 689. E.g., Certain Parcels of Land, 85 F. Supp. at 1001.
1393. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d at 689 (citing 8 Thompson on Real Property § 4316
(1963)).
1394. Anderson, 435 N.W.2d at 690.
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nal, and thus, defendants were not good faith purchasers; judg-
ment was reversed and remanded for entry of judgment quieting
title in the plaintiff.13 95
WORKER'S COMPENSATION
CHOUKALOS V. NORTH DAKOTA WORKERS$ COMPENSATION
BuREAu
In Choukalos v. N.D. Worker's Compensation Bureau,'3
Richard Choukalos appealed an affirmation by the district court of
the North Dakota Workers' Compensation Bureau's denial of his
claim for benefits. 139 7 Choukalos became mentally impaired fol-
lowing termination from employment by the North Dakota Insur-
ance Department.1398 The issue on appeal was whether mental
injury resulting from employment termination is compensable
under the workers' compensation statutes. 13 9
.The North Dakota Supreme Court reasoned that workers'
compensation statutes were enacted to protect workers from the
hazards of employment.1400 Absent a clear legislative statement,
the statute can not be construed as offering protection from the
hazards of termination.'14 0  An employee can pursue remedies
other than workers' compensation for injury resulting from termi-
nation. The decision of the district court was affirmed.14 0 2
HAYDEN v. N.D. WORKERS COMp. BUREAU
In Hayden v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau,4 0 3 the Workers
Compensation Bureau was held to have the authority to deter-
mine a violation of the false claims act and a worker was found to
1395. Id. Justice VandeWalle concurred, noting that the plaintiffs should prevail on
the basis of their claim of adverse possession. Id. (VandeWalle, J., concurring).
1396. 427 N.W.2d 344 (N.D. 1988).
1397. Choukalos v. N.D. Workers' Compensation Bureau, 427 N.W.2d 344, 345 (N.D.
1988).
1398. Choukalos, 427 N.W.2d at 345. The Bureau did not dispute that termination
caused an "acute onset or flare-up of his underlying psychiatric condition." Id.
1399. ld.
1400. Id. at 346. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-01-02(7) (1985) and § 65-01-02(8XSupp.
1989Xdefining a compensable injury as "an injury by accident arising out of and in the
course of employment"). "Arising out of" language is "'construed to refer to causal
origin'" and "'course of employment'" language refers to "'time, place, and
circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment"' (quoting 1 A. LARSON,
LARSON'S WORKMENS' COMPENSATION LAw § 6.10; at p. 303 (1985)). Choukalos, 427
N.W.2d at 346.
1401. Choukalos, 427 N.W.2d at 346. See Smith and Sanders, Inc., v. Peery, 473 So. 2d
423 (Miss. 1985); Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 144 Cal.
App. 3d 72, 192 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1983).
1402. Choukalos, 427 N.W.2d at 346.
1403. 447 N.W.2d 489 (N.D. 1989).
1990] .881
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEW
have violated the false claims statute by accepting benefits while
working. 14
4
While employed by a drilling corporation, Douglas R. Hayden
was injured in a work related accident. 140 5 The Workers Compen-
sation Bureau determied that Hayden was temporarily perma-
nently disabled and awarded Hayden benefits. 14°6 The Bureau
discontinued the benefits after it found out that Hayden was
employed on a full time basis driving a beet truck and received
$600 in total disability benefits during that period. 140 7 Hayden
requested a hearing and after the hearing the Bureau issued an
order denying any more disability benefits and ordered Hayden to
pay the amount of benefits received during the period he was
working. 1408 Hayden appealed the order to the District Court for
McKenzie County which affirmed the Bureau's decision. 1409 Hay-
den appealed the district court decision to the North Dakota
Supreme Court. 1410
The supreme court first considered whether or not it had the
jurisdiction to hear Hayden's appeal.14 1 ' Hayden initially filed his
appeal in Williams County and the Bureau filed a motion to dis-
miss because section 65-10-01 of the North Dakota Century Code
provides that appeals must be filed in "the district court of the
county wherein the injury was inflicted or of the county in which
the claimant resides.' 1 412 Since Hayden resided in Montana, the
proper place to file an appeal from the Bureau's decision was
McKenzie County, the place of the injury.1 4 13 The district court of
Williams County allowed Hayden to change the venue of the
appeal. 1414 The supreme court did not agree with the Bureau's
contention that the district court could not transfer the case,
determining that the supreme court could allow such a transfer if
it deemed it proper.141 5
1404. Hayden v. N.D. Workers Comp. Bureau, 447 N.W.2d 489, 495-96 (N.D. 1989).
1405. Hayden, 447 N.W.2d at 490. Hayden was a motorman on a drilling rig and his
injury occurred while working on a rig in McKenzie County. Id.
1406. Id.
1407. Id. at 490-91.
1408. Id. at 491.
1409. Id.
1410. Id. The supreme court determined whether or not a "reasoning mind could
reasonably have determined that the factual conclusions were supported by the weight of
the evidence." Id. (citing Power Fuels, Inc. v. Elkin, 283 N.W.2d 214 (N.D. 1979)).
1411. Hayden, 447 N.W.2d at 492.
1412. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-10-01 (1987Xclaimant may appeal to the district
court either where injury was inflicted or county of residence).
1413. Hayden, 447 N.W.2d at 492.
1414. Id.
1415. Id. at 493. The Bureai, -' ntended that section 27-02-05.1 of the North Dakota
Century Code only authorized the power to naasfer venue with the supreme court. Id.
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The supreme court next considered whether or not the
Bureau had the authority to find Hayden in violation of the false
claims statute. 1416 The statute makes a violation a misdemeanor
and provides for administrative sanctions.1 41 7 The supreme court
found that the Bureau had the authority to enforce regulations for
administering the provisions of Workers Compensation laws. 141 8
Thirdly, the supreme court determined whether or not Hay-
den "returned to work" as defined in the false claim statute. 41 9
Hayden asserted that he did not return to work because it was
temporary work and that he suffered pain while working.1 420 The
court examined legislative history and concluded that the intent
was to impose a penalty for anyone who "accepts disability bene-
fits for a period during which that person is actually working."' 4 2 1
The supreme court concluded that Hayden was actually working
during the period for which he accepted the disability benefits. 14 1
Finally, the court decided whether Hayden met his burden of
proving his continued disability.' 42 Although there was conflict-
ing evidence, the supreme court concluded that the Bureau's find-
ing that Hayden was not disabled was supported by the
preponderance of the evidence.142 The court found that the
Bureau properly addressed the conflicting evidence. 42
The judgment denying benefits and ordering Hayden to reim-
burse the Bureau was affirmed. 14 2
The supreme court noted that section 28-04-07 of the North Dakota Century Code
provided that the trial court may change the place of trial. Id. at 494. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 27-02-05.1 (Supp. 1989Xadministrative supervision by the supreme court); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 24-04-07 (1974Xchange of venue).
1416. Hayden, 447 N.W.2d at 494. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 65-05-33 (1987Xa claimant
filing false claim, false statements or accepts disability benefits after the claimant has
returned to work shall reimburse the Bureau and is guilty of a misdemeanor).
1417. Hayden, 447 N.W.2d at 494.
1418. Id. at 495.
1419. Id. Hayden had completed his GED and an Emergency Medical Technician
course. Id. Hayden drove a beet truck and was employed as a surveyor and a bartender.
Id. Hayden did not report any of this employment to the Bureau. Id. See N.D. CENT.
CODE § 65-05-33, supra note 1416.
1420. Hayden, 447 N.W.2d at 495. Hayden introduced the "odd lot" doctrine which
the court declined to accept. Id. Under the "odd lot" doctrine, disability may be found if a
worker is so limited in his capacity for work that he could not be employed on a regular
basis. Id.




1425. Id. at 498. The court determined that even if the state had accepted the "odd
lot" doctrine, Hayden wouldn't qualify because he did not prove an obvious physical
impairment. Id.
1426. Hayden, 447 N.W.2d at 498. Justice Meschke concurred noting that the court
preferred disposing of cases on their merits and that the court fairly applied the rule when
determining jurisdiction. Id. Justice Vandewalle also concurred in the last three parts of
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
WALD v. CITY OF GRAFTON
In Wald v. City of Grafton 1427 the sole issue was whether a
claim under the worker's compensation statute bars claim for loss
of consortium.1428 In October of 1985, Cynthia Wald's husband
was seriously injured while on the job.14 29 He subsequently filed
for and received worker's compensation benefits.1430  Cynthia
then sued her husband's employer (the City of Grafton) for loss of
consortium.1431 The trial court granted summary judgment for
the city because of the exclusive-remedy provision of the workers
compensation statute. 1432
The supreme court looked to North Dakota Century Code
sections 65-01-01 and 65-05-06 and found that they barred
Cynthia Wald's action for loss of consortium. 1433 Cynthia Wald
contended that she, herself, did not receive benefits, hence she
should not be precluded from suing.14 34 The supreme court dis-
agreed and followed the precedence of other states that did not
allow loss of consortium claims that had similar exclusive-remedy
statutes.1435 The court also refused to follow the "Massachusetts
rule" that allows recovery for loss of consortium. 1436 The court
noted that the Massachusetts statute was much more narrowly
drawn, and thus was much different from North Dakota's broad
workers compensation statute. 143
7
In Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337, etc.,14as the North
Dakota Supreme Court had decided that "a right of consortium is
property under Section 5-01-06, N.D.C.C."'1 439 Wald reasoned
the opinion and would have concurred in the first if jurisdiction was a matter of equity. Id.
Justice VandeWalle concurred because the result was the same whether or not the court
had jurisdiction. Id. at 499-500. Justice Levine dissented, stating that the majority
"improperly blended two very different concepts: jurisdiction and venue." Id. at 500
(Levine, J., dissenting).
1427. 442 N.W.2d 910 (N.D. 1989).
1428. Wald v. City of Grafton, 442 N.W.2d 910, 911 (N.D. 1989).
1429. Wald, 442 N.W.2d at 910.
1430. Id.
1431. Id. at 910-11.
1432. Id. at 911.
1433. Id. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 65-01-01 (1985 & Supp. 1989Xprovides worker's
compensation benefits for the "exclusion of every other remedy"); 65-05-06 (1985 & Supp.
1989Xexclusion of other relief upon receipt of worker's compensation benefits).
1434. Wald, 442 N.W.2d at 911.
1435. Id. The court looked to the treatise by Professor Larson that discussed the
exclusive remedy provisions of worker compensation acts. Id. See 2A LARSON WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAw § 65.11 (1988).
1436. Wald, 442 N.W.2d at 911-12.
1437. Id. at 912.
1438. 246 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1976).
1439. Wald, 442 N.W.2d at 912 (citing Hastings v. James River Aerie No. 2337, Etc.
246 N.W.2d 747 (N.D. 1976)).
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that since the court held consortium was property, her claim was
for property and not personal injuries, thus not barred by the
worker's compensation statute.1 440 The court distinguished Has-
tings on the grounds that it was a dramshop case and the "statute
involved employed words that had certain meaning at common
law."'1 44 1 The law of consortium involves more than property
rights between a husband and wife.1 442 For this reason loss of con-
sortium could not be "neatly categorized as a 'property' right."'1 443
The court then stated that any changes in the Workers Compensa-
tion Act is for the legislature. 1 444 Therefore, the decision of the
trial court was affirmed. 144 5





1445. Id. Justice Levine stressed in her concurring opinion that the limits placed on
injured workers under the worker's compensation law similarly limit the injured worker's
spouse. Id. at 913 (Levine, J., specially concurring). Levine also stated that because
marriage is an "economic partnership," an injured person's worker's compensation benefits
inure to the benefit of the person's spouse. Id.
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